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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

IRAQ

CHAPTER I

BRIEF

A General Summary of the
National Intelligence Survey
on Iraq

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington, D. C.

CHAPTER I

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This Chapter was prepared for the NIS under the general direction of the NIS Committee in accordance with allocations of responsibility in the NIS Standard Instructions. Section coordinators are noted at the top of each page.

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MASTER INDEX

CHAPTERS II - IX

The *Master Index* is a guide to the complete NIS on Iraq. The alphabetized topics below refer to Section tables of contents where individual page listings appear for the indicated topic or for some more general topic related to it. Most of the citations below point to detailed coverage, rather than passing mention. The *NIS Standard Instructions* show the formal NIS topical outline for basic intelligence and can be used as an additional reference and general guide to NIS 30 coverage.

The "Comments on principal sources" that follow most Section texts are not listed in the index. In general these comments contain an evaluation of data and a list of those principal sources not produced by the contributing agency.

CHAPTER II (Military Geography) covers Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel because the five countries were treated as one geographic area, NIS 28-31; and items indexed for SECTIONS 20-22 and 24-26 refer to this combined publication. A maintenance addition of SECTION 23 (Weather and Climate) covers Iraq alone. SECTION 21 covers oceanography. SECTION 26 covers analysis of military regions and is equivalent to SECTION 21, "Military Geographic Regions," under the revised NIS outline.

The following elements are omitted from NIS 30 for the reasons stated:

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Coasts and Landing Beaches	SUPPLEMENT II	Subject adequately covered in SECTION 22 (Coasts and Landing Beaches)
Merchant Marine	SECTION 36	Subject of insufficient importance in the area
Naval Forces	SECTION 82	Subject inapplicable in the area
Ports and Naval Facilities	SUPPLEMENT I	Subject adequately covered in SECTION 35 (Ports and Naval Facilities)
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Telecommunications	SUPPLEMENT III	Subject adequately covered in SECTION 38 (Telecommunications)
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* Map indexes indicating coverage and/or evaluation of mapping data, maps, and charts are discussed in Sections 90-92.

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10. Introduction

CHAPTER I of the National Intelligence Survey on Iraq (NIS 30) is a selective summary of the full-length survey. This summary is designed to present a clear, concise view of the area and to contain sufficient detail within itself to serve as an initial basis for strategic planning. The facts selected for inclusion in the summary are those considered most essential for this purpose. The CHAPTER I is, however, an integral part of the complete NIS 30. CHAPTER I alone is not expected to support planning in depth nor to provide the user with all the details he may require for any special purpose. Additional details may be located by consulting the Master Index, which correlates CHAPTER I with other elements of NIS 30.

General introductions, comments on sources, and a summary map are significant features of CHAPTER I. Most Sections are prefaced by a general introduction evaluating the area from a topical point of view and relating the topic under consideration to other topics. Generally, the last Subsection is entitled "Comments on principal sources." This Subsection also points out significant gaps in information and indicates the general credence to be accorded the subject matter. Sections 10, 11, and 19, because of their inherent nature, do not include Subsections, "Comments on principal sources." A comprehensive map presentation at the end of the Chapter condenses intelligence from the general map coverage of NIS 30.

NIS 30 is part of a world-wide program for the collection of information and production and coordination of basic intelligence required by agencies of the Government for strategic and high-level operational planning and estimates and for the formulation of policy. Intelligence requirements of this type were pressing during World War II. The United States, unlike enemies and allies who had spent years in amassing basic intelligence on other countries, entered the war without comprehensive preparation in this field. As a result, a disproportionate amount of time and manpower was diverted, during the period 1941-45, to produce the area studies then urgently needed. Accordingly, on 13 January 1948, the National Security Council charged the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for coordinating the efforts of the Intelligence Agencies of the Govern-

ment in the production of basic intelligence on foreign countries, areas, and broad special subjects.

Pursuant to the National Security Council directive, the Central Intelligence Agency, in collaboration with other intelligence agencies, evolved an outline of the basic intelligence requirements of the Government. This outline, published in the *NIS Standard Instructions*, provides for the coverage of 122 land and four ocean areas of the world by major basic intelligence aspects and subaspects which appear as the Chapters and Sections of the NIS. When appropriate, Chapter discussion is amplified by more detailed treatment in one or more Supplements. Topical responsibility was assigned to each agency according to its mission, dominant interests, and capabilities for specialized appraisal and world-wide collection of information on the topics concerned. Standards of quality for the intelligence to be produced were agreed upon. Uniform systems for base maps, spelling of geographic names, and editorial format were adopted to eliminate confusion and facilitate comparison of data among areas and topics.

A guide for the order in which NIS are to be produced is set forth in priority lists issued periodically by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Every effort is made to conform to these priorities. Intelligence agency capabilities to produce NIS on different areas and subjects, however, vary with the agency and from time to time. To exploit production capabilities to the maximum, therefore, it is necessary to produce simultaneously portions of NIS on a large number of areas and a diversity of subjects without concentrating rigidly on the completion of coverage of any single area or subject. To facilitate this required flexibility, the Section has been adopted as the basic unit of production, publication, and maintenance. The CHAPTER I of an NIS is not produced until after completion of the basic research and development of CHAPTERS II-IX, inclusive.

Collection of information on NIS Area 30 is a continuing process. Sections will be revised and published under the maintenance program when sufficient information becomes available to enable improving their adequacy as follows: 1) presenting fundamentally changed situations in an area, 2) filling gaps in intelligence sufficient to require new evaluations, or 3) incorporating new intelli-

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gence requirements which reflect policy, planning, or high-level operational needs. This revision is accomplished by Section rather than in a fragmentary manner because the integrated treatment of an entire topic in a Section almost invariably requires a comprehensive reworking of the whole Section when fundamental changes occur. Such pertinent new facts as were available at the time this CHAPTER I was prepared were selectively integrated in the Chapter.

The running head at the top of each NIS page carries a date (month and year) and the name of the agency primarily responsible for the Section.

The date is that on which the agency approved the Section for publication in the NIS and is indicative of the latest information available to the agency at that time, including, where feasible, a summary field review of the draft. The fact that this date may be considerably earlier than that on which the material is received by the user does not invalidate the material. The NIS is concerned with the fundamental situation in a country or area and remains generally valid with respect to the fundamental situation until superseded by revision under the NIS maintenance program. The user may keep himself up-to-date by applying current intelligence to that contained in the NIS.

11. Significance of the Area

Rich in oil and unused agricultural resources, Iraq is a sparsely populated Arab state located in the center of the land bridge between Asia and Africa on the historic flood plains and fringing uplands of the Tigris and Euphrates. But for the two rivers, most of the country would be desert. A substantial part of the income from oil is invested in projects to irrigate or reclaim potentially useful land which, under cultivation, could support many more people than Iraq now has. Most of the population subsists on primitive agriculture, which provides the country self-sufficiency in food. A small, largely pro-Western ruling clique governs the country and in 1955 concluded with Turkey an agreement which became the multilateral, anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact. Iraq is the only Arab member of a protective "northern tier" consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. The United States supports the agreement to the extent of membership in most of its working committees.

Iraq is fourth among crude oil producers in the Near East; the most important fields are in the vicinity of Kirkuk in the northeastern part of the country. Petroleum operations have been initiated, developed, and owned by foreign companies, originally mostly British. With the exception of a small area, concessions are owned and operated by the Iraq Petroleum Company (or subsidiaries) jointly owned by British, American, French, and Dutch interests. Relations between the Iraqi Government and the company have been generally amicable, with oil profits shared on a 50-50 basis. In recent years oil payments to Iraq, not including those of oil companies for local services and

material, amounted to about 30% of the estimated gross national product. Oil payments supplied about two-thirds of the total Iraqi foreign exchange and around 60% of total government revenues.

Iraq has allocated 70% of its oil royalties annually since 1950 to the development of resources such as land, water, and manpower. Official Iraqi estimates show that the amount of potentially tillable land is almost three times that now under cultivation. Water is abundant, and in ancient times an elaborate irrigation system served a much larger area than is now used, but was destroyed by the Mongols in the 13th century and never restored. A Development Board plans and schedules projects for flood control, irrigation, agricultural development, land resettlement, rural community projects, and education. The United States participates in some of these programs and provided some 2.3 million dollars of technical assistance during the current year. Other Iraqi funds have gone into local industries and such other projects as a national oil refinery, a textile mill, a cement plant, low-cost housing, roads, and bridges.

The efforts of the Development Board have thus far had little impact upon the economy or the poverty-stricken countryside, especially in the southern part of the country. Agriculture employs about three-fourths of the population to produce one-fourth of the national income. Illiteracy, low health standards, and antique farming methods are prevalent. Under the quasi-feudal land tenure system, debts owed the landlord tend

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to tie the sharecropper to land in which he has no equity. Farm labor is drifting to urban centers, where it adds to chronic underemployment and to politically volatile pools of unskilled labor. Private capital is scarce, and tribal customs resist change. Incentive and training, especially in mechanical and managerial skills, are lacking.

The ruling clique consists mostly of wealthy Iraqi landlords, professional politicians, businessmen, and tribal leaders. Operating through a constitutional monarchy and backed by an army of some 53,000 and a police force half that size, both fairly well trained and equipped in comparison with other Arab forces, the group needs no outside support to maintain itself in power. The majority of the people, especially in tribal and rural areas, have little comprehension of democracy or interest in governmental affairs. Government to them seems in general alien, repugnant, and corrupt, and most of the beneficial projects accomplished by the Development Board relatively remote.

The United Kingdom is still associated with the small circle of conservative rulers, most of whom were trained by the British during the time from the end of World War I to 1932 when the country was administered under British direction through a League of Nations mandate. From 1932 to 1955 a special treaty relationship committed the United Kingdom to defend Iraq and permitted peacetime air installations in the country. This relationship was broadened with the advent of the Baghdad Pact, and the corps of British advisors has steadily decreased.

Rivalry with Egypt for leadership among the Arab states has been sharpened by increased great power participation in the area, with Egypt since 1955 accepting closer relations with the Soviet bloc and Iraq remaining a protagonist of pro-Western posture. Like other Arab states Iraq regards Israel as the principal military threat but has shown more awareness than the others of the dangers of Soviet infiltration. The Iraqi leadership saw a direct threat to the country in Soviet maneuvering in Iran after World War II and in recent Soviet encroachment in Syria, the transit route by which 70% of Iraqi oil reaches European markets. As Iraqi and Egyptian policies diverged, the heightened tensions in the Arab world have largely vitiated the Arab League and its related Arab Collective Security Pact, originally intended

as the basis of a joint military command structure directed against Israel.

Egypt sidestepped the Collective Security Pact and created a series of separate military agreements aimed at isolating Iraq and consolidating Egyptian political and military hegemony. Egypt has great prestige among politically aware Arabs, based on its larger population, military strength, propaganda and cultural influence, and especially its more dramatic assertion of Arab nationalism. Nevertheless, other Arab governments, especially Saudi Arabia, alarmed by recent Egyptian tactics, have cultivated closer relations with Iraq, thus reducing its isolation and improving its leadership position.*

Alienation from the Arab world and loss to Egypt of relative prestige within the area has seemed a high price to pay for Western protection and economic aid and is resented by the small group of Iraqi intellectuals and educated middle class. The Iraqi Government has thus far controlled local nationalist opinion and emerged from the Suez crisis with internal stability unimpaired. The course that appeals to most Arabs in the great power rivalry is to remain uncommitted in order to play the powers against each other for maximum advantage. Nevertheless, to the Iraqi leadership generally, the location of their country and its wealth in oil make involvement in any major war seem likely. Faced with encouraging economic prospects of the country that depend on maintenance of present western European oil markets and preservation of the present Iraqi social and political system, pro-Western policies seem to them the safer course.

* During the first week of February 1958, Egypt and Syria joined in a "United Arab Republic." About ten days later Iraq and Jordan countered by forming an "Arab federation." Within this federation internal affairs and administration are to remain separate. Iraq and Jordan each retains sovereignty within its area and maintains its existing regime. The King of Iraq becomes head of the federation. Unification of Iraqi and Jordanian laws, army, educational systems, and foreign policies is specifically anticipated in the agreement. The economic provisions of the agreement are reminiscent of those in the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, in that a customs union is to be formed, economic policies merged, and a common currency established. International commitments already in effect in either country are not to be affected by the federation.

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Tab 1

ARMY	FEMA	NSA
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DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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12. Military Geography

A. Geographic situation

Iraq is located on the land bridge between Africa and Asia (see FIGURE 29). The extensive oilfields and the main pumping station in Iraq for the important pipeline system to the Mediterranean coast are within a short distance of the U.S.S.R. From the southern border of the Soviet Union across the mountains and basins of Iran to the major producing petroleum fields of Iraq, the distance is only 240 statute miles by the shortest road and only 125 nautical miles by air. From Iraq, other strategic parts of the Near East are relatively close. All the petroleum fields along the Persian Gulf are within 450 statute miles by land and only 300 nautical miles by air of the southern border of the country, and the Suez Canal is about 535 statute miles by road and slightly less than 400 nautical miles by air from the western boundary of Iraq.

1. Boundaries

The land boundaries of Iraq total about 2,260 miles and are defined and currently undisputed; however, only the Syrian, Turkish, and part of the Iranian boundaries are demarcated. The country has a coastline of only 36 miles, and no official claims have been made for territorial waters. Iraq has no system of permanent fortifications along the land boundaries, nor does it have any coastal defenses.

The northern and most of the eastern boundaries of Iraq traverse very rugged terrain. The total length of the Iraqi-Iranian boundary is 900 miles, most of which is in mountains; only about 55 miles is on the east bank of the Shatt al Arab and about 135 miles is on a flat, marshy plain. The 235-mile boundary with Turkey is along high mountains and through deep, narrow valleys and gorges.

All of the western and southern boundaries of Iraq traverse terrain which would impose few barriers to military movement. In the west, the 370-mile boundary with Syria is across level to rolling desert and steppe plains, and the 85-mile boundary with Jordan is across a nearly level desert plain containing scattered areas of lava. In the south, the 427-mile boundary with Saudi Arabia is across a desert plain which has a stony or sandy surface broken by numerous wadies and low limestone ridges. East of this stretch, the 118-mile boundary with the Neutral Zone, which is

jointly administered by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, is across a level to rolling desert plain broken by a few small wadies. The 123-mile boundary with Kuwait is in a steep-sided wadi for about 85 miles and then extends eastward across a sandy or stony desert plain to the Persian Gulf. The wadi trends north-south and is a potential avenue of approach.

2. Terrain

Iraq is an irregularly shaped country with an area of approximately 170,000 square miles or about two-thirds the area of Texas (see FIGURE 29). Most significant of the environmental elements of Iraq are its vast plains, which comprise about nine-tenths of the country. These plains have a variety of surface conditions. In the north, the plains are nearly level to rolling and contain small, scattered areas of low bushes and grasses. In the south and southwest, they are mostly barren deserts. In the southeast, numerous lakes and marshes cover much of the nearly flat surface. The plains slope gently downward from the northwest to the Persian Gulf and are broken only by the Jabal Sinjār (see FIGURE 1, Profile B) which has a maximum elevation of 4,781 feet. Between the Iraqi-Jordanian boundary and the hills and mountains in the northeast, the plains slope gently downward to the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (see FIGURE 1, Profile A).

The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers flow between high, steep banks in northern and western Iraq and are contained locally by natural and man-made levees in southeastern Iraq. High water levels occur from early March through May, and large areas that are not protected by levees are flooded south of Baghdad. The numerous intermittent wadies of western and southern Iraq are in the Euphrates drainage system. Several large eastern tributaries flow into the Tigris River from the hills and mountains, but it has only a few western tributaries.

Hills and mountains, which comprise about one-tenth of the country, are located in the north and northeast near the Turkish and Iranian borders. Some peaks exceed 10,000 feet above sea level in the mountains near the Iranian border, whereas the maximum elevations in the hills are about 3,000 feet. The hills and mountains consist of parallel ridges, generally trending northwest-

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southeast, that are separated by narrow valleys. Vegetation consists of grasses in the valleys, bushes and widely scattered trees above 6,000 feet. Several perennial streams flow through the valleys in the hills and mountains. Floods often occur during the winter and spring rains (early October or November through May). Seasonal high water peaks, caused by snowmelt, usually occur in May.

Numerous small villages with narrow, winding streets and closely spaced low buildings usually constructed of burnt or mud brick are scattered along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and along the larger streams in the hills and mountains. Cities are few and usually have village characteristics, but some, especially Baghdad, Basra, and Kirkuk, have areas of new multistoried buildings of concrete and a few wide, modern streets. All of the larger towns are connected by roads, although many villages are connected only by tracks or trails. The principal cities of Iraq are connected by standard-gage (4'8 1/2") or narrow-gage (3'3 3/8") railroads which parallel the Tigris or Euphrates Rivers or cross the plains of northeastern Iraq.

3. Climate

Iraq has great daily and seasonal ranges in temperature and receives most of its relatively scanty precipitation during the cooler months of the year. Summers (early June through September) are hot, and winters (early December through February) generally are mild except in the mountains. The hottest months, July and August, have afternoon temperatures usually between 100° and 112° F.; a maximum temperature of 123° F. has been recorded. In the north, the diurnal range is about 35° F. In the south, daytime temperatures are lower than in the north; and the nighttime temperatures are usually higher. Humidity may be high for several days at a time in the southern part of the country.

Winter temperatures are usually above freezing except in the mountains; however, freezing temperatures may occur anywhere, except in the extreme south. In January, the coldest month, afternoon temperatures are in the 50's and 60's and night temperatures between 34° and 44° F. However, at times during the winter, afternoon temperatures have been in the 80's and night temperatures as low as 0° F. in the northern part of the country, 19° F. in the central part, and 24° F. in the southern part. Frosts may occur at any time from early November through February.

In general, the mean annual precipitation increases from south to north. It is less than 10 inches in the south, about 19 inches on the plains and hills, and between 35 and 45 inches in the mountains. Essentially all the precipitation and the maximum cloudiness is associated with cyclonic

storms that move inland from the Mediterranean from early October or November through May. Showers occur up to 11 days a month during this period, but rarely does precipitation occur several days in succession. Snow falls in the mountains and may lie on the ground at high elevations for a considerable length of time during the period from early November through March; elsewhere snowfall is rare. From early June through September skies generally are clear 20 to 30 days a month.

Duststorms may occur at any time during the year but are most frequent in the summer months, particularly in southern Iraq. Duststorms which reduce visibility to less than 1,000 yards may occur on seven or eight days a month in southern Iraq, especially in June and July, but are less frequent in northern and western Iraq. Sometimes the duststorms in Iraq are very severe, and visibility is reduced to 20 yards or less.

4. Approaches

Within 1,000 nautical miles of the Iraqi border, air approaches from the north and east are, in general, over high and rugged mountains. Approaches to Iraq by air from the west and south are generally across desert plains; however, mountains over 10,000 feet high are within 150 nautical miles of the Iraqi boundary on the west. In winter, turbulence and icing would make flying hazardous over the mountains. The principal hazard to flying over the desert areas is poor ground visibility during duststorms, which are most common in the summer months.

The air approach from the north is over the Black Sea or Caucasus Mountains in the U.S.S.R. and the mountains in Turkey and Iran. The Crimean Mountains on the north shore of the Black Sea, which are about 560 nautical miles from the Iraqi boundary, have elevations slightly over 5,000 feet above sea level; and the Caucasus Mountains, approximately 400 nautical miles from the boundary, have maximum elevations of about 18,500 feet. The mountains of eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran extend about 300 nautical miles beyond the Iraqi boundary and have maximum elevations generally between 13,000 and 17,000 feet above sea level. The best flying conditions are from early April through September when cloud cover is at a minimum and visibility is best; however, heavy turbulence may be encountered over the mountainous area at any time of the year.

Air approaches from the east are over desert plains and a rugged belt of mountains in Iran. Peaks near the Iraqi boundary are approximately 15,000 feet high and one peak less than 400 nautical miles from the boundary is almost 19,000 feet. The mountains in eastern Iran, which are about

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DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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800 nautical miles from the Iraqi boundary, have peaks more than 13,000 feet high. The best flying conditions are from early April through September when clear days are common.

Air approaches to Iraq from the south are mostly over a dry, barren desert, although there are some hills and mountains in northeastern Africa and parts of the Arabian Peninsula. The mountains in Yemen, in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula, have a maximum elevation of slightly less than 12,400 feet about 1,000 nautical miles from the Iraqi boundary. The mountains in Oman, on the eastern side of the peninsula, have a maximum elevation of about 9,900 feet 650 nautical miles from the Iraqi boundary. The mountains along the coast of the Red Sea have numerous peaks between 7,000 and 9,000 feet high. In general, weather conditions are favorable for flying throughout the year, although, over the desert, dust storms cause poor visibility at times during the summer months.

Air approaches from the west are over the eastern Mediterranean Sea and the steppe and desert plains of the Near East; however, mountains are encountered in western Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Crete. The mountains in western Turkey have elevations slightly more than 10,000 feet within 500 nautical miles of the Iraqi boundary, and the mountains near the Mediterranean coast in Lebanon and Syria have similar elevations within 150 miles of the boundary. On Crete, mountains reach slightly more than 8,000 feet about 750 nautical miles from the Iraqi boundary; and, on Cyprus, they are slightly more than 6,400 feet within 400 miles of the boundary. The most favorable flying weather on this approach is from early May through September when clear days are common.

The only sea approach to Iraq, through the Persian Gulf, is restricted by the 25-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz which separates the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. North of the Strait of Hormuz, depths are generally deeper along the Iranian coast than along the Arabian coast. Water depths gradually decrease northward to between 20 and 30 fathoms at the head of the Persian Gulf. Weather conditions in the Persian Gulf are generally favorable for sea approaches throughout the year; gales are infrequent, and tides and currents are negligible. From late May through August, dust may reduce visibility. The low coastline is bordered by tidal mud flats and is backed by marshes. The 5-fathom line lies from 15 to 50 nautical miles offshore and dredging is needed to maintain a navigation channel into the Shatt al Arab for ocean shipping.

The principal land approaches to Iraq from the east traverse rugged mountains which would compartment ground operations (FIGURE 29). Elsewhere, most of the principal land approaches cross vast desert and steppe plains characterized by scanty water supply, high summer temperatures, and sandstorms.

On the western approaches from Syria and Jordan, the surface is mostly favorable for cross-country movement, although the water supply is limited. The most favorable approach from Syria is along the Euphrates River. This route has a two-lane, all-weather road for most of its length. The other two approaches from Syria follow earth tracks across the desert and steppe plains. The approach to Mosul from Turkey and northeastern Syria is on nearly level plains and in low hills; it has a single-track, standard-gage (4'8½") railroad and a dry-weather road. The approach from the Mediterranean Sea through Jordan has a two-lane, all-weather road; but the deployment of troops and vehicles along the route would be restricted in the coastal mountains and in the lava areas in Jordan.

Land approaches to Iraq from the east are across Iran. Most approaches are through rugged mountains where steep slopes would channelize movement and deployment off the roads would be impossible in most places. Snow may block these routes for several days from early December through February. The best of these approaches extends west from Kermanshah. This approach has an all-weather two-lane road and is across broad basins and through moderately steep passes. Although the northernmost approach, through the Rawāndūz gorge, has a poorly surfaced all-weather road and, south of the gorge, the approach through Panjwin pass has an extremely poor road, they are the next best routes across the mountains. In the extreme south, the Shatt al Arab, Tigris River, and extensive marshes and lakes restrict approaches to Basra.

An approach to southern Iraq can be made from landing beaches in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A desert track crosses Kuwait to Basra, Iraq; and conditions are generally favorable for cross-country movement. Problems on this approach would be the lack of water and the prevalence of dust.

B. Military geographic regions

Significant contrasts in terrain and climate are the bases for dividing Iraq into three military geographic regions: Tigris-Euphrates Delta, Northeastern Hills and Mountains, and Steppe and Desert (see FIGURE 1). Within each region the environment is relatively uniform in its effect on military operations; however, from one region to

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DSWA	NRC	USMC

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


FIGURE 1. MILITARY GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS AND TERRAIN PROFILES

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another the effect of environment on almost all aspects of military operations would vary greatly.

Tigris - Euphrates Delta — This extensive plain region, which comprises about 20% of Iraq, includes the delta of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The nearly flat surface slopes gently downward from a maximum elevation of about 250 feet above sea level in the north. Extensive marshes, lakes, areas subject to spring flooding, and irrigation canals are common south of the dam near Al Hindiyah on the Euphrates River and the dam at Al Kūt on the Tigris River; however, these rivers are bordered by marshes and lakes as far north as Baghdad. Maximum flooding usually occurs during May, when melting snow from the mountains in northeastern Iraq as well as in Turkey and Iran causes the rivers to inundate vast areas. Vegetation consists of tall reeds and grasses in the marshes, groves of date palms and trees along the rivers, and cultivated crops. Most of the population is concentrated in numerous small towns and villages along the rivers. Baghdad in the north and Basra in the south, respectively the largest and third largest cities in Iraq, are connected by a fair-weather road along the Tigris River and by a fair-weather road and narrow-gauge rail line along the Euphrates River.

Conditions in the Tigris - Euphrates Delta Region are unfavorable for ground operations. South of Al Hindiyah and Al Kūt vehicles and foot troops would be severely handicapped by numerous marshes, lakes, canals, and irrigated fields; amphibious vehicles would be needed to move off the roads in much of the region. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers would require bridging at all times. Destruction of the two dams probably would cause inundation of extensive areas for a considerable period. The hot, humid climate is enervating and malaria is common in this region. Concealment and cover would be readily available in the date groves and trees near the rivers and in the towns and villages. Elsewhere limited concealment for foot troops is available in cultivated fields in early summer and in the marshes throughout the year.

Airborne operations would be hindered by weather and drainage conditions. Fog and cloudiness in the winter and dust in the summer would be major problems in flying. Airdrop sites would be restricted throughout the year in most of the region to some dry areas which are generally adjacent to the irrigation canals.

There are no practical landing beaches along the 36-mile coastline of Iraq. Mud flats border the entire coast; however, amphibious landings could probably be made within the entrances of the Shatt al Arab and the Khawr az Zubayr.

Military construction would be difficult or infeasible. Conditions in the southern two-thirds of the region are unfavorable for the construction of airfields, roads, and bunker-type installations because of the prevalence of drainage features. The construction of tunnel-type installations would be infeasible throughout the region because of the unstable soils and the lack of suitable slopes.

Northeastern Hills and Mountains — This region, which constitutes about 10% of Iraq, is part of a larger mountainous area which extends over western Iran and southeastern Turkey. In this region the hills and mountains consist of parallel ridges separated by narrow valleys; in general, the ridges are aligned northwest-southeast. Summits range from about 3,000 feet above sea level in the hills to about 9,000 feet in the mountains. Near the Iranian border the mountains are extremely rugged and several peaks exceed 10,000 feet in elevation. The floors of the valleys are between 500 and 2,000 feet below adjacent summits in the hills and between 2,000 and 5,000 feet in the mountains. Vegetation consists of grasses in the valleys, shrubs and widely scattered trees in the hills, open deciduous forests between 2,000 and 6,000 feet above sea level, and widely scattered bushes above the tree line. Most valleys contain perennial streams which provide a source of water, although during the summer months the water decreases in volume and becomes brackish in the western part of the hills. In general, the population is distributed in small villages along the larger streams. Most of these villages are connected by tracks or trails.

In general, ground operations would be severely hindered by rugged terrain which would channel vehicular movement to narrow valleys and passes and make cross-country movement for foot troops difficult. Wet ground and snow would be a problem generally from early November through March. On the forested slopes, concealment is available in the deciduous forests from early June through September, whereas grasses in the valleys would afford only limited concealment for foot troops. Surface irregularities would afford cover throughout the region.

The most favorable conditions for airborne operations in this region occur from early June through September when skies are relatively clear and the ground of the few sites suitable for airdrops in the larger valleys is usually dry. However, even during the summer months, flying would be affected by morning haze and turbulence.

Military construction would be difficult. Conditions for the construction of roads and airfields generally are unfavorable throughout the region because of restricted alignments. The construc-

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Tab 1

Army	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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tion of tunnel-type installations would be limited, especially in the east, by inaccessibility and hard crystalline rock which would be difficult to excavate. The construction of bunker-type installations and hasty fortifications would be limited to the deeper soils in the valleys. Throughout the Northeastern Hills and Mountains Region the possibility of earthquakes is a consideration in construction.

Steppe and Desert — This region covers about 70% of Iraq and is part of a much larger region that extends into adjoining countries. Most of the region is a sparsely settled, nearly level rolling plain generally sloping downward toward the east. Secondary relief features include scattered hills and ridges with crests up to 500 feet above the surface of the plain and abrupt banks of wadies up to 150 feet high. In the north the plain is broken by a small isolated group of hills and mountains, which have a maximum elevation of about 4,700 feet above sea level, and along the Euphrates River by an escarpment 200 to 300 feet high. Vegetation consists of small, scattered areas of low, bushy shrubs and grasses north of the Euphrates River and mostly barren desert to the south. The perennial streams include the Tigris, Euphrates, Great Zab, and Little Zab Rivers; however, only the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers provide large quantities of surface water. The wadies flow after winter rains, but many terminate in salt lakes or the water percolates into the ground. Settlements are generally limited to a few towns and small villages near the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The transportation pattern includes a standard-gage (4'8½") rail line along the Tigris River and several roads.

Terrain conditions, for the most part, would not hamper ground operation, although water supply would be a problem in some parts. Cross-country movement would be relatively easy over the nearly level to rolling plain, except locally where wadies have cut deeply into the surface. The major obstacles to cross-country movement are the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which would require bridging. The sparse vegetation would afford only limited concealment, and cover would be restricted to wadies and low rock ridges.

Clear skies throughout the year would facilitate airborne operations. Nevertheless, during the summer months, visibility may be reduced by haze and dust storms. Numerous sites suitable for air-drops are prevalent in all parts of the region.

Military construction would be hindered by the scarcity of water, lack of timber, and rock suitable for construction. The nearly flat surfaces of the plain afford numerous sites for the construc-

tion of airfields and unrestricted alinement of roads. The construction of tunnel-type and bunker-type installations would be feasible in small areas north of the Euphrates River. Earthquakes which have been infrequent and relatively weak in the past, probably would not affect military construction.

C. Strategic areas

The three strategic areas of Iraq are the Kirkūk-Mosul Area, the Baghdad Area, and the Basra Area (FIGURE 29). These strategic areas contain the oil resources and most of the industry of the country, the largest cities, and the key communications centers.

Kirkūk-Mosul Strategic Area — This area in northern Iraq is the largest oil producing area in the country and contains two of the largest cities in Iraq: Kirkūk and Mosul (FIGURE 2). The Kirkūk oilfield, because of its size and potential production, has considerably greater significance than the smaller fields west of the Tigris River. The pipeline system to the Mediterranean originates at the pumping station near the southern end of the Kirkūk oilfield. A single pipeline, which is not connected to this system, extends from the oilfield north of Mosul to the refinery near Baghdad. Kirkūk and Mosul contain light industries and are centers for transportation and telecommunications. Two airfields, one civil and the other military, with runways exceeding 6,000 feet are within 5 miles of Kirkūk. A civil airfield with runways exceeding 6,000 feet is within 5 miles of Mosul. The militarily significant industrial installations in the strategic area include a small chemical plant and a refinery at Kirkūk, a cement plant and a textile factory at Mosul, and a small refinery near the oilfields south of Mosul.

Baghdad Strategic Area — This area in central Iraq is centered on Baghdad, the capital and largest city (FIGURE 3). In addition to its political importance, Baghdad is a key transportation and communication center; roads, railroads, and telecommunication lines radiate from the city. Two airfields, one civil and the other military, with runways exceeding 7,000 feet, are within 5 miles of the city. Two additional military airfields, which have runways exceeding 6,000 feet, are located west of the strategic area and about 45 miles from Baghdad. The Baghdad Strategic Area contains the principal agricultural area and the most significant concentration of light industry in Iraq. Industries which are of military significance include a small ammunition factory, a refinery, and

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


FIGURE 2. KIRKUK - MOSUL STRATEGIC AREA

railroad repair shops; a small arms factory is located south of the strategic area about 40 miles from Baghdad.

Basra Strategic Area — This area at the head of the Persian Gulf contains two major oilfields as well as Basra, the principal port and third largest city in the country (FIGURE 4). Basra is the focal point for all transportation and communication lines to central and northern Iraq. A civil airfield and a military airfield are located within 10 miles of the city; both have runways over 6,000 feet in length. The only militarily significant industrial installations are a refinery and the repair shops for the port and railroad. The oilfields are connected by pipelines to the secondary oil port of Al Faw.

D. Comments on principal sources

Reliable, detailed information for most military geography topics on Iraq is available [redacted]

[redacted] from recent publications; however, data are still lacking for some topics, especially vegetation and soils. The reliability of available climatic data is limited by the relatively few years of record and the few stations, particularly in the southwestern desert and in the northeastern hills and mountains. [redacted]

[redacted] Information for most topics contained in CHAPTER II is much more complete now than it was in 1949 when CHAPTER II was published. Information on the best maps and aerial photography available for terrain intelligence is contained in SECTION 19.

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


FIGURE 3. BAGHDAD STRATEGIC AREA




FIGURE 4. BASRA STRATEGIC AREA

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13. Transportation and Telecommunications

A. General

The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers influence the Iraqi transportation pattern to the extent that almost all the existing land routes and planned expansion of rail and road transport facilities parallel the two rivers and their distributary, the Shatt al Arab (see FIGURE 5). Although the Tigris and the Euphrates are too shallow in their normal

state for navigation by other than shallow draft barges and sailing craft, the rivers satisfied most of the transportation needs for the low economic development of the country until the first part of this century. The British built railroads in support of their political plans and strategic requirements before and during World War I. Today, the railroads are the most important means of trans-




FIGURE 5. TRANSPORTATION PATTERN

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Box 155

Tab 1

Army
CIA
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FEMA
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TREAS
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portation. Geographically, Iraq is on the most direct and easiest route from western Europe to the Persian Gulf. The standard-gage (4'8½") railroad north of Baghdad connects at Tall Kushik with the Syrian railroad, which connects with the Turkish State Railways and, thus, with the rail network of Europe. Baghdad is the cross roads of the north-south transportation routes and an east-west route from Iran to the Mediterranean. The oil pipelines from Kirkūk to the Mediterranean are transverse to the general transportation pattern.

With the development of oil resources in recent years, transportation facilities have become increasingly inadequate. A National Development Board was created by the Iraqi Government in 1950 to use oil royalties for economic development including roads and bridges, and an extensive program of road improvement was initiated. Progress on this program has been slow, however; and the condition of most of the highways is still poor. Theoretically, official recognition is given to the concept of developing a highway network which will complement or feed the main rail and water transportation arteries; but, as a practical matter, trunk highways parallel to the railroads and rivers are being improved since demands on the transportation system cannot be met by either existing or planned rail and water facilities. Through the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the United States is providing technical assistance in road development, and much of the improvement work on highways and bridges is being performed by engineering firms from the United States.

The Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact has studied the needs of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to encourage social and economic progress through a series of communication improvement projects. Among other projects, the U.S. Richards Mission, working through the Economic Committee, has authorized money for improving a 40-mile highway link between Cizre, Turkey, and Zākhū, Iraq; for telecommunication projects linking Baghdad to Tehran, Iran, and Ankara, Turkey; and for telecommunication equipment for use within Iraq (see FIGURE 5). In the past, Iraq has not entered into formal arrangements with neighboring countries respecting international highways; but it is anticipated that the highway link with Turkey will stimulate trade between the countries. The volume of traffic between countries to the east and west of Iraq is insufficient at the present time to make Iraqi highways important as transit routes.

The British developed Basra, the principal port of Iraq, as a result of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. The considerable investment of the British

in the political and economic interests of Iraq has given the British extensive influence over port operations and maritime affairs. The Iraqi Government has complete control of the port, although at present a British subject is serving as the acting director. Iraqi nationals are gradually taking over port administrative positions previously filled by the British. The growing independence from British domination and influence is also spreading to the shipping field.

Iraq has no merchant fleet but depends on the ships of other nations for its ocean shipping requirements. A program to establish a nationalized merchant fleet was initiated in 1957. The Iraqi desire to attain a semblance of independence from foreign shipping lines is motivated by the vulnerability of the oil pipeline to the Mediterranean and political instability within the Near East. These two factors increase the importance of sea transport for Iraqi oil products.

Civil aviation, although limited in scope, has developed steadily since the end of World War II. Emphasis has been placed upon expansion of scheduled international services rather than domestic services or private flying, which has been limited by costs prohibitive to the general public.

The telecommunication system of Iraq is among the best developed in the Near East. The eastern part of the country, which is the most densely populated, is well serviced by the network which centers at Baghdad; but the western part of the country, largely desert, is almost void of communications.

B. Railroads

The railroad system is government owned and is operated by the Iraqi State Railways, a semi-independent administrative entity within the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. Railroad operations are centered in Baghdad, with meter-gage routes extending southeastward to the port of Basra and northward through oilfields in the Kirkūk area to Irbil. The standard-gage line proceeds northwestward from Baghdad to the Syrian border and is the eastern leg of a main railroad route connecting western Europe with the Near East.

The 1,060-mile railroad system of Iraq comprises 725 miles of meter-gage (3'3¾") lines and 335 miles of standard-gage (4'8½") lines. All of the lines are single track except 10 miles of double track north of Basra. Track structure is relatively light; rail on the meter-gage railroads weighs 50 to 60 pounds per yard and the rail on the standard-gage lines weighs 75 pounds per yard. The axleload limit is 9.9 short tons on the meter-gage routes and 20.1 short tons on the standard-

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Box 155

Tab 1

Army	FEMA	NSA
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DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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gage lines. None of the railroads has been electrified.

The 1955 motive power inventory listed 129 meter-gage and 29 standard-gage locomotives. All of the motive power consists of oil-fired steam locomotives, but two diesel-electric and two diesel-hydraulic locomotives have been ordered for experimental use on the meter-gage lines. Ten meter-gage steam locomotives are also on order, and bids have been invited on an additional 10 meter-gage locomotives and 7 standard-gage locomotives.

The rolling stock inventory at the beginning of 1955 was as follows:

	METER GAGE	STANDARD GAGE
Freight cars	6,300	1,472
Passenger cars	260	97
Total	6,560	1,569

Much of the rolling stock is old, but the purchase of about 400 new freight cars is planned as a part of the 1955 to 1960 railroad development program. Long range planning calls for increasing the capacity by adding new rolling stock, increasing the maximum permissible axleloads, employing heavier and more powerful motive power, and using more capacious rolling stock.

The five-year Iraqi Development Board program includes rail construction and the replacement of meter-gage lines with standard gage. Progress is extremely slow, however, because of the poor financial condition and operational difficulties of the railroads.

Operational efficiency suffers from a lack of technically trained personnel and from inadequate replacement and maintenance of equipment. Transshipment of freight from cars of one gage to another; car couplings that require all cars to be headed in the same direction, which results in delay when cars must be turned around before they can be made up into trains; and a variety of poor braking systems all complicate and limit operations. The lack of alternate routes makes the railroad system vulnerable to attacks at critical structures.

C. Highways

Highway transport has played an increasingly important part in the economy since World War II, but the highway system is inadequate in both quality and extent to meet the expanding transport needs of the country. The better highway routes of the sparse system generally follow the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys and radiate from the larger population centers. Iraq has 4,309 miles of highways, consisting of 1,302 miles of bituminous-treated surface, 248 miles of bituminous surface, and 2,759 miles of earth- or gravel-surfaced roads.

The principal highways usually have a macadam base and a bituminous-treated surface from 12 to 20 feet wide with shoulders up to 5 feet wide. Provision for drainage is poor. There are numerous desert tracks in addition to the regular highway system; previous higher mileage estimates have included desert tracks.

The few major bridges on the highway system are of concrete, steel, or timber construction and have gross load capacities from 2 to 40 short tons and roadway widths of 9 to 20 feet. Two new bridges, one three lane and one four lane, were opened at Baghdad in early 1957.

Highway maintenance is poor, and much of it is still accomplished by manual labor. Roads currently under construction conform to improved standards for foundations and surfaces, but the older roads were not designed for the heavy loads now hauled over them.

Under the present road development program (1955 to 1960), approximately US\$180 million will be spent on highway and bridge construction. This program calls for the construction or reconstruction of 3,100 miles of highways, and some of this work is already in progress. Priority has been given to the construction of roads from Baghdad to Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk; to the development of roads between cities having no railroad connections; and to the improvement of other main highway routes. A large amount of modern highway construction equipment has already been purchased, and additional equipment is being imported.

Restrictions to the movement of personnel and freight by highway transport include the sparsity and low-type construction of the road system, large sections of which become impassable during wet weather; narrow, low-capacity bridges; steep grades and sharp curves in the mountainous regions of northern and northeastern Iraq; narrow, cliff-lined defiles; and extensive areas of deep sand. Climatic restrictions are intense heat in the southern and central desert regions, sand and dust storms, severe floods in the Tigris and Euphrates River valleys from February to June, and flash floods and snow blockage in the mountain passes during winter.

Motor vehicle traffic is generally light throughout the country and most of it is in the larger city areas. In the city of Baghdad, a modern bus transportation system operates numerous buses. Animal transport, consisting largely of camels, is the form most used in sparsely settled areas.

The inventory of highway vehicles at the beginning of 1956 listed a total of 32,957 motor vehicles—20,603 passenger cars, 9,043 trucks, and 3,311 buses.

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In addition, there were 1,719 horse-drawn vehicles and 2,091 motorcycles.

D. Inland waterways

Iraq has three principal inland waterways—the Shatt al Arab and its two main confluent, the Euphrates and the Tigris. Until the advent of the Iraqi railroad system, these waterways afforded the chief means of surface transportation. Although inland waterway traffic has declined (no precise traffic figures are available), inland waterways still carry a substantial portion of the freight of the country. The volume of cargo moved by waterway is not known, but nearly 300,000 tons of shipping pass the lock at Al Kut on the Tigris each year.

The Shatt al Arab accommodates maritime traffic between the Persian Gulf and the port of Basra and has a least depth of six feet from Basra to the confluence of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The Tigris is navigable by barges and shallow-draft steamers as far as Baghdad, and, during the high-water season from November to May, small native steamers can proceed as far as Mosul. Navigation on the Euphrates is very limited, but from November to May small craft can navigate the entire length of that stream in Iraq. *Keleks*, native rafts made of skins, are used to transport produce downstream on both the Tigris and the Euphrates and are dismantled upon completion of the journey. The principal maintenance on the Iraqi waterways is the continual dredging of the channel at the entrance to the Shatt al Arab made necessary because of heavy siltation.

E. Ports and naval facilities

Iraq has one principal port, Basra; one secondary port, Al Faw; and one minor port, Umm Qasr. Basra, a deepwater commercial port, extends 7 miles along the Shatt al Arab about 80 miles above its mouth. This improved river harbor has 4,740 linear feet of alongside berthing space for nine Victory-type vessels, 7,000 additional feet of quayed lighter berthage, and a large number of supplemental landings for lighters and small craft. The excellent terminal facilities include 500,000 square feet of covered storage space, petroleum tankage for 42,000 barrels, 33 shore cranes with a maximum heavy lift of 60 tons, and 3 floating cranes with a maximum heavy lift of 100 tons. Basra has an estimated military unloading capacity of 8,900 long tons of general cargo per day, but the clearance facilities—a meter-gauge (3'3 3/4") railroad, highway, and inland waterway—are inadequate to clear this amount of cargo from the port.

Al Faw, primarily a base for dredges, was recently converted into a marine terminal for crude petroleum shipments. This secondary port, situated close within the mouth of the Shatt al Arab, has four T-head piers each capable of accommodating a T-2 tanker. Plans are underway for the construction of two supertanker berths. The terminal has 22 storage tanks with a combined capacity of 3,300,000 barrels. No facilities for general cargo are available.

The minor port of Umm Qasr, located on a tidal estuary, was in active use briefly during World War II. It has been almost completely dismantled but is considered to be a favorable site for future port development and eventually may be converted into an oil terminal. Financial difficulties in sponsoring such an undertaking and disputes with Kuwait over the ownership and boundaries of the nearby area preclude present development.

The ports of Basra and Al Faw are faced with the problem of continuous dredging because of the incessant silting in the Shatt al Arab. The outer bar has a controlling depth of 21 feet at low water and 27 feet at high water.

Iraq has no naval facilities.

F. Civil air

The government has developed Iraqi Airways, a government-owned air carrier, and has provided airfields, aids to navigation, and such other supporting services as weather station data and communications. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation, under the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, is responsible for administration of civil air matters. The Directorate General of Railways within the same ministry, however, is the nominal administrator of Iraqi Airways, which is a department of Iraqi State Railways.

Iraqi Airways has been developed largely with the technical assistance of British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), which provides many of the technical personnel, pending the training of qualified Iraqis. The air carrier has over 300 employees, including about 16 pilots. British personnel comprised about 15% in 1948 and about 7% by 1956. Fourteen of the pilots are Iraqis, and these constitute the only major group of qualified four-engine pilots in Iraq. Iraqi Airways has a fleet of three Vickers Viscount, three Vickers Viking, and one De Havilland Dove aircraft. Three additional ViscounTS are on order—one for late 1957 delivery and two larger models for delivery in 1959. The carrier operates international scheduled air services to points in 13 foreign countries in Europe and the

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Tab 1

ARMY	FEMA	NSA
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DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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Near East. Domestic scheduled services are conducted between Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul, which have the best equipped airfields open to civil use. The scheduled air traffic potential at other airfields is limited because the airfields usually are not associated with major population centers but are used chiefly for support flights for the oil industry. Navigational facilities are not abundant, but the generally good flying weather reduces the need for extensive aids.

Other civil air activities are conducted by the Iraqi Airplane Society, an aero club which has about 50 private pilots and 5 Auster V aircraft used for training purposes; by the Iraqi Customs Department with 5 pilots and 3 Austers used in border patrol work; and by the Iraqi Department of Agriculture with 6 pilots and 6 to 8 Piper Cub aircraft used for locust control work. The Iraq Petroleum Company owns and operates a few airfields to support its pipeline pumping stations, but aircraft used by the oil company are registered in the United Kingdom and operated by a British charter company.

Iraq is signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the International Air Services Transit Agreement and is a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Sixteen foreign air carriers operate scheduled international services to Iraq from the United States, Europe, and Near Eastern points. Foreign services from the United States, England, and the Netherlands stop in Iraq en route to the Far East. The other foreign services terminate in Iraq or neighboring countries. The foreign carriers make about 52 landings at Baghdad and 22 at Basra each week. Iraq has entered into bilateral air transport agreements with eleven nations, but only about half of the foreign carrier services to Iraq and Iraqi services to four foreign nations are sanctioned by these agreements. All the other international services are conducted under provisional arrangements renewable for limited periods of time.

G. Telecommunications

The extensive government-owned telecommunication system is operated by the Directorate General of Posts and Telegraphs, a part of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. The system appears to satisfy the needs of the various government departments, the Iraqi police, the armed forces, and also the modest requirements of the general public. The Iraqi Petroleum Company and its associates, the Basrah Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company operate a territorially limited but highly efficient telecommunication system of their own under government concessions.

The open-wire network carries both telephone and telegraph traffic. The principal communication axis is formed by two lines which extend along different routes from Baghdad to Mosul and by two lines from Baghdad to Basra. Lines branching from these main trunks extend to most of the larger communities. There are approximately 80 telephone exchanges in the country, serving about 38,000 subscriber sets, of which about three-fourths are automatic and attached to exchanges in Baghdad (25,000) and Basra (3,800). Exchanges in the provinces are manual, mostly of the magneto types. Morse telegraph apparatus is in general use, but teleprinters are used along the Basra, Baghdad, Kirkūk, and Mosul lines.

Public radiocommunication facilities are limited to government coastal stations in Basra and Al Fāw and an aeronautical radiotelegraph station in Baghdad. The army operates a radiotelegraph network controlled from Baghdad.

International open-wire circuits provide connections to neighboring countries; but a large portion of international traffic is carried by the Baghdad radiocommunication station, which maintains direct telephone and telegraph circuits to key points in the Near East and Europe and uses Tangler and London stations for relay to more distant parts of the world.

Radio broadcast facilities are concentrated in Baghdad. Domestic programs in Arabic are carried by a medium-wave 100/200-kilowatt dual Marconi transmitter which can be heard throughout the Near East, Sudan, Afghanistan, and parts of India. Present transmitters for international broadcasts are being replaced by two short-wave, 100-kilowatt transmitters beamed principally at Europe and the Far East. International programs use the Arabic, Kurdish, and English languages. The number of receiving sets has increased considerably during past years and totaled 66,000 at the beginning of 1955. The only television station, which was inaugurated in 1956, is in Baghdad.

Telecommunication equipment manufacturing industry in Iraq is limited to a plant manufacturing dry batteries for the military and a factory assembling broadcast receivers from British and United States parts. Most imported equipment comes from Great Britain.

Top-level engineering personnel are British, but experienced Iraqis are being used as supervisors and inspectors. Younger employees are graduates of technical schools and the Baghdad Engineering College, and selected men are being sent abroad for a year of practical training with manufacturers supplying telecommunication equipment to Iraq.

Telecommunication facilities of the Iraq Petroleum Company consist of telephone and tele-

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Tab 1

Army	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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graph lines with radiocommunication stations backing up the wire lines that follow the oil company pipelines. Telephone and telegraph equipment activities are automatic with interdialing facilities. The automatic telephone and telegraph system of the Basrah Petroleum Company operates from Basra central offices to the oil fields and tanker loading stations and includes short stretches of multichannel, medium-high-frequency radio links. Telecommunication facilities of the Mosul Petroleum Company are also fully automatic. The systems of the oil companies are interconnected.

H. Comments on principal sources

Information on the transportation and telecommunication systems of Iraq is, for the most part, recent, fairly reliable, and adequate except that some of the figures reported are not precise and include estimates which vary slightly according to the source. Use has been made of CHAPTER III supplemented by information from engineering reports of consulting firms and oil companies, reports of U.S. and international investigating groups, [] and current Iraqi Government and other overt publications.

14. Sociological

A. General

Iraq can be considered essentially stable in its present social configuration, despite internal differences and conflicts of an ethnic, linguistic, and religious nature. It has no refugee problem, with its concomitant emotional disruption; and its principal minority group, the Kurds, is too uncoordinated to translate its antipathy toward the Arabs, or its vague hopes of political independence, into effective action. The great majority of the population is ethnically homogeneous and united by the powerful appeal of Arabism and by the bond of a common tongue and religion.

Unity on political issues on the part of the Iraqi population is improbable. The great lower class rural majority is disinterested in politics and distrustful of government in general. The literate, articulate middle class, which is preponderantly urban, is often out of sympathy with governmental aims and turbulent in its expression of dissatisfaction; but it is still too small and disordered to challenge effectively the political control of the select upper class. There are no indications of political or other differences between groups or classes in Iraq so compelling as to threaten an upset in the social order or form of government as presently constituted.

No other country, with the possible exception of Egypt, has so continuous a thread of recorded history as Iraq, which dates back to before 3,000 B.C. From the time of the first primitive written records, and even further into prehistoric times, the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers has been a haven to those who chose to till the soil. Throughout this period a succession of peoples have

held the reins of power. Sumerians, Babylonians, and Assyrians ruled the then known world from this river valley before the time of Christ. When, in the seventh century of the Christian era, the conquering armies of Islam freed the valley of Persian rule, they established an era of Muslim control which, though occasionally interrupted, has persisted to the present day. Throughout this long history, despite intermittent foreign rule, a strong thread of continuity is apparent. There is no discernible anthropological difference between the early residents of the valley and the Arab population of today. Linguistic continuity also extends back from the Semitic and Iranian tongues of Arabic and Kurdish, spoken in Iraq today, to the earlier Semitic and Iranian languages of antiquity. The course of the Tigris and Euphrates still dictates, as it did in the distant past, the practical boundaries of arable Iraq and forms a drainage basin which constitutes a natural economic unit. Taken together these ethnic and geographical factors contribute to a sense of identity which, though not always apparent, gives to the Iraqi a feeling of historical permanence that is often lacking among neighboring Arab peoples. This group identity is being transmuted into a nascent sense of nationality, which, in turn, is given substance in modern international relations by the comparative wealth and economic progress brought to the country by revenues from the great Iraqi oil fields. Economic stability and visible evidences of increasing prosperity have given the middle and upper class an increasing consciousness of their status as citizens of Iraq rather than merely as Arabs, or Muslims, or members of some sect, tribe, or family.

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Tab 1

ARMY	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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The diversion of oil revenues to works for the public good, carried out by the Iraq Development Board created in 1950 by the Iraqi Government for this purpose, has put Iraq in the forefront of Arab countries in the construction of new schools, hospitals, and housing; the expansion of sanitary measures and agricultural services; and the control of the rivers to prevent floods and to provide efficient irrigation. Considerable efforts are being made to correct the almost universal lack of sanitation in the rural areas and in the city slums and to provide at least a minimum of medical care for the lower class Iraqi. The sudden and wholesale participation of the government in public works, for the benefit of a population long inured to governmental indifference, coincides with a period of social unrest brought about by the changing economy of the modern world wherein the tribal and feudal balance between tribesmen and sheikh or peasants and overlord is under severe strain. These large-scale public works serve to ease the dislocation inherent in the initial erosion of an established social order, though at the same time these public works hasten the displacement which they were established to alleviate. The tendency, consequently, is for greater dependence on governmental paternalism in place of the traditional reliance on the bounty and protection of individual group leaders. Despite the outward aperturances of democratic process, government in Iraq is still substantially the exclusive domain of a small upper class ruling clique.

The social outlook for Iraq indicates a continuation of the changing order already noted. Provided no drastic reduction in the receipt and use of oil revenues takes place, the increasing use of the new facilities for education may be expected to result in the continuing growth of the middle class in numbers and influence. The lower class agricultural majority can expect to become even less dependent on the feudal landlord or tribal sheikh as additional governmental plans for irrigation and land distribution are put into practice. It is too early to estimate whether the increased prosperity inherent in continuing expenditure on public works will act as a check on irresponsible political actions such as have often characterized groups and governments in neighboring Arab countries.

B. The Iraqi people

1. Population and manpower

The official Iraqi estimate of the total national population as of December 1956, based on a projection from the 1947 census, is 5,159,000 persons. However, with a rate of growth of 1½-2% per annum, this estimate appears low; more probably the present population is close to the 6.5 million

figure tentatively released as the total from the October 1957 census.

FIGURE 6 illustrates the relationship between area and population in the various provinces and desert administrations in Iraq. The importance of Baghdad province in regard to total population and density is primarily represented by the capital city, Baghdad, with its estimated population of some 1,000,000 persons. Mosul, the second city of Iraq, has a less pronounced effect on its province, as compared with Baghdad, because of the greater area of the province itself and the more uniform spread of rural settlement due to greater rainfall. Three great desert areas—Al Bādiyah Ash Shamālīyah, Al Bādiyah Al Janūbiyah, and Bādiyat Al Jazīrah—occupy almost half of the country. Although they have no officially recorded population, they are, in fact, the grazing grounds of a good proportion of the 300,000 nomadic tribesmen of Iraq. For administrative purposes the Bedouin are accredited to the province they most consistently frequent, though their migratory track may take them over the less fertile sections of various provinces, over the desert areas, and across international boundaries. Excluding the desert administrations, the population density of Iraq is about 71 persons per square mile; that of the country in its entirety is approximately 38.

Current prosperity and increased urban employment, growing out of the Development Board construction projects, have steadily drawn unskilled labor away from agriculture, reducing the proportion of those working the soil from 80% indicated by the 1947 census to about 75%. Dependence on pastoralism in some degree is common among all rural Iraqis. The nomadic tribesmen—some 8% of the rural population—while still predominantly dependent on flocks of camels, sheep, and goats, are increasingly attracted to settled agriculture. Factors contributing to this trend are the introduction of dry farming techniques on land formerly thought fit only for grazing, the declining market for camels, and the success of the government's Bedouin settlement program.

Wheat, barley, and temperate-zone fruits characterize northern agriculture, while dates and rice typify the south. The extensive desert areas to the west and south of the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers afford only scant grazing for Bedouin flocks.

Of the urban population some 90,000 are engaged in industry, and an additional 15,000 are employed in the production and distribution of oil. Iraqi industry is still characterized by the family workshop. Almost 99% of the 22,460 industrial establishments recorded in the 1954 industrial census employed fewer than 20 workmen, while the national average for all establishments, regardless of size, was only four workers per plant.

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Box 155

Tab 1

ARMY	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOI	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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


FIGURE 6. POPULATION DENSITY, 1955

Some 57% of those engaged in industry worked in plants employing fewer than 20 workers (FIGURE 7).

The largest employer in Iraq is the government which, excluding the army and the state railroad, had some 19,000 persons in the civil service in 1956. The largest single private employer is the Iraq Petroleum Company, with about 7,600 employees in 1954. Industries which bulk largest in numbers employed, given here in order of importance, illustrate different facets of Iraqi industry: spinning and weaving, which in the main involves elaborate mechanical equipment, organized production, and comparatively high annual pay; fruit- and date-packing, employing large numbers of women and children on a seasonal basis with its consequent low annual pay; and tailoring, where small workshops made up of an owner-worker and his family still predominate. Female workers make up almost 14% of the total employed in industry. Boys under 18 make up 12% of those reported, though substantial numbers below the legally employable age of 12 are thought to be unreported by employers.

FIGURE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, 1954

SIZE OF PLANTS BY NUMBER OF WORKERS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NUMBER OF PLANTS	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NUMBER OF WORKERS	AVERAGE NUMBER OF WORKERS PER PLANT
1-19.....	98.7	57.1	2.3
20-99.....	0.9	9.1	41.1
100 and over.....	0.4	33.8	321.1
	100.0	100.0	
National average.	4.0

The national labor force amounts to some 2,509,000 persons, or about 49% of the entire population. Of the total males, 58%, and of the total females, 40% constitute the proportion of the sexes in the labor force.

Unemployment is not now a serious threat to Iraqi labor. Underemployment is still common in agriculture, where inertia and lack of capital binds the farm worker to the soil or to the pastoral life. However, the drift of labor to the city is steady enough to bring about local shortages in some rural areas. The construction growing out of the development program has been active enough to

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provide comparatively full employment for the abundant supply of unskilled labor in the cities. Skilled labor, however, is in almost continuous short supply; and work in this category has attracted qualified recruits from among Palestinian refugees and from the neighboring Arab countries.

Return for labor among agricultural workers is generally low. Sharecropping is the prevailing practice—particularly in central and southern Iraq—and the one-third to one-half share of the crop that remains with the farmer as his return allows for little more than bare subsistence. The law in general favors the landlord rather than the tenant; there are no minimum wage obligations for farm workers, and most legislation designed to protect labor specifically excludes agricultural workers. Improvement occurs chiefly where regional projects under the economic development program permit the farm worker to supplement his agricultural return by casual labor in nonagricultural pursuits or from increased crop yield brought about through agricultural improvement programs, such as those sponsored by the ICA.

Urban labor is the subject of considerable official attention. The code legalizing this interest dates from 1942 and is specific in its protection afforded to women and children and to workers in such matters as hours, severance pay, and compensation for injury. However, compliance with these regulations is not required by firms with fewer than four employees; and they are widely evaded by the larger Iraqi employers. Enforcement is haphazard except among the large foreign companies. Proposals for the modernization of this code have been brought before Parliament but have yet to be enacted.

The Iraqi social security law (December 1956) is limited in coverage to concerns employing 30 or more persons; its benefits are therefore restricted to 41% of the total of industrial workers. Urban wages remain relatively high, and the legal minimum of 0.250 Iraqi Dinar (ID) per day (1ID=US\$2.80) is generally exceeded even for unskilled workers. The Iraq Petroleum Company, which has always led the field in regard to wages, established in June 1956 its minimum take home pay for unskilled labor of ID 0.500 per day. Thus, urban labor, particularly in the skilled categories, is able to command relatively high salaries. The rising cost of living, however, tends to minimize the recent gains in wages.

Workers can organize only with government permission, which is difficult to obtain; and unions are dissolved by government decree at will. At the beginning of 1957 there were in all Iraq only five labor unions, with a combined membership of little over 2,000 persons. In the absence of effective labor organization such strikes as occur

are usually spearheaded by self-appointed "strike committees" acting in the name of the workers. Strikers are apt to be diverted from legitimate social and economic goals by extraneous political objectives, and their justifiable complaints are usually blunted by unrealistic demands. Labor is devoid of skilled leadership from its own ranks and is unaware of its power or responsibility as a group. Such guidance as it may receive from management is at best paternalistic and unilateral. The attitude of the government toward labor is one of paternal authoritarianism. Its action in unresolved labor disputes, which it is required to arbitrate, is customarily aimed at a quick resumption of production and its decisions to this end usually favor management.

A sense of responsibility toward his job is not very well developed in the Iraqi worker; and absenteeism is a conspicuous accompaniment to the current rise of wages. The capabilities of the Iraqi laborer for sustained, though not overly hard, labor are good; and he shows considerable aptitude for the acquisition of mechanical skills within the limitations imposed by unfamiliarity and widespread illiteracy. The reserves of unskilled labor presented by the underemployed rural workers and the substantial nomadic population are sufficient to care for the manpower needs of any industrial or agricultural expansion in the foreseeable future.

2. Physical characteristics

The preponderant and controlling ethnic element in the population of Iraq is Arab, which as a term applies as much to unity of language and culture as to identity of origin and physical type (FIGURE 8). Under this classification are such divergent groups as the nomadic tribesman and the settled townsman, the illiterate peasant and the university graduate, and the Muslim marsh-dweller of the south and the native Christian cultivator of the north. Little physical difference separates the desert nomad from the cultivator or townsman, though the settled Arab shows less of the lean build and coppery skin color than the Bedouin nomad. Certain physical characteristics may be considered as held in common by all the Arab population of Iraq. Anthropologically, the Iraqi Arab is a Semitic-Mediterranean, with long head, uniformly brunet coloration, and moderate height. He has an inherent sparseness of build which is not entirely the result of frugal living, and his features show with considerable frequency the long thin face and the high-bridged nose characterizing the Arabs of Central Arabia. Significant physical adulteration occurs only on the periphery of the country, where intermarriage

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FIGURE 8. ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND LINGUISTIC DIVISION OF THE POPULATION, 1956

	ESTIMATED NUMBER	PERCENT- AGE OF POPULA- TION	RELIGION	PRIMARY LANGUAGE
Arabs.....	3,834,000	76.68	All, except 130,000 Christians of various sects, are Muslim, with the Shiah sect predominating over the orthodox Sunni.	Arabic, except for those Christians speaking Neo-Syriac dialects.
Kurds.....	909,000	18.18	Muslim, Sunni sect.....	Kurdish.
Turkomans.....	100,000	2.00	Muslim, Sunni sect.....	Turkomani.
Iranians.....	52,000	1.04	Muslim, Shiah sect.....	Persian.
Yezidis.....	40,000	0.80	A mixed Arab-Kurdish group, observing an eclectic and esoteric rite originating in a Muslim heresy. Miscalled "Devil Worshipers."	Arabic.
Assyrians.....	34,000	0.68	Christians, chiefly of the Nestorian Church..	Neo-Syriac.
Armenians.....	17,000	0.34	Christians, chiefly of the Armenian Orthodox Church.	Armenian.
Others.....	14,000	0.28	About 5,000 Jews; the remainder made up of Mandaeans and esoteric sects of extreme Shiah derivation.	Arabic.
Total.....	5,000,000	100.00		

with Turks, Iranians, Kurds and the like has been going on for centuries.

The Kurds, who are also Muslims, constitute the only ethnic minority of numerical importance in Iraq. They make up nearly a fifth of the total population and are, in fact, in a majority in the four northern provinces. Physically the Kurd is an Irano-Afghan, with a liberal admixture of Iranian Nordic. Like the Arab he is long-headed, and in the most typical examples exhibits an even more arched nasal profile than the Bedouin. His stature is measurably greater than that of his Arab neighbor, but his general coloration is approximately the same despite a limited incidence of blondism.

Obvious visual differences distinguishing Arabs from minority groups include those of dress. Western garb has been adopted by most of the upper and middle classes, but in the great rural lower class the Arabs still cling to the traditional flowing headdress or *kaffiyah* and *'aqāl* (headcloth and fillet) while the Kurds prefer the headcloth wound over a skull cap into an untidy turban. The Arabs cling to the enveloping outer cloak or *aba*, while the stiff-armed version of heavy felt is standard winter garb for Kurdish peasants from the northern provinces of Iraq.

3. Language

Throughout history Iraq has been a stronghold for the Semitic languages, one superseding another in concert with military or economic dominance. Arabic, the Semitic tongue which is the official language of Iraq, swept over the Tigris-Euphrates valley with militant Islam in the seventh century; and by the 12th century only isolated pockets of linguistic resistance remained. Modern Iraqis pride themselves, with some justifi-

cation, on the comparative purity of their Arabic. It is rich, nevertheless, in loan words from Persian, Kurdish, and Turkish. Such dialectal differences as exist between the geographical extremes do not interfere seriously with individual communication.

Kurdish, an Indo-European language closely related to Persian, is distinctly divided by dialectal differences, with the divergences in some cases so great as to make individual communication between the extremes virtually impossible. The dialect of As Sulaymāniyah is used for the publication of laws, decrees, and textbooks in Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdish, along with Arabic, is an official language in Kurdish-speaking areas.

Of the other linguistic minorities, Turkomans and Iranians are numerically significant. The language of the former enjoys official status, along with Arabic, in Turkoman communities; members of the Iranian and Turkoman minorities are apt to know some Arabic. Bilingualism in Arabic, Turkish, or Persian exists among the Kurds with some frequency at the ethnic boundaries of the separate groups. Among the middle and upper class strata of Iraq, which are almost exclusively Arab, English is widely used, though not necessarily fully comprehended.

4. Religious and ethnic fragmentation

Iraqi society is fragmented along religious and ethnic lines. A bare majority of the Muslim population belongs to the Shiah branch of Islam, while the remaining minority is of the Sunni or orthodox branch. Despite the slackening of religious fervor among middle and upper class Muslims and the consequent lessening of intersectorian friction among them, the lower class majority still

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retains a keen sense of sectarian rivalry. Christians in Iraq constitute a mere 3.6% of the population, and such effectiveness as they might exert as a united bloc is dissipated, here as elsewhere in the Near East, by interdenominational rivalry. The numerous additional sects and faiths which are represented in Iraq, though insignificant in number of communicants, illustrate in indirect proportion to their size those exaggerated traits of mutual-exclusiveness that characterize the survival technique of religious, ethnic, and tribal communities throughout the Near East.

The overriding urge toward group exclusiveness has its genesis in the patriarchal family and manifests itself in the social self-sufficiency of villages in relation to their neighbors and, most specifically, in the often militant independence of the tribe.

5. Attitudes

The cultural atmosphere of modern Iraq, which is not only Muslim but Arab in its broadest sense, is superimposed on a long succession of indigenous and intrusive Eastern cultures which in themselves were mature for their time. A sense of common participation in the creation of the Arab Empire following the original Muslim conquest and a recollection of the time when Baghdad as the imperial capital was a world center of culture and influence give the Arab Iraqi a consciousness of participation in the mainstream of Arab history. Common use of the Arabic language is a prime ingredient in the feeling of culture unity between Iraqis and other Arab peoples. Perhaps the most powerful inter-Arab tie is that of religion which provides for most Arabs a common meeting ground under Islam and which in Iraq, for the great lower class majority at least, is still the basic guide for the ethics of human relationships. Islam in a general sense makes for local unity, giving to all in the Muslim community a factor in common unaffected by ethnic differences. Local sectarian rivalry, however, has given it divisive effects as well. The schism which divided Islam into the antipathetic Sunni and Shiah sects is felt with considerable emotion by the Iraqis. The orthodox Sunni Muslims in general control the government, and the Shiahs who form a slight majority of the total of Iraqi Muslims—and a substantial majority of the Iraqi Arabs—feel perennially relegated to second place in respect to opportunities for government service. The concentrated interest of the Shiah Muslim world in the great pilgrimage cities of Iraq—Karbalā', An Najaf, Al Kāzimiyah, and Sāmarrā'—gives to the Iraqi Shiah congregation an importance in their own eyes which they feel the government consistently disregards.

The very existence of the great variety of religious and ethnic minorities illustrates the ingrained, socially exclusive character of minority-group attitudes, which in turn explains the comparatively small effect that the minorities exert on the attitudes of the Muslim Arab majority as expressed by the government.

The attitude of the rank and file toward international affairs is one of indifference, as indeed it is toward virtually all matters of public concern not directly affecting their livelihood. The expressed attitudes of the very select upper class and the comparatively small middle class constitutes Iraqi public opinion. The middle class is capable of emotional, undisciplined, and destructive expression, though the strict hand of authoritarian government has reduced such expressions to a minimum. Public opinion regarding the Arab League can be characterized as one of practical indifference; toward its Arab neighbors in general it has endorsed a policy of independent action based on Iraqi rather than Arab interest. Public opinion on the Baghdad Pact, in government circles, in general was initially favorable, since it offered the prospect of increased prestige and military strength through strong Western support. More recent reactions to the Pact have been less favorable as a result of the Pact's exacerbation of Arab political disunity, disappointment over the amount of U.S. material support received, and the cumulative effect of Egyptian anti-Pact propaganda. Outside of government circles the reaction has been dubious and suspicious at best.

Israel and the plight of the Palestine Arab refugees are of no interest to the Kurds of Iraq and are far from being burning issues with the Arab majority. Though Iraqis in general do not hesitate to use these issues when it is to their advantage to arouse pan-Arab or pan-Islamic enthusiasm, few have demonstrated any eagerness to shed blood over them.

Iraq is confident of its own importance in the Arab world; and it can point, in substantiation, to a surplus of arable land, a substantial regular income from oil royalties, and an impressive series of accomplished developmental projects. While the middle class Iraqi may acknowledge the cultural supremacy of Egypt and look upon it as the leader of the Arabs in their opposition to entrenched Western interests, those among the governing clique under no circumstances look to that country for leadership in Arab affairs; nor are they willing to accept for Iraq a status secondary to any of the other Arab nations. Pan-Arabism in a cultural sense is an impulse common to most Arab Iraqis. It is particularly attractive to the literate middle class. Pan-Arabism as a political force is

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a tenet of the opposition in contrast to the policy currently endorsed by the governing group.

The upper and middle classes of Iraq have eagerly adopted the appurtenances of Western culture and technology; and even the lower class, through the continuing impact of the oil industry and the economic development schemes which it supports, has a more than customary awareness of modern technology as applied to agriculture and industry. However, the ethical values and institutions of Western culture have been only partially absorbed or understood, and few Western ethical concepts have been adopted to bolster Islam, which in the middle and upper classes has lost much of its moral force. The individual literate Iraqi finds it difficult to understand such unfamiliar concepts as "enlightened self-interest," exemplified by the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA) programs, thinking instead that, in some way which he has not yet discovered, the United States is to derive benefits which must ultimately be at the expense of Iraq.

The literate Iraqi in general looks upon the Western powers with considerable distrust, and his attitude toward them is subject to abrupt change on relatively small provocation. Anti-U.S. sentiments, which were at a peak after the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948, are less apparent today since the literate Iraqi, either from conviction or expediency, acquiesces in the moderately pro-U.S. policy pursued by the government. Among the Western powers the United States is viewed with most favor by the Iraqi. He admires its wealth, he respects its strength, and he is conscious to a certain degree of the humanitarianism that has characterized U.S. relations with the Near East in the past. Iraqi officialdom would welcome U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact because of the added strength and stature it would give to Iraq in Near Eastern eyes. Despite the strain of the Suez invasion, U.K. influence in Iraq remains strong, rooted as it is in years of favored status. While a relaxation of the strong hand used by the present Iraqi Government could easily lead the volatile Iraqi middle class to anti-British acts, British method in government, industry, and commerce can be expected to predominate in the immediate future as it does today. The Iraqi's attitude toward the Soviet Union is largely negative because of the lack of official Soviet-Iraqi contacts and the repressive measures taken by the government against Communist activity. Nevertheless, Communism continues as a rallying point for dissident groups of middle class Iraqis, who are interested in it mainly as a practical weapon with which to attack the ruling group and the British. Students and other intellectuals, looking for a means to express their traditional impatience with

the *status quo*, have shown a receptiveness to Communist disruptive tactics. The town-dwelling Kurds have also shown a receptiveness to Communist propaganda, espousing it in an expression of dissatisfaction with their minority status or as a convenient vehicle for their separatist ambitions. The Turkomans, as pro-Turk and anti-Kurd, are the most staunch among the minorities in their resistance to Communist penetration. Various other minorities, both religious and ethnic, flourish in Iraq (see FIGURE 8), encountering relatively little official interference or public discrimination. Remnants of the old Turkish millet system, under which the non-Muslim communities were permitted a substantial degree of self-government, still exist in the personal status courts maintained, with government consent, by the chief minority faiths for cases involving their coreligionists.

The divisive force of ethnic and linguistic difference separates the 18% of the population which is Kurdish from the Arab majority; and substantial minorities of Iranians, Assyrians, and Turkomans strive similarly toward social and economic self-sufficiency. The once prosperous and large Jewish minority, which until 1949 exercised strong control over Iraqi trade and commerce, has been reduced through emigration to Israel from well over 100,000 to some 4,000-5,000 persons. Despite the separation inherent in socially exclusive or self-sufficient enclaves, minorities as such do not at this time pose a serious threat to the stability of Iraqi society or politics. The largest—the Kurds—while harboring individual and unorganized separatist sentiments, are too disinclined to act effectively to this end as a bloc.

6. Education

Iraq expends annually on education a sum equivalent to about 15% of the national budget, in addition to substantial amounts from the Development Board for new school construction. The attack on the mass illiteracy—almost 90%—is chiefly through primary rather than adult education.

In all some 516,000 students are enrolled in Iraqi schools. Approximately 83.5% are in the primary levels, 14% in secondary schools, 1.0% in vocational and teacher training, and 1.5% in institutions of higher learning. The several colleges in the governmental system—Medicine, Pharmacy, Law, Engineering, Commerce and Economics, Arts and Sciences—within the past year have been consolidated by official decree into the only university of Iraq, but as a unified and functioning institution it remains still largely in the planning state. Some 2,000 Iraqi students go abroad each year in pursuit of higher or other specialized studies. Most of these are on government grants, and about half are enrolled in U.S. institutions. Some 90%

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of all Iraqi educational institutions are under the free public school system. Of the nonpublic schools, about one-half are foreign supported. Attendance during the primary school age is theoretically compulsory for all, boys and girls alike, but a shortage of schools and teachers, the need for the children's earnings even in the average home, and lax enforcement of attendance regulations, all contribute to absenteeism in the schools. Only about half of those of primary school age attend school at all. About 25% of the total school enrollment is made up of girls.

Much emphasis is placed in the standard public school curriculum on Arab culture and nationalism, and teaching methods rely more on learning by rote than by analysis and deduction. Student preference for the academic as opposed to the vocational approach to education predominates and reflects not only the need felt by the post-World War I British advisers for a literate middle class to fill the vacancies in the newly created civil service but also a traditional Arab concept of education as something divorced from technology. The result has been a shortage of young men adequately trained for the demands of modern technology. There continues, instead, a surplus of traditionally educated white collar workers for the number of government jobs, which still remain the preferred objective. To correct this situation the government now emphasizes vocational rather than academic training, but schooling that does not lead directly to white-collar status continues to be unpopular. With occasional exceptions the continuing teacher shortage is reflected in an inferior quality of teaching throughout all levels of the educational system. The result is evident in the scholastic difficulties experienced by many of the Iraqis who go abroad for advanced study. As in other Arab countries, Iraqi students when not under restraint participate in political demonstrations with an enthusiastic lack of moderation, a practice which results in occasional episodes of mob violence, frequent loss of time, and general indifference to scholastic authority.

7. Public information

The few papers constituting the local press have little circulation outside the cities. Rigid official control and the threat of suppression serve to ensure that the editors, who in the main share in the pan-Arab isolationism of the middle class, reflect in print the broad lines of the policy endorsed by the government. Iraq depends for its books

and magazines primarily on imports, chiefly from Lebanon and Egypt. Word-of-mouth is still the favorite medium of transmission in the rural areas, though the battery-powered radio is common in village coffee shops where Egyptian, British, and U.S.S.R. programs, which often come in as clearly as those of the Iraq Government Broadcasting Service enjoy considerable popularity. The new Iraqi television station—the only one in the Near East—serves thus far only a very limited audience and is operated as an adjunct to the government educational system. The cinema, showing preponderantly U.S. films, is a very popular form of urban amusement.

8. Living standards and public health

The living standards of the wealthy in Iraq compare favorably with those of the upper middle class in western Europe. Western mechanical conveniences are readily available to the moneyed class, and servants in quantity are considered a normal accompaniment of upper class status. Middle class living conditions in general afford few of the conveniences taken for granted at comparable levels in the United States, while the condition of the great lower class, which is largely rural, is primitive in the extreme. Even elementary sanitary facilities are lacking, sources of pure drinking water are apt to be more the result of accident than design, and epidemic diseases, while diminishing, are still prevalent. The urban lower class, despite a beginning in governmental slum clearance and resettlement, is at home in the same squalid surroundings to which it has long been accustomed.

Diet for the majority of Iraqis is inadequate by U.S. standards. Deficiency diseases are common, as are also malaria, hookworm, dysentery, and trachoma. Medical personnel, though not up to Western standards, in general are competent but amount to only one per 5,300 inhabitants, with the severest shortage in the rural areas. Hospital facilities in Iraq allow for about one bed for each 800 persons in the population; quality of hospital care in Iraq judged by Western standards ranges from barely satisfactory in the Royal Hospital in Baghdad, used for training doctors and nurses through the Royal School of Medicine, to primitive in the provinces.

Substantial allotments for low-cost housing and new hospitals have been earmarked from the proposed budgets of the Development Board, and if no serious interference with the accrual of oil revenues occurs, marked improvement in both these fields should be evident in the next 10 years.

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C. Social structure**1. Rural society**

The structure of Iraqi society as a whole is apparent in its most elemental form in the rural communities, where foreign pressures are the least direct. The basic social unit is the patriarchal family which in the course of natural increase emerges as village or tribe. Marriage outside the extended family is rare, with first cousin marriage rights prevailing according to long established Arab custom.

The Bedouin of Iraq, some 300,000 of whom still adhere to the nomadic pastoral life, are looked upon with a certain nostalgic respect by the settled population as the custodians of the early Arab virtues of hospitality, courage, and honor. Bedouin allegiance is to the tribe rather than to the government, and while each tribe has a specific nationality, many continue to follow the sparse desert pastures unhindered across national boundaries just as they did before those boundaries existed. Tribal life is essentially egalitarian, with little social distinction arising from difference in economic status. This trait, along with tribal affiliation, persists even after the tribesman has been forced by the changing pattern of modern economy to adopt the sedentary life. Increasing numbers of Bedouin are being induced by government settlement schemes to change to the fully settled agricultural life. The consequent blurring of the dividing line between nomad and cultivator, along with governmental suppression of Bedouin raiding, has tended to reduce the traditional hostility between the free-roving Bedouin and the settled farmer.

The steady transition from nomad to village-dweller does not diminish the tradition of family solidarity and loyalty, but the communal sharing of tribal land and the equalitarian atmosphere of the nomadic clan tends to be replaced by a feudal relationship between sheikh and tribesmen. Land once held as the property of the tribe as a whole is apt to become the personal property of the sheikh and be cultivated by the tribesmen on a sharecropping basis. The tribal leaders and big landlords—Arab or Kurdish—have diminished in prestige and power in direct proportion to the advance of civil authority into the rural areas. They are, however, still important in relation to the control they exercise over votes and economic effort; and they are regularly cultivated by the government for that reason.

Agriculture is the primary occupation of some 75% of the Iraqi population. A conspicuous preponderance of this majority is landless, tilling the soil as tenants of large local and absentee landlords. The settled rural population adheres to the

Near Eastern preference for agricultural villages and towns rather than isolated farmsteads. Settlement is thick along the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers and their tributaries, where a steady water supply makes irrigation possible. Only in the northern extremity of Iraq, particularly in mountainous Kurdistan, is there enough rainfall to eliminate the dependence on irrigation. Few rural settlements yet have electricity, sewage disposal systems, or adequate schools and medical facilities.

The agricultural village as such is a physically and socially stable fixture in Iraqi society. The Iraq Development Board program points toward a continued betterment in rural living conditions and crop production. About 1.5 million acres of cultivable land have already been distributed among individual Bedouin and other landless peasants. Governmental programs for aid to the farmer, in addition to settlement schemes for Bedouin and for landless peasants, include assistance through flood control, irrigation, and drainage. Agricultural agents are available to advise the cultivator; and the United States, through the ICA, is supplying 114 technical and clerical personnel to assist the Iraqi Government in tackling domestic problems, almost all of which are of direct concern to the cultivator. As a result of these aids, return for labor among the rural rank and file shows signs of permitting the peasant to rise somewhat above the traditional subsistence level of existence to which he has been accustomed. The further development of the large Iraqi reserve of unused cultivable land through irrigation and drainage gives promise of increased prosperity and stability for the agricultural segment of Iraqi society.

2. Urban society

The facade presented by urban Iraq is one of growing modernism. New business houses, government buildings, schools, and clinics are Western in appearance and function. Truly urban society, accounting for some 25% of the total population, is epitomized by the few large cities, all long-established centers of riverine trade. Foremost is Baghdad, the capital and the largest; then Mosul, center of northern trade; and Basra, the principal sea port of Iraq. All three are located on the main rivers. Lesser centers, many of which are also partly agricultural, exist elsewhere on the watercourses of the country. Oil production in recent years has brought technology to urban Iraq where economic activities formerly had been limited almost entirely to trade and handicraft. Cases in point, out of many, are Kirkūk, northern oil producing center; Dawrah, near Baghdad, site of the national petroleum refinery; and Al Fāw, pipe-

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line terminus on the Persian Gulf for the oil fields of southern Iraq.

The city is the stronghold of the small ruling upper class and the literate, articulate middle class. The latter as a volatile, discontented, and underemployed white-collar element shares with comparable strata in neighboring Arab countries the capability for inciting and participating in destructive demonstrations over social and political issues; even the strong hand of government has not been able wholly to suppress these activities. The lower class, however, constitutes the overwhelming majority of city dwellers and is on the whole unconcerned with issues not directly affecting its livelihood, as are the members of the rural lower stratum.

The family remains the basic social unit among the urban lower class majority, with the extended family clustered together in groups of contiguous buildings. The middle and upper classes, while equally responsive to family ties, recognize that family solidarity in a physical sense is no longer practical in present-day urban life. Those among the lower class who are in a minority status because of religion or race continue, as before, to coalesce into homogeneous enclaves within the city.

There is no insurmountable barrier in the Iraqi social structure between middle class and upper class status. The difference is largely economic. The transition from lower to middle class status is more difficult. No real meeting ground exists for the middle class Iraqi and the peasant; there is, instead, a conspicuous lack of interest or sympathy for lower class welfare on the part of the literate middle class.

Urban society as such is relatively stable in regard to its class structure. In regard to temper it is unstable in direct relationship to the unrest of the middle class and to the degree of government control over students and other middle class groups. The outlook for the long run, however, is favorable. Iraq, in its effort to eliminate

middle class unemployment and underemployment through emphasis on vocational training, and in its prospects for increased prosperity from its economic development program, should under normal conditions legitimately anticipate an extended period of increased employment and greater economic stability.

D. Comments on principal sources

U.S. Government reports form a preponderant majority of the sources used in this Section. While often inadequate in those sociological subjects not obviously related to international politics or to the activities of U.S. information and foreign aid programs, they are, as far as they go, accurate and dependable. The fundamental conclusions to which they have led, both in CHAPTER IV and in CHAPTER I, SECTION 14, are believed to be sound.

U.S. mission reports on the reactions of the people in general have been excellent, but more data could be used on individual and group reaction to native and foreign radio and press and to the new Iraq television network. In the matter of religion, information is generally lacking on the international influence of Iraq through its role as a world center of Shiah pilgrimage. Data are continually desired on the number, economic status, and temper of the changing agricultural and pastoral majority.

Official Iraq statistics on which reliance must often be placed, while more dependable than those from neighboring Arab states, are incomplete and sometimes inaccurate and contradictory. The estimates relating to population and manpower used in this Section are, for example, based on figures supplied to the United Nations by Iraq which themselves are projections from the somewhat unreliable 1947 census. The statistics and data released by the Iraq Development Board are reliable and serve as an invaluable guide to the degree and direction of Iraqi social betterment through public works.

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15. Political

A. General

Present-day Iraq is a creation of the mandates system of the League of Nations. During World War I the Hashimite Sharif Husayn, former King of the Hijaz and the hereditary protector of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, supported by two of his sons, 'Abdallāh and Faysal, and other Arab leaders, raised a revolt against the Ottoman Turks and aided the Allied cause in the Near East. This uprising was in response to British promises to create a single, independent Arab state comprising most of present-day Iraq, Jordan, Syria, former Palestine, and a portion of the Arabian Peninsula. The terms of this pledge, rather vaguely defined in 1915-16 correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Sharif Husayn, were irreconcilable with the secret Sykes-Picot agreement by which Britain, France, and Imperial Russia in 1916 agreed to respective spheres of influence in the Arab possessions of the Ottoman Empire, and which was published soon after the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia. It also conflicted with a British Government undertaking, formalized in the Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917, to establish a "national home" for the Jewish people in Palestine. An Arab government under Husayn's younger son, Faysal, was actually formed in Damascus in 1919 but was ousted by French military pressure in 1920.

Faysal pleaded the Arab nationalist cause at the peace negotiations in Versailles; but, in the end, great power interests prevailed. At the San Remo Conference in 1920, the Levant region (now Syria and Lebanon) was awarded to France; and Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine were similarly awarded to the United Kingdom under League of Nations mandates. Faysal was placed on the throne of Iraq. His elder brother 'Abdallāh became ruler of a semi-independent Amirate which later became the kingdom of Jordan, and western Palestine was opened to large-scale Jewish immigration. The irreconcilable commitments of World War I and the postwar developments underlie much of Arab hostility toward the United Kingdom and the Western powers generally. The feeling that the Allies had betrayed the Arabs was much heightened by the emergence of Israel as a sovereign political entity in 1948, its speedy recognition by the United Kingdom and the United States as well as the

U.S.S.R., the defeat of Arab armies in the fighting that ensued, and continued Western support of the Israeli state.

Iraq attained independence in 1932, when the United Kingdom surrendered its mandate and sponsored its former ward for membership in the League of Nations. However, Iraq remained closely bound to the United Kingdom by a treaty which, although ostensibly between two sovereign powers, contained unequal provisions intensely resented by most Iraqis. This treaty was constantly under popular and political attack until it was ended in April 1955 with entrance of both parties into the Baghdad Pact, a regional agreement which placed the relationship with the United Kingdom in the context of a multilateral arrangement. Informally, the United Kingdom continues to exert some influence on Iraqi policy by reason of its long advisory association with most of the leading figures still influential in the government as well as its dominant position in the management of the Iraq Petroleum Company and in Iraqi foreign trade.

The physical security and high fertility imparted by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which flow through central and southeastern Iraq (ancient Mesopotamia), gave rise to man's first cities (ca. 4500 B.C.) and the first experiments with government and organized armies (the Sumerian kingdom, about 4000 to 2700 B.C.). From the 30th century B.C. the wars and dealings among the kingdoms in this area—Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian—were among the world's earliest experiences in international relations. As a link on the route of migration and conquest, the area received infusions of Persian and of Greek culture and was reconquered by Arabs in the name of Islam in the seventh century A.D. Baghdad, as the seat of the Caliphate (749-1258 A.D.), became a world center of learning and commerce, as well as the political capital of an empire that embraced much of the then civilized world until, already in decline, it was finally overrun by Mongols in the 13th century A.D.

Arab-Muslim patterns have predominated in Iraqi life since the eighth century A.D. Yet the course of empire has left its sedimentation of ethnic and religio-cultural groups. Sometimes in conflict, but more often in mutual tolerance

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coupled with dislike and distrust, they have maintained their separate identities with remarkable persistence. Both the Caliphate and the Ottoman Porte allowed the various minority groups considerable autonomy as separate millets, with which the government dealt as a whole through their leaders; this system was gradually extended to the heterodox Muslim sects as well. Centuries of fragmentation and mutual distrust have not been healed by the comparatively recent appeal of state-centered nationalism. Moreover, the long period of neglect when Iraq formed part of the outer fringes of the Seljuk (from about 1055 to 1258 A.D.) and Ottoman (1517-1918 A.D.) empires, ruled by Turkish overlords, conditioned the people to distrust all government as an alien institution.

Among the numerous religious and ethnic cleavages, three major groupings are politically significant, although no one of them can dominate the political life of the country: these are the division of the Muslim majority between the two major sects of Islam, Shi'ah and Sunni (orthodox); and of the latter sect along ethnic lines between Arabs and Kurds. The Kurds, a mountain people who constitute a majority in the northern provinces of Iraq and in adjacent areas in Turkey and Iran as well, have long cherished separatist inclinations. Despite fragmentation, the reality of the Iraqi state has been gradually accepted as physical control of the central government has been extended throughout its territories and the central authority has begun in the minds of the people to stand for some positive benefits (schools, health services, agricultural services) as well as for conscription and taxes. However, the Iraqi Government continues to be under the necessity of balancing regional and sectarian interests; and this is inducing a spirit of compromise and disinclination to extremes akin to that found in Lebanon, which has similar delicate balances among population groups.

The government is highly centralized, with political power concentrated in the conservative, propertied elite and officials down to the local level appointed by the authorities in Baghdad. When parliament is not in session legislation may be promulgated by decree, subject to subsequent parliamentary ratification.

Political attitudes in Iraq are still not far removed from those of the patriarchal society which is the basis of both nomadic and village life. Strong individual leadership is the rule, and in general personalities are more important than the offices they occupy or the formal institutions framed by constitution and laws. Political parties are in reality little more than groups of clients and followers around influential persons; they seldom represent any real program or political belief. As

elsewhere in the Near East, the Western-type constitution and laws are largely a facade behind and through which older, indigenous patterns of clan and family factionalism have operated as the real political dynamic. However, in Iraq the throne, at first with British support and more recently in its own right, has become a regulating and moderating force.

B. Constitution and structure of government

The Iraqi Constitution was voted in 1924 and promulgated 21 March 1925, over considerable nationalist opposition, since it was associated in passage with the unpopular Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1924, through which the United Kingdom operated its mandate for Iraq. Despite these early objections, it has proved to be a satisfactory fundamental law for the independent state and has seldom been amended. It established a constitutional monarchy of parliamentary type. The constitution specifies that "sovereignty resides in the people," and the Cabinet is made responsible to Parliament. The legislature is bicameral, with an upper house appointed by the King and a lower chamber elected by universal male suffrage on the basis of proportional representation. Legal voting age is 20 years. A new electoral ordinance in 1952 changed the system from indirect to single-stage elections by electoral districts of from 15,000 to 70,000 registered voters. As of October 1957, this ordinance was in process of confirmation by Parliament, as required of all legislation promulgated by decree during parliamentary recess. Two elections have already taken place under the new ordinance.

The King has considerable authority, deriving largely from his power of appointment and dismissal of a wide range of officials. Both the King and Prime Minister also have extensive emergency powers. Suspension of the ordinary laws for periods of martial or emergency rule has been frequent. By these means the executive branch (the King or, at other times, a strong Prime Minister) has nearly always assumed the predominant role in Iraqi politics, despite the intent of the constitution that Parliament should be the principal locus of power. Similarly, provisions of the detailed Bill of Rights are frequently evaded without protest from ordinary Iraqis, most of whom are unfamiliar with Western concepts of personal freedoms and accustomed to more or less authoritarian attitudes on the part of public officials.

The legal system, also devised during the mandate, is based on Ottoman, Anglo-Indian, and continental European prototypes. Portions are gradually being recodified to eliminate some of the Ottoman features. As is common in Near Eastern states, a tripartite system of courts is provided:


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the ordinary civil and criminal system; *ad hoc* administrative tribunals (*Diwān Khāss*), to interpret laws and regulations; and special courts, including those for the tribal and religious jurisdictions and for constitutional interpretation (the *ad hoc* High Court). Certain special provisions were introduced into the legal system in order to adjust its predominantly Western concepts to indigenous customs and practice: non-Muslim religious communities (which were semiautonomous millets during Ottoman times) retain their own courts for matters of personal status, applying their own customary law; nonorthodox Muslims are similarly

entitled to trial by the legal system in use by their sect; and special arbitral tribunals apply tribal rules and precedent to the nomadic population. The court system, although subject to some political influence, is relatively free of pressure and, by Near Eastern standards, efficient and honest. Some bribery and speculation are inevitable under local social standards and pay scales and are more or less condoned.

Administratively, Iraq is divided into 14 provinces, which in turn are subdivided into districts and counties (see FIGURE 9). Local administra-



*Convened only by the Cabinet. When Parliament is not sitting the High Court is appointed by the Cabinet.

**Appeals from decisions of the Inspection Committee may be made to the judiciary.

FIGURE 9. BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT, 1957

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tive as well as functional officials, such as school and health officers, are regarded as representatives on their respective levels of the several cabinet ministries to which they are responsible. Three desert areas (*Bādiyyah*) are given special administration because of their primarily Bedouin population. Provinces and districts have advisory administrative councils comprising certain officials serving *ex officio* plus members elected by a complicated four-stage system (see FIGURE 10). There is also a General Council in each province, again partially elected by a quite different method, whose duties are chiefly budgetary and fiscal. Municipalities also have elected councils which are empowered to levy certain taxes and dispose the revenue.

C. Political dynamics

Unlike Syria, Egypt, and to some extent Jordan, political power in Iraq remains in the hands of the Arab world's traditional ruling elements—landowners, large merchants, and tribal chiefs. The chief figures among this group to achieve political stature are those who as young men were the companions in arms and political supporters of Faysal, first King of Iraq and grandfather of the present king. Arbiters of the affairs of the ruling group, and consequently the centers of political power in the country, are Nūri al-Sa'īd, the ablest politician and frequent Prime Minister of Iraq, and 'Abd al-Ilāh, Crown Prince, uncle, and principal adviser of the King and regent during his minority (1939-1953). The combination of Nūri and 'Abd al-Ilāh represents in the main an alliance. Nūri has devoted his life to the Hashimite dynasty and his loyalty is unquestioned. Moreover, these two men agree on principal objectives for their country: both want a stable political life with steady economic development; both desire a Western-aligned and Western-protected position of security, and the enhancement of Iraqi prestige in the Arab world. Nevertheless, they differ from time to time on the means of attaining these goals; and there are periods of mutual and intense irritation. Nuri has occasionally demonstrated that the parliamentary machinery cannot be operated without his consent. 'Abd al-Ilāh on his part resents too great a monopoly of power in the hands of any one person; and he, too, endeavors to keep some personal following in Parliament. He uses the Palace's constitutional power of appointment and dismissal to prove from time to time that the tenure of any government—even one of Nūri's—is dependent on the King's pleasure; he sometimes has indulged in petty political harassment and intrigue. This interplay, like personal clashes and factionalism among the leading politicians generally, is not so deep as to threaten the interests of the ruling group as a whole. The traditional ruling circle of Iraq is thus less vulnerable than that of Syria to challenges from other elements bidding for political power.

The chief challenge to the traditional ruling group rises from the growing middle class (minor officials, white-collar workers, small merchants, the professions, teachers, students, middle officer ranks in the armed services) who, impatient and hypercritical, stung by the Arab defeat in Palestine, and resentful of the West, are eager for personal and national status. In this segment of the population, especially among youth, the issues of Arab unity, enmity toward Israel, and anti-imperialism, most often directed against the United Kingdom and the United States, attain their greatest emotional force and have become the princi-




FIGURE 10. SELECTION OF ROTATING MEMBERS OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCILS

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pal—almost the only—political motivations. On these issues spokesmen for this group, usually the extremists and demagogues, have been able to arouse the street mob and bring pressure on the government by the threat of civil disturbance. Denied this technique in the past four years by strong governmental security controls, this nationalist segment is at present without organization or effective leadership, but its latent emotionalism threatens renewed and possibly violent protest should it be faced by a less determined government. To this group, Nuri al-Sa'id personifies discredited methods of an older generation, and his long and friendly association with the United Kingdom represents collaboration with imperialism. In their view, the government's policy of alining Iraq with the West in the Baghdad Pact has dissipated the bargaining position of Iraq between East and West and has alienated it from the main current of Arab thought and aspiration, which to them is exemplified by Egyptian President 'Abd al-Nasir.

The conservative oligarchy has been able to maintain itself against the heady emotions engendered by Arab nationalism at home and abroad because the loyalty of the armed forces has been vigilantly maintained; judicious tampering with the election machinery has assured a "safe" parliament; and an expanding economy has helped to absorb and channel the energies of ambitious, educated youth, which everywhere in the Near East constitutes the most restive political element. An additional factor, perhaps the most important in maintaining the *status quo*, has been the political skill of Nuri al-Sa'id. Sometimes called a benevolent dictator, Nuri does not maintain himself primarily by force, although the knowledge that he is prepared, if necessary, to use force is itself a strong deterrent to civil disorder. Nuri's unique position rests upon his ability to anticipate, deflect, and contain the sources of opposition by playing one against another. Nuri often voices the classic anti-Israeli and Arab nationalist themes more loudly than his attackers; he never leaves opponents in sole command of popular issues. Aided by the highly centralized character of the government, he has built up through the years an intricate and highly personal system of patronage through which he is able to block or buy off much potential opposition and thus prevent formation of successful combinations against him. Chronic frustration adds to the emotional heat of Nuri's opposition, but his methods also compel grudging respect and admiration. As long as the present firm controls are exercised, there is little inclination to organize any party or movement against him.

Although several younger men, such as Khalil Kannah, are being given increasing responsibilities as potential future Prime Ministers, Nuri has no heir apparent capable of manipulating Iraqi politics with the same mastery. It is generally expected that his departure from active political life will be followed by a troubled period of jockeying for place among a number of potential successors, with the Palace playing a restraining moderating role and endeavoring to prevent sharp divergence from the present pro-Western policies. There are some signs that in Iraq a loyal opposition in the Western parliamentary sense is beginning to develop. In Parliament, and even among the restive elements of the middle class, there is a body of opinion which opposes Nuri personally and some aspects of his domestic policy, but which supports the throne, abjures extremist and violent means, and accepts with reservation the pro-Western orientation of Iraq. At present, however, persons of this political viewpoint lack leadership; and they have little immediate potential for achieving political organization.

All Iraqi political parties, including the Constitutional Union founded by Nuri al-Sa'id, were dissolved by martial law decree in November 1952, following an episode of preelection violence. Party groupings have continued in shadow form and actually functioned by tacit consent in two subsequent elections, but there has been no effective party life since late 1954. Government officials have recently expressed themselves as willing to charter any moderate group which would agree to act within the constitution and the national interest, but the few applications received have been turned down. Political parties, like all other organizations, are subject to very stringent laws; the government may suspend summarily, either permanently or temporarily, any association deemed detrimental to public security and may confiscate its funds. Another ordinance requires Ministry of Interior approval of any association's officers and regulations; prohibits membership of students or government employees in political associations; opens records and premises to government search; limits fees, subscriptions, and property holdings; and imposes other restrictions. Remnants of the former extreme nationalist Independence (*Istiqlal*) and National Democratic (*al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimūqrāti*) parties still meet informally with their respective leaders. Both are to some degree Communist infiltrated and at times respond favorably to the entreaties of the outlawed Communist Party of Iraq for common action. However, formation of a united front has been blocked by the government's refusal to legalize any combination of opposition groups. Visibly unable to offer the present governing group any real con-

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test, those leaders identified with nationalist-neutalist opposition in the last decade have lost stature and public confidence. The Communist Party itself, after several years of rigorous and consistent government suppression, is virtually impotent. The Party has worked out an alliance with the Ba'th Party (Hizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabi al-Ishtiraki—Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party), similarly outlawed by the government, and a quick revival of membership and activity in both parties is likely if government controls are relaxed.

D. Public order and security

Internal order in Iraq depends upon the police and army. The police, executive arm of the Ministry of Interior, are considered the first echelon of internal security. The maintenance of security is considered their primary mission; and they are, consequently, centrally organized as a military striking force commanded by a former army general. In event of severe or widespread disturbances, as in the period following the Anglo-French military action in Suez in 1956, police are supplemented by army units in maintaining internal order. In April 1957, political functions such as countersubversion and passport control were removed from the police proper and regrouped in a new Directorate General of Security. Positive intelligence is a function of the army. However, political intelligence activities, especially those concerning other Arab states, tend to be carried on outside the organizational framework by individuals or special missions loyal to the Palace or to a particular minister or interested official.

Police and army have always been separately maintained and at times interservice rivalry has been encouraged in order to use one force to counterbalance and check on the other. This was in part the aftermath of a period (1936-1941) of extensive army interference in politics when several governments were placed or unseated by coup and counter coup. Although it is always possible in Arab countries that political discontent will find expression through the army, both services in Iraq are at present considered nonpolitical and loyal to the regime. As is common in Near Eastern states, police are underpaid; and bribery and petty graft are commonplace. Slow advancement, isolated and uncongenial duty, and the universal dislike and disdain of the populace for the police all make for low morale and attract a relatively unpromising type of recruit. Top officers estimate that 75% of ordinary policemen are illiterate.

The services of British advisers on duty with the police have gradually been terminated (only one remained as of October 1957). Internal disturbances ensuing from the Suez crisis highlighted weaknesses of the police organization. The Iraqi

Government urgently requested and is to receive a police training mission from the United States through the Technical Cooperation Program, and also some needed police equipment.

E. National policies

Policy is determined and executed within the small ruling group which directs Iraqi affairs of state. Ordinary Iraqis are aware only of the more emotional regional issues in the field of foreign policy and largely ignore domestic affairs. On emotional issues which directly affect internal politics—Palestine, the Baghdad Pact versus Nāsir's "positive neutralism," Arab unity and "anti-imperialism"—even the most conservative political figures find it expedient to espouse the popular side publicly, whatever their actual policy intentions may be. Through much of the brief history of Iraq, consistent policymaking and orderly implementation have been hindered by administrative inexperience and by frequent Cabinet changes.

1. Internal policies

Only two major lines of internal policy emerge with consistency. The earliest is that of welding the heterogeneous peoples of the country into one population infused with a feeling of nationhood. Constant effort on many levels has not yet fully achieved this goal; most Iraqis still identify themselves primarily with the tribal, religious, or ethnic groupings to which they are born. Those who have positive feelings of patriotism are generally drawn to the vaguely defined ideal of Arab unity rather than to the country of Iraq as such.

Since 1950, the government's principal domestic policy aim has been the utilization of much of its oil income to finance a broad program of economic and social development. In May 1950 the Economic Development Board was created under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. It includes one U.K. and one U.S. member, and it has been entrusted with the allocation of 70% of the annual Iraqi oil revenues. The Board spent the equivalent of US\$450 million on its first program extending over five years; a second plan, covering six years, is under way, budgeted at US\$1.4 billion. Because of considerable intra-government criticism of the development program, initial concentration on long-range capital development has now given way to greater emphasis on direct-impact projects such as low-cost housing. Major programs undertaken by the Board are in the fields of flood control and irrigation, drainage and reclamation (including the distribution of newly reclaimed land to landless peasants as freeholdings), road and bridge construction, electrical power development and encouragement of small industries, improvement of agricultural methods, and exten-

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sion of education and of health services. Educational policies have been revised toward greater emphasis on trade and technical training geared to the needs of the development scheme, and efforts are being made to minimize political agitation in schools and colleges. These multifarious programs, which would tax a more expert administrative system than that of Iraq, are not well coordinated, nor are they proceeding with equal efficiency.

Under the stimulus of the development scheme, change is taking place in Iraqi life at an unsettling rate. On the one hand, many Iraqis are having difficulty adjusting themselves to the changes, while on the other, new desires are being created faster than economic expansion can be reasonably expected to satisfy them. Iraqi Government officials do not fully comprehend the resultant problems with their potential for violent political protest.

2. Foreign and defense policies

The principal aims of Iraqi foreign policy, as defined by the present ruling group, continue to be the promotion of the interests and prestige of the Hashimite royal house and the preservation of the delicate balance by which Iraq strives to keep intact its economic and defense ties with the West and at the same time to be a loyal member of the Arab community. The maintenance of this careful balance has been thus far largely a function of Nuri al-Sa'id's adeptness in international as well as local politics. To a considerable extent it depends also on the ability and willingness of the United States and the United Kingdom to provide the Iraqi Government sufficient support to justify its present policies in the eyes of the public.

The Baghdad Pact was initially executed 24 February 1955 (ratified 15 April 1955) as a treaty of mutual defense between Iraq and Turkey; Pakistan adhered 23 September and Iran 3 November 1955. On 5 April 1955 the United Kingdom became a party to the Baghdad Pact by means of a Special Agreement which replaced the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, long a primary target of the nationalistic segment of Iraqi opinion. This Special Agreement with its annexed notes, which is binding only as long as both parties are Baghdad Pact members, defines the terms of defense collaboration between Iraq and the United Kingdom; and the Pact is the only remaining formal link between the two countries.

Baghdad is the permanent seat of the Pact organization (see FIGURE 11) and of its regular secretariat. The United States, although not adhering to the Pact itself, is associated either as a full

member or observer with all of its operative bodies except the security organization. Joint participation in the Baghdad Pact has submerged many minor but longstanding frictions between Iraq and Iran and Turkey, and its relations with these countries are becoming increasingly cordial.

The membership of Iraq in the Baghdad Pact prevented fulfillment of Egyptian President 'Abd al-Nasir's dream of a solid bloc of Arab states under Egyptian leadership committed to neither East nor West and, as a concept of nationalism, undermined Nasir's dogma that true Arab nationalism must stand aloof from any great power system. The Pact thus revived a historic animosity between Iraq and Egypt over hegemony in the Arab world and opened a bitter personal contest between Nasir and Nuri al-Sa'id. Nasir's more flamboyant leadership, with its note of defiance of the Arabs' one-time "imperialist masters," has been a great restorative to Arab self-esteem after the Palestine defeat and has had greater popular appeal in all Arab countries than the real, but less spectacular, progress of Iraq. Popular adulation of Nasir for a time threatened to isolate Iraq in the Arab world and brought widespread criticism of its policies at home. However, Nasir's willingness to encourage the Arab peoples in movements against their own governments has alienated political leaders in Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia; and the gradual reversion in their policies has permitted Iraq to keep a place in the Arab community. A centuries-old dynastic quarrel between the Hashimite house and that of King Saud has been resolved, and cordial relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia have been established. Lebanon has given pro-Western Iraqi policies (although not the Baghdad Pact *per se*) open and consistent support. King Husayn of Jordan, a Hashimite cousin of Iraqi King Faysal II, has had to rely occasionally on Iraqi assistance against Israeli pressures and also to contain chronic internal unrest. Mutual support between the two governments, given under a treaty made in 1947, is assured as long as Husayn remains in control of Jordanian affairs, although the Iraqi regime is widely unpopular in Jordan and has undertaken major commitments there only reluctantly under impetus of Egyptian-Syrian pressures.

Iraq is especially concerned to have a friendly regime in Syria because the pipelines which carry much of the Iraqi oil to Mediterranean outlets pass through Syrian territory. Syria has, therefore, been a focus of the contest between Iraq and Egypt. As of October 1957, the pro-Egyptian and pro-U.S.S.R. element had achieved the upper hand in Syria; Syrians sympathetic to Iraq were silenced, demoralized, and politically impotent; and the possibility that Syria would become a base for

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


FIGURE 11. ORGANIZATION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT, 1957

Soviet penetration and subversion was causing acute alarm in Iraqi Government circles.

The prospect of nearby Western air bases inherent in the defense aspects of the Baghdad Pact animated the U.S.S.R. to initiate a new and more dynamic Near East policy. In April 1955 the Soviet Foreign Ministry publicly stated its opposition to the Pact and since then has afforded diplomatic support, arms, and limited economic assistance to Syria and Egypt, adversaries of the Pact. The Pact partners have in turn pressed for, and are receiving, new reassurances and increased support from the United States and the United Kingdom.

The acerbity of the differences between Iraq and Egypt has also exposed latent stresses in the Arab League, formed 22 March 1945 with Iraq as a charter member. Egyptian influence has predominated from the outset in the League, which has tended to become more and more an instrument of Egyptian policy. Except as a vehicle for concerting the already universally felt attitudes and actions against Israel, the League has become virtually inoperative. All League members except Jordan also belong to an Arab Collective Security Pact (February 1951) which was intended to form the basis of a joint military command structure directed primarily against Israel. The military

arrangement, frequently alluded to by Iraq, has been sidestepped by Egypt, which instead has created a series of bilateral and trilateral military agreements aimed at isolating Iraq and consolidating in Egyptian hands the military leadership of the Arab world. The extent to which these several joint command systems actually function depends on the shifting alignments of inter-Arab politics.

Toward Israel, Iraq emphatically supports the common Arab position; it does not recognize the Israeli state as a legal entity. Iraq has supported the economic boycott to the extent of maintaining closure of the leg of the oil pipeline that terminates in Haifa, despite the financial sacrifice involved. However, the Iraqi Government is loath to see Arab-Israeli issues become active because each flareup calls into question the alignment of Iraq with the West.

In 1954 Iraq suspended diplomatic representation with the U.S.S.R. without formally severing relations and now has no representation with any Soviet bloc country. Unlike other Arab governments, that of Iraq feels itself directly exposed to Soviet military threat because of geographic position. The government's attitude toward U.S.S.R.

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is one of intense suspicion, although many Iraqis outside the government obviously would like to regard the U.S.S.R. as a benevolent giant, well disposed toward the Arabs (see CHAPTER IV, SECTION 42 under Attitudes of the People).

The United States, once highly regarded in Iraq, has lost some of its standing because of popular resentment over U.S. support of and supposed bias toward Israel. However, in view of the contraction of U.K. power since World War II, Iraq has been anxious to see the United States become a more active participant in Near Eastern affairs and would, in fact, like the United States to be the principal guarantor of Iraqi security. To that end, Iraqi leaders have exerted all possible persuasion on the United States to join the Baghdad Pact and to assume a greater burden of military assistance, although this pressure has abated somewhat since enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and is played down during periods when Iraq is preoccupied with inter-Arab relations. Iraqi military leaders appear to have sensed and to resent the secret U.S.-U.K. agreement by which Iraq continues to receive mostly British equipment partly through offshore procurement.

The planning of defense policy, which is the function of a special Defense Council assisting the Minister of Defense, has also received impetus as a result of the Baghdad Pact, in which Iraq has had opportunity to compare its defense concepts with those of other member countries and to participate in the preparation of strategic plans for the Pact area. Most Iraqis regard Israel as their principal military threat and would probably prefer not to be involved in any global conflict; however, those in responsible positions recognize that Iraq, by reason of its geographic position and oil resources, would almost inevitably be drawn into any major conflict embracing the Near East.

F. Comments on principal sources

U.S. Government reports from Iraq, together with numerous published sources including Iraqi Government laws and publications used in the preparation of this Section and CHAPTER V, provided an abundance of data from a wide range of the social and political spectrum. However, a fuller assessment of anti-Western sentiment and its political potential would be desirable. With this exception, political data on Iraq is both adequate and reliable.

16. Economic

A. General

Iraq has as encouraging a long-run economic outlook as any other Near Eastern state. Although most of its area of about 170,000 square miles is desert, there are large areas of inherently fertile land awaiting only an adequate supply of water to make it productive. The twin-river system—the Tigris and the Euphrates—is potentially capable of supplying this water. Earnings from the vast oil resources are being utilized in financing a large-scale development program. With a somewhat sparse population (about 6.5 million) in relation to resources, prospects for economic development and a substantial increase in per capita income are favorable.

The Iraqi economy has been traditionally based upon agriculture, but by World War II the petroleum sector of the economy had begun to assume major importance. By 1956 the petroleum sector had outdistanced agriculture and accounted for about 27% of an estimated national income of ID292.4 million (US\$820 million—1 Iraqi Di-

nar=US\$2.80), as shown in the following estimates:

	MILLION IRAQI DINARS	PERCENT
Oil industry	78.2	27
Agriculture	70.0	24
Services	49.1	17
Manufacturing, except oil	33.7	11
Wholesale and retail trade	31.0	11
Housing and other construction	18.9	6
Transport	11.5	4
Total national income	292.4	100

The Iraqi Government embarked upon an ambitious economic development program in 1951 as a long range (20 years or more) plan; the first stage covered 1951-56. In 1955 a new six-year plan, to expend ID500 million, was adopted. Thus far, the government's rate of expenditure has tended to fall well below expectations; but it is anticipated that this rate of spending will increase during the next four years. On the whole, it appears that the development program, administered by a specially created Development Board,

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is well suited to the long-run basic needs of the country and is reasonably well covered by financial resources. Seventy percent of the government's earnings from oil operations provides the financial backing for the program. The new six-year development plan allocates 31% of over-all expenditures for irrigation and flood control, 25% for communications, 21% for public buildings, 10% for mining and industry, and 13% for miscellaneous projects.

As yet, however, the government's efforts to develop natural resources have had only a modest impact upon the economy, doing little to eradicate the widespread poverty which prevails in Iraq. The annual per capita income in 1956 may have approximated ID45 (US\$126), above the general average for the Near East but far below the economic potential of the country. Furthermore, whereas agriculture constituted only about one-fourth of the national income in 1956, approximately three-fourths of the population is directly dependent upon agriculture or animal husbandry. Consequently, the average per capita income of the farm population is probably far below the national average. The traditional sociological setting of the country, with tribal customs dominating its activity, tends to resist economic change. A semifeudal land tenure system that prevails throughout most of Iraq hinders the adoption of modern techniques, and the appeal of higher wages in the cities has helped stimulate a migration of farm labor to urban centers.

Foreign technical aid programs, sponsored by the United States and the United Nations, have been concerned primarily with the development of human and natural resources rather than by grant of budget support and other types of aid strictly financial in nature. Both extend technical assistance in agriculture, education, public health, and land and community development. While there has been progress in these fields, actual accomplishment has fallen behind originally projected schedules because of unforeseen problems which have developed as the complex Iraqi development plan has progressed. Advancement in agriculture, one of the major fields of technical assistance, has lagged as a result of the typical reasons cited under Subsection B, Agriculture, below.

The amount of aid granted by the United Nations, while important, is considerably less than that extended through ICA. The operations of the two agencies generally do not overlap but rather complement each other. In addition to the above-mentioned fields in which both agencies operate, ICA also extends technical assistance in the following important fields: highways, railroads, flood control, communications, public

and internal security. Approximately 115 specialists are provided through the ICA program.

A Baghdad Pact Nuclear Center was established in early 1957 at Ash Shālīkiyah, near Baghdad, for the training of students in the peaceful use of the atom. During the first year of operation, there are to be 3 classes of 20 students each (5 each from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey). It is planned to increase the number of classes in succeeding years. The six- to eight-weeks' course includes the study of nuclear structure, nuclear reaction, production of radio-active isotopes, properties of radio-active substances, and suitability of radio-active materials for specialized applications. The Center is equipped with the various instruments and electronic devices used in the field, and students are trained in their use.

Whereas in the long run Iraq should be able to achieve a more balanced economy, the present dependence upon oil revenues makes the economy vulnerable in the short run to serious disruptions should the export of oil be interrupted for any protracted period. The sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) pipelines in Syria in November 1956 would have been a much more serious blow to the economy had it not been for the substantial reserves held by the government and had not Iraq been able to obtain loans up to ID28.2 million from IPC. The rate of expenditure set forth in the new six-year plan involves a sharp decline in reserves over the next few years.

B. Agriculture

1. General

Despite the fact that agricultural output currently meets the basic subsistence requirements of the country and leaves a substantial surplus of some commodities for export, its relative importance in the economy has declined sharply since 1949. Whereas this relative decline is attributable largely to the boom in oil production, a quasi-feudal absentee land tenure system, the lack of enterprise among the rural population, primitive health standards, and a scarcity of private capital have discouraged any rapid increase in agricultural production. More recently, the lure of the cities and the increased demand for labor in connection with the government's development projects have precipitated a migration of farm labor to more lucrative occupations and has resulted in a shortage of agricultural labor in some regions of the country.

Only a small percentage of the total land area of Iraq is suitable for crops or intensive animal husbandry. In 1955, out of a total area of about 110 million acres, approximately 16 million acres

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were registered as agricultural land; less than half of this area was cultivated at any one time, mainly because of the fallow system of farming practiced in Iraq. In addition to this registered acreage, part of the large semiarid regions of the country is utilized for seasonal, nomadic grazing of livestock.

About two-thirds of total cultivated acreage lies in an irrigated zone along the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers in the central and southern sections of the country. Somewhat less than one-third is in a rain-fed zone in the north. Government irrigation and drainage projects now under construction or planned should eventually greatly

increase the total annually cultivated acreage (see FIGURE 12).

One of the main causes of the low productivity of the agricultural sector is the system of land tenure. Except for some fairly limited areas in various parts of the country, there are almost no peasant proprietors in Iraq. Although there are some indications of change, most of the arable land is held by quasi-feudal landlords, who either own it outright or have it under lease from the government on terms that approximate ownership. These large estates are cultivated by sharecroppers, who, in return for use of the land, surrender about 50% of their harvest to the landlords. Most land-




FIGURE 12. IRRIGATION SYSTEM

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lords show little or no interest in increasing the productivity of their estates. The land assigned to the fellah, or peasant, generally changes from year to year, so that he has little incentive to improve productivity. The depressed economic condition of the fellah tends seriously to limit the market for domestic industrial products. While the sharecropper is legally prohibited from leaving an estate so long as he is indebted to the landlord, as he usually is, more remunerative occupations are nevertheless causing some of them to seek employment elsewhere.

The confused tenure system covering grazing lands has seriously handicapped the development of a major livestock industry in Iraq. Since grazing rights and areas are not clearly defined and are allocated to various tribal groups, no efficient management of pastures can be maintained. With virtually no forage or grain feed grown, and only inadequate watering facilities, large numbers of livestock are lost in years of drought.

The power of the landlords has prevented an adequate implementation of many laws enacted since 1934 to improve the land tenure system. More recently some effort was made to supervise the settlement of newly opened lands. About 16,000 families had been settled on 1.4 million acres in various settlement projects and areas by the end of 1956. The Dujaylah settlement in southern Iraq, the earliest of such projects, encompasses about 80,000 acres operated by small peasant proprietors. To date, the Dujaylah project has been costly and only partially successful.

The scarcity of private capital and the disinclination of large landowners to mechanize have tended to restrict the adoption of more productive agricultural methods. Because of the shortage of resources and the shortcomings of its management, the Agricultural Bank, established as a separate institution by the government in 1940 with a paid-up capital of ID1.6 million, has not played a vital role in the economy. For the most part, it has concentrated its activities on making medium-term loans to the more substantial landowners of the country. The government has recently authorized a cooperative loan bank, a joint undertaking of the government and the agricultural cooperatives, with the government subscribing 51% of the bank's capital of ID250,000. The cooperative movement in Iraq, begun in 1944, has met with little success. A total of 51 cooperatives were registered in 1955, with activity limited to isolated consumer cooperatives.

In recent years the Iraqi Government has been giving increasing attention to agricultural policy. A college of agriculture and an experimental station have recently been established near Baghdad. There are at present four other experimental stations in the country. A veterinary college was

opened late in 1956. The Iraqi Government also provides scholarships for training abroad. New methods of agricultural extension are being coupled with programs in crop diversification. The extension service is now promoting the establishment of supply depots where small farmers may buy seeds, fertilizers, and farm machinery. The Iraq Development Board has allocated US\$78.4 million in the 1957/58 budget to finance the beginnings of a comprehensive land drainage program. With the cost of drainage estimated at about US\$55 per acre, this appropriation should make it possible to reclaim 1.4 million acres of arable land.

Iraq is currently receiving substantial technical assistance from the United States in the field of agriculture. Among U.S. programs being implemented by the International Cooperation Administration in this field are plant quarantine, irrigation operation and maintenance, village water improvement, a farm mechanics workshop, livestock and dairy production, and agricultural extension. Achievements have been limited; one of the major problems is inefficiency of the Iraqi Government administration. Technicians are seriously hampered in their work by lack of transportation facilities, slow procedures, procurement problems, refusal to delegate authority and tendency to shun responsibility on the part of lesser officials, and lack of trained personnel or even personnel qualified for immediate training.

The United Nations Technical Assistance Program in Iraq, with 40 specialists, is also concerned with increasing agricultural production. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has provided experts in forestry, rice cultivation, poultry husbandry, soils, dairy production, forage production, marketing, and agricultural extension.

2. Production

Agriculture in Iraq is characterized by generally poor yields, attributable to, in addition to problems noted above, the uncertain supply of water, the salinization of the soil because of poor drainage, the marginal fertility of some soils, and the generally antiquated methods of cultivation. Little fertilizer is applied to the soil. The system of crop rotation is inadequate and makes little provision for soil-building crops. The soil is often poorly prepared because of the inadequate supply and poor quality of draft animals.

Soil and climatic conditions vary considerably throughout Iraq and account for the regional specialization in various crops. Date production is centered chiefly in the Basra region and in central Iraq; tobacco is grown primarily in the north; and most of the rice is produced in the south in the Al 'Amārah province.

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Wheat and barley are more widely dispersed; and they are by far the most important agricultural commodities, normally grown on more than 85% of the cultivated acreage, and together account for nearly 50% of Iraqi exports (excluding petroleum). Output fluctuates widely—wheat, from 500,000 to 1,200,000 metric tons, and barley, from 700,000 to 1,200,000 metric tons in recent years—according to rainfall and supply of irrigation water. Yields are well below those of the United States. Rice, another leading cereal crop, is produced particularly in the Al 'Amārah province, where large estates predominate and where irrigation is usually adequate. Output in 1956, a slightly below-average year, was 111,000 metric tons.

Iraq produces about 80% of the world supply of dates. In 1956, when the country produced 300,000 metric tons, dates comprised more than 17% of total exports, excluding oil, and stood second to barley in importance as an export crop. Dates also constitute an important staple food for the lower income groups of the country.

Tobacco, grown principally by Kurdish cultivators, is of some importance. A government monopoly determines the acreage devoted to tobacco production, which in 1957 amounted to about 18,600 acres. Production ranges between 5,000 and 6,000 tons annually, and in 1957 it is estimated at 5,250 tons. Local output of tobacco satisfies the bulk of normal Iraqi requirements. In 1956, an estimated 8,800 metric tons of cotton, another minor crop, was also produced. Recent trends in the production of leading agricultural commodities are illustrated in FIGURE 13. The sharp reduction in 1955 is attributable to adverse climatic conditions.




FIGURE 13. TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Sheep and goats are by far the most numerous types of livestock in Iraq. According to the 1953 livestock census there were 4.5 million sheep (more recent estimates place the number at about 8.5 million) and 1.6 million goats in the country, as well as lesser numbers of cattle, horses, donkeys, mules, buffaloes, and camels.

C. The petroleum industry

1. Importance

In recent years the importance of the oil sector in the economy of Iraq has grown very rapidly. In May 1957 Iraq ranked fourth among crude oil producing countries in the Near East, exceeded only by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Over 95% of the total production is exported as crude petroleum, principally to the industrial centers of western Europe.

2. Pipelines

Crude petroleum operations have been initiated, developed, and owned by foreign companies, by far the most important of which is the Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd. (IPC).^{*} Location of the main producing fields far in the interior of the country has necessitated the development of an extensive pipeline transportation system to ocean ports. Most of the oil must be moved at least 500 miles. The operating oil companies have developed two distinct pipeline systems: the northern, with terminals on the eastern Mediterranean; and the southern, much smaller, with a Persian Gulf outlet.

The IPC constructed the northern system of pipelines and pumping stations—valued at 83% of its investment—to carry crude through Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean and thereby save several thousand miles in tanker haul to western Europe as well as eliminate toll costs at the Suez Canal. This shortcut enables IPC to compete successfully with other Near East petroleum on the western Europe market. A table, FIGURE 14, shows the ultimate destinations of the petroleum in recent years. The small amounts of crude pumped off for Syria and Lebanon are refined at an IPC re-

^{*} There are three principal crude oil producing companies: the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Basra Petroleum Company, and the Mosul Petroleum Company, all of which have the same ownership. Owners are: the British Petroleum Company, the Royal Dutch Shell Group, and the *Compagnie Française des Pétroles* each with 23.75%; the Near East Development Corporation, also with 23.75%, owned 50% by Standard Oil (N.J.) and 50% by Socony Mobil Oil Company; and the Gulbenkian Estate the remaining 5%. The fourth company, the Khanaqin Oil Company, is owned entirely by the British Petroleum Company and is a small producer. The oil companies and the Iraqi Government share the profits equally.

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FIGURE 14. CRUDE OIL EXPORTED FROM IRAQ, BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION
(In thousands of long tons)

COUNTRY OF DESTINATION	1953		1954		1955	
	Northern pipelines	Southern pipeline	Northern pipelines	Southern pipeline	Northern pipelines	Southern pipeline
Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan.....	576	0	581	0	555	0
France.....	8,538	679	9,367	789	9,243	1,083
United Kingdom.....	5,513	666	4,232	766	3,438	224
Federal Republic of Germany.....	1,467	0	1,582	0	1,800	257
Italy.....	5,340	425	6,121	628	5,822	1,572
Belgium.....	867	0	915	0	1,411	0
Netherlands.....	665	276	1,153	47	267	170
United States.....	117	67	181	0	992	0
Portugal.....	14	66	181	331	33	595
Spain.....	49	0	14	0	618	0
Borneo.....	0	343	0	1,384	0	0
Indonesia.....	0	248	0	389	0	2,551
Other countries.....	743	93	407	118	517	496
Total.....	23,889	2,863	24,734	4,452	24,696	6,948

FIGURE 15. PETROLEUM OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

YEAR	PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM	CONSUMPTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM IN LOCAL REFINERIES	VALUE OF CRUDE EXPORTS	VALUE OF IMPORTS BY CONCESSIONAIRES	RECEIPTS TO IRAQ, INCLUDING LOCAL EXPENDITURES	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
	1,000 long tons		ID1,000,000			1,000
1946.....	4,680	385	10.8	2.4	4.1	11.3
1947.....	4,702	470	14.0	5.0	7.7	14.6
1948.....	3,427	505	11.4	9.3	11.1	14.2
1949.....	4,067	520	14.1	10.3	7.6	12.9
1950.....	6,479	560	28.7	8.4	7.9	11.4
1951.....	8,351	610	35.7	8.8	19.3	11.0
1952.....	18,843	710	79.6	14.4	*48.4	13.3
1953.....	28,217	795	120.1	13.2	55.4	13.2
1954.....	29,812	1,121	156.0	5.8	66.7	12.8
1955.....	31,744	1,016	168.1	6.3	94.3	15.3
1956.....	30,706	1,231	156.6	7.2	79.9	16.0

* Including ID7.5 million for settlement of previous claims.

finery at Tripoli, Lebanon, to supply products needed in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. A southern IPC pipeline going to Haifa has been inoperative since 1948. Oil produced by the Mosul Petroleum Company is exported through IPC pipelines. The southern pipeline, owned by Basra Petroleum Company, terminates at the Iraqi port of Al Faw and does not transit any other country. Most of the oil goes to western Europe and must, therefore, make the long journey around the Arabian Peninsula and pass through the Suez Canal. Because of the sabotage of the three pumping stations in Syria during the Suez crisis, total exports in 1956 amounted to 29.2 million long tons, compared to 31.6 million in 1955.

3. Production

The trend of petroleum production has paralleled the course of pipeline developments. Commercial production began on a very small scale in 1925; a table, FIGURE 15, traces its growth since World War II as facilities have been increased. It had been expected that 34 million long tons would be reached

in 1956, but sabotage to the three IPC pumping stations in Syria in November 1956 and the closing of the Suez Canal affecting tankers from Al Faw caused severe cutbacks, as shown by the following figures on output in million long tons:

1956		1957	
September	3.1	January	0.8
October	3.2	February	0.8
November	0.6	March	1.4
December	1.0	April	1.6

Output has continued to recover with the partial rehabilitation of the IPC pipelines, beginning in mid-March 1957, and the reopening of the Suez Canal in April; but it remains below the peak reached in October of 1956. Operation of the trans-Syrian pipelines in September 1957 was about 68% of capacity, or at an annual rate of 17 million long tons.

The value of Iraqi oil exports and the foreign exchange receipts of Iraq from the petroleum sector increased much more rapidly between 1953 and 1955 than the physical output (FIGURE 15).

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The difference is due to a change in the financial agreement between the government and the petroleum companies. The unusually high figure of foreign exchange receipts in 1955 includes ID10.7 million due on the 1954 oil exports under the terms of the revised agreement signed in March 1955.

4. Refining

Refining of petroleum products in Iraq is mainly for local consumption. With the exception of a relatively small bitumen export transaction in 1957, refined products exported are for oil company use only. Imports are now limited to lubricants not produced by the Dawrah lubricants refinery and to aviation gasoline. Figure 15 shows the total amounts of crude consumed in domestic refineries. Considerable improvement and expansion of refining capacity took place in 1955 when the Government Oil Refineries Administration completed a new refinery with a capacity of 24,000 barrels daily at Dawrah, near Baghdad, designed to supply domestic needs. It is entirely owned by the Iraqi Government, utilizing the services of U.S. contract management. Further expansion to 48,000 barrels a day charging capacity is planned by 1960 by which time increased domestic consumption of petroleum products is expected. Dawrah is the only major refinery in Iraq, having replaced the obsolete Alwand refinery, previously the principal source for domestic supply. Other government-owned refineries are Muftiyah and Qayyarah. IPC owns topping plants at Kirkuk and Al Hadithah that refine products largely for company operations.

5. IPC expansion plans

IPC's export plans call for over 40 million long tons per year crude exports by 1960. Iraq apparently prefers to expand existing facilities before considering a proposed pipeline which would skirt Syria and terminate in Iskanderun, Turkey. Iraqi attitudes on this Turkish pipeline vary, depending on internal and external political circumstances. Expansion of existing facilities, with full restoration of the trans-Syrian lines capacity of 25 million long tons, would increase Iraqi oil exports by 23.5 million long tons annually, or more than 70% over the pre-Suez crisis level.

D. Other industries

1. Composition

Apart from oil Iraq has few industries of any size. They consist of the production of electricity, cement, textiles, sugar, soap, asbestos pipe, beer, vegetable oil, and matches and in 1956 contributed a mere ID34 million, or 11%, to the national product. An industrial census of 1954 showed that

the largest enterprises are those supplying electricity and water and those manufacturing bricks and cement, while many small-unit industries produce consumer goods. Concentrated in and around Baghdad, over 90,000 persons were employed by industry in 1954, and their number has expanded considerably since then. This does not include the many handicraftsmen without fixed workshops.

2. Recent progress

With the impetus of development plans, industrial advances have been made in Iraq both by the private and the public sectors. Industrial capacity has been raised considerably; and it is expected that four additional cement factories, two of which will be privately owned, will come into operation in 1957 and increase capacity from 2,000 to 3,400 metric tons per day. In textiles, present capacity is about 40 million square yards per annum, which constitutes a large part of total consumption. About 60% of this capacity is state owned and has only recently been commissioned. Electric power capacity is about 180,000 kilowatts.

3. Government policy

It is generally recognized that the realization of the government's industrialization goals will depend on a broad participation of the private sector, but so far this has not occurred. Private capital participation is at present somewhat hampered because of a traditional predilection for handicrafts, the lack of technical and managerial skills, and a seemingly higher rate of return in trade, commerce, and real estate transactions. Industrial capital formation is further handicapped by the absence of an organized capital market. Stated government policy is to establish and prove industrial projects, then turn them over to private industry. This course would minimize the risk of failure and encourage private capital to seek industrial risks.

Steps also have had to be taken to encourage private initiative in industrial investment. A law has been enacted whereby private enterprise may participate in projects established and initially operated by the Development Board. The law also provides that raw materials and machinery imports shall be exempted from tariff duties. Infant industries vital to the economy will be given protection by the government from foreign competition. Other financial incentives to private industry take the form of income tax exemption, rent-free sites, and access to the resources of the Industrial Bank which in 1956/57 were increased by a loan of ID3 million from the Development Board. The resources of this bank can be used either in the form of loans to private entrepre-

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neurs or in direct equity capital participation. As of March 1957 the bank had disbursed industrial loans totaling ID2.4 million and had equity investments of ID1.7 million. In the summer of 1957 the Industrial Bank was placed under the jurisdiction of the Third Technical Section of the Development Board to permit coordination of financing and planned industrial development.

Government participation under the revised six-year development plan approved in 1956 anticipated allocating US\$188 million for industrial development in the period 1955/56-1960/61.

E. Foreign trade

1. Exports

Principally because of its large exports of petroleum, Iraq regularly enjoys a merchandise trade surplus. A summary of Iraqi foreign trade from 1949 through October 1956 is shown in FIGURE 16. In 1955 total exports were valued at ID185.3 million, of which ID168.1 million, or 91%, consisted of petroleum. A breakdown of Iraqi petroleum exports by pipeline systems is shown in FIGURE 14.

Agriculture accounts for all of the remaining exports of any significance. Such exports have declined continuously since 1953 because of a rise in domestic consumption, marketing problems, and decline in the output of some export commodities (see FIGURE 17). Cereals and dates accounted for more than 70% of the non-oil exports in both 1954 and 1955. The percentage in 1956 was somewhat lower because of the effects of the 1955 drought on cereal production. Until October 1955 Iraq had difficulty in disposing of its dates, but since then substantially smaller crops of high quality have permitted disposal of surpluses. Marketing has improved as a result of an agreement with the United Kingdom under which the latter abolished its 10% ad valorem duty on pitted dates. During 1956 and 1957 Iraq accumulated large carryover stocks of barley.

FIGURE 17. PRINCIPAL EXPORTS (EXCLUDING OIL), 1954-56
(In millions of Iraqi Dinars)

ITEM	1954		1955		JANUARY-OCTOBER 1956	
	Value	Per-cent	Value	Per-cent	Value	Per-cent
Barley.....	8.8	48.9	6.0	37.7	4.4	40.6
Wheat.....	0.5	2.8	1.7	10.7	insig	insig
Other grains.....	0.7	3.8	0.9	5.7	0.4	3.4
Dates.....	3.5	19.4	2.8	17.6	1.8	16.3
Raw cotton.....	0.3	1.7	0.6	3.8	0.5	4.9
Raw wool.....	0.9	5.0	1.4	8.8	1.3	12.4
Live animals.....	1.6	8.9	0.4	2.6	0.4	3.5
Seeds.....	0.3	1.7	0.5	3.1	0.3	2.6
Hides and skins.....	0.3	1.7	0.2	1.3	0.3	2.7
Other.....	1.2	6.1	1.4	8.8	1.4	13.6
Total.....	18.1	100.0	15.9	100.0	10.8	100.0

During the last three years the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Denmark took more than one-third of the nonpetroleum exports, the United States about 4% of the total, and the Sino-Soviet bloc practically nothing.

2. Imports

The large receipts, through royalties from petroleum exports, enable Iraq to pursue a liberal import policy and thereby satisfy in part the demand generated by large-scale development expenditures. The propensity to import in Iraq is high, largely because of the limited variety of consumer goods produced locally and the dependence upon foreign suppliers for most capital goods.

Preliminary data indicate that imports in 1956 totaled ID113.9 million, or 17% more than in 1955. The large capital goods component (40% of total imports since 1953) was originally due to large-scale imports by petroleum companies in connection with the construction of pipelines and other installations. Since 1953 such imports have declined, but they have been offset by large-scale capital goods imports associated with the government's development program. Sugar, tea, and

FIGURE 16. TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
(In millions of Iraqi Dinars)

YEAR	IMPORTS				EXPORTS				TRANSIT TRADE
	For local consumption	Currency and bullion	By oil companies	Total	Non-oil	Reexports	Petroleum	Total	
1949.....	30.2	0	10.3	40.5	11.2	1.2	14.1	26.5	2.7
1950.....	29.2	0	8.4	37.6	20.1	1.6	28.7	50.4	4.3
1951.....	42.1	0	8.8	50.9	27.0	1.9	35.7	64.6	5.7
1952.....	47.4	0	14.4	61.8	18.8	1.2	79.6	99.6	6.6
1953.....	55.2	insig	13.2	68.4	19.1	0.8	120.1	140.0	7.3
1954.....	65.6	1.4	5.8	72.8	18.1	0.6	156.0	174.7	6.2
1955.....	89.1	1.8	6.3	97.2	15.9	1.3	168.1	185.3	6.1
1956 (Jan.-Oct.).....	89.2	n a	7.2	96.4	10.8	n a	156.6	167.4	n a

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FIGURE 18. PRINCIPAL IMPORTS
(In millions of Iraqi Dinars)

ITEM	1954		1955		JANUARY- OCTOBER 1956	
	Value	Per- cent	Value	Per- cent	Value	Per- cent
Sugar.....	5.3	7.3	5.3	5.4	6.4	6.6
Tea.....	6.4	8.8	8.1	8.3	5.8	6.0
Cotton piece goods..	3.7	5.1	3.2	3.3	2.1	2.2
Rayon piece goods..	4.8	6.6	5.5	5.7	4.3	4.5
Woolen piece goods..	1.1	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.1
Soap.....	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Iron and steel.....	8.2	11.3	13.0	13.4	12.6	13.0
Boilers and machin- ery.....	10.1	13.9	12.5	12.8	15.6	16.2
Vehicles and parts..	6.2	8.5	9.7	10.0	7.8	8.1
Electrical machin- ery.....	3.5	4.8	4.8	4.9	6.9	7.2
Chemicals and phar- maceuticals.....	2.1	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.4	2.5
Paper and card- board.....	1.2	1.6	1.3	1.4	1.8	1.9
Timber.....	1.5	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.1	2.2
Other.....	18.1	24.9	26.6	27.4	26.7	27.7
Total.....	72.8	100.0	97.2	100.0	96.4	100.0

FIGURE 19. SOURCES OF IMPORTS (INCLUDING OIL
COMPANY IMPORTS)
(In millions of Iraqi Dinars)

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	1954		1955		JANUARY- OCTOBER 1956	
	Value	Per- cent	Value	Per- cent	Value	Per- cent
United Kingdom....	22.5	30.9	27.4	28.2	27.8	28.8
United States.....	10.3	14.1	14.7	15.1	13.8	14.3
Federal Republic of Germany.....	6.0	8.2	7.6	7.8	8.9	9.2
Japan.....	5.9	8.1	8.2	8.4	5.9	6.1
Ceylon.....	5.3	7.3	7.5	7.8	5.8	6.0
Belgium.....	2.4	3.3	3.2	3.2	5.0	5.2
Netherlands.....	2.3	3.2	3.1	3.2	2.8	2.9
Italy.....	2.1	2.9	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.2
India.....	2.3	3.2	2.5	2.6	1.5	1.6
Other.....	13.7	18.8	20.8	21.4	22.8	23.7
Total.....	72.8	100.0	97.2	100.0	96.4	100.0

textiles, accounting for more than 35% of total imports of consumer goods since 1954, are the more important of such imports. Textile imports, however, have tended to decline in recent years because of the increased domestic production (FIGURE 18).

The United Kingdom is by far the most important source of imports since Iraq is a member of the sterling area. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are the next most important suppliers. In aggregate these three countries account for more than 50% of total imports (FIGURE 19). Imports from the Sino-Soviet bloc are of little importance, accounting for only about 2%, or ID2.3 million, of the total

in 1956, of which more than 50% originated in Czechoslovakia.

F. Finance

1. General

Until 1931 Iraq was a member of the Indian monetary area, and Indian rupees circulated as the internal means of payment. In 1931 the Iraq Currency Board was established to handle the issuance of the national currency. The dinar was set up as the currency unit, and its exchange rate was fixed at par with the pound sterling. While the Currency Board was a supervisory agency, it had no authority to pursue a monetary policy aimed at influencing domestic economic activity. It was the foreign exchange situation that mechanically determined the volume of currency in circulation. In 1947 the National Bank of Iraq was created as a bona fide central bank, but it was not until 1949 that the bank actually started operations.

The National Bank Law of 1947 provides that the central bank shall: 1) manage the currency and ensure its stability, 2) serve the state finances, 3) facilitate internal and external payments, and 4) promote and facilitate credits for trade, industry, and agriculture. Although its legal framework contains all of the necessary prerequisites of a bona fide central bank, the National Bank of Iraq has generally been very cautious in exercising its authority.

In addition to the National Bank there are at the present time 11 commercial banks and 5 government-financed credit institutions operating in Iraq. Of the commercial banks eight are branches of foreign banking institutions, two are privately owned by Iraqi businessmen, and one (the Rafidain Bank) is state owned. In addition to the banking institutions noted above, there are *sarrāfs* (moneylenders) who supplement the commercial banks. Banks and *sarrāfs* are subject to control by the National Bank of Iraq in accordance with the Law for the Control of Banking of 1950.

2. Monetary situation

During recent years Iraq has enjoyed a considerable degree of monetary stability, despite the potential inflationary pressures growing out of the rapid increase in royalty payments by oil companies. Whereas the steady rise in these payments has stimulated substantial government expenditures on economic development, a large part of the receipts has accumulated as reserves having no direct impact upon the money supply. Furthermore, because of a progressively liberalized import policy, imports have risen greatly during the period. Consequently, increases in the money supply and in the cost of living have not been un-

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


FIGURE 20. INDEXES OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTION, COST OF LIVING, AND MONEY SUPPLY

usually large in recent years. The relationship between oil production and the monetary situation is illustrated in FIGURE 20.

As of 31 May 1957, the total money supply amounted to ID77 million, an increase of more than 60% since 1950. Although deposit money has increased substantially during the past six years, central bank notes still comprise more than 65% of the total money supply. Iraqi law provides that at least 70% of the cover for currency issued shall consist of gold or foreign currencies. In practice a cover of more than 90% is maintained in order to guarantee confidence in the Iraqi Dinar. As of 31 May 1957, such holdings by the National Bank of Iraq amounted to ID108 million, or more than twice the amount of the total note issue.

Although total money supply increased by 18% between January 1956 and May 1957, a general feeling of monetary stringency has prevailed. This stringency apparently resulted more from an increase in demand for loans than from any important decline in the supply of loanable funds. Most commercial banks increased their interest rates from 5% to 7% (legal maximum) during 1956. Whereas the liquidity position of the banking system in general has remained satisfactory, this has not been true of all banks, some of which have endeavored to attract demand deposits by paying as much as 4.5% interest on them.

The claims of the commercial banks upon the private sector of the economy amounted to ID32.8 million in December 1956. This was nearly three times the level of such claims in 1951, but only ID1.7 million above the level of December 1955. Whereas the National Bank of Iraq is the lender

of last resort and offers rediscounting services at 3.5%, the generally favorable liquidity position of commercial banks has lessened the necessity of such borrowing. Consequently, the central bank's control over commercial banks is rather limited.

3. International finance

a. GENERAL — Approximately 90% of the foreign exchange earnings of Iraq are sold to the Bank of England in return for sterling claims that are invested primarily in British Government securities. In return for delivery of the bulk of its foreign exchange earnings to the common pool, Iraq is permitted to draw foreign currencies—including dollars—"according to need." In general, Iraq has found the payments arrangements of the sterling area sufficiently liberal to permit necessary purchases from the dollar area.

Mainly because of the large sterling receipts from the oil companies, Iraq normally enjoys a strong foreign exchange position. Between 1949 and 1956 total gold and foreign exchange holdings increased by more than 200%, or from US\$111.8 million to US\$374.7 million. Sterling accounts for more than 95% of the total holdings, although since 1955 the gold component has increased moderately.

The sabotage of the IPC pipelines in Syria in November 1956 significantly reduced foreign exchange earnings in the following months. As of 30 June 1957, holdings had declined to about US\$325.4 million. The anticipated increase in foreign exchange expenditures on development during the 1957/58 fiscal year may cause a more substantial drop in over-all foreign exchange holdings

FIGURE 21. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(In millions of Iraqi Dinars)

ITEM	1955	1956
Current transactions:		
Goods and services		
Merchandise.....	+88.2	+59.9
Investment income.....	-73.7	-68.8
Other services.....	-1.9	+7.5
Total goods and services.....	+12.6	-1.4
Donations and related transfers		
Salaries remitted abroad.....	-0.4	-0.4
Private donations.....	+1.4	+3.6
Official donations.....	+2.4	+2.5
Total current transactions.....	+16.0	+4.3
Errors and omissions.....	+1.1	+6.8
	+17.1	+11.1
Capital transactions:		
Private (excluding banking system)		
Long term.....	+6.1	-0.7
Government and banking system		
Long term.....	-5.7	-1.7
Short term.....	-14.5	-6.7
Monetary gold.....	-3.0	-2.0
Total capital transactions.....	-17.1	-11.1

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during the coming year, or at least until the flow of the IPC pipeline has been fully restored.

b. **BALANCE OF PAYMENTS** — During recent years Iraq has normally experienced a substantial surplus on current account. In 1955 this surplus amounted to about ID16 million (US\$45 million) (FIGURE 21). The surplus in 1956, however, amounted to only ID4.3 million (US\$12 million), because of the sharp reduction in oil revenues in November and December.

4. Public finance

The sharp rise in petroleum revenues after 1949 greatly increased the financial role of the government in the economy by permitting it to undertake an ambitious program of economic development. Whereas government expenditures amounted only to about ID4 million during the 1921/22 fiscal year, they totaled approximately ID90 million during the 1955/56 year (excluding expenditures under the autonomous budgets).

Iraq operates under a multibudget system. At the present time there is an ordinary budget, which covers the normal operations of the government; the Development Board budget; 4 related budgets; and 14 autonomous budgets. Prior to 1951 all of the oil revenues were allocated to the ordinary budget for use in financing capital works projects. On 1 April 1951, however, capital works projects were transferred to the newly created Development Board budget. Under this new arrangement 30% of the oil revenues were allocated to the ordinary budget and the balance to the Development Board budget.

Because of the increasing petroleum revenues, the ordinary budget was in approximate balance or in surplus until the 1956/57 fiscal year; in fact, a surplus of ID12.5 million was attained during 1955/56 (see FIGURE 22). Abnormally heavy expenditures during 1956/57 (ID74.5 million), coupled with a modest decline in revenues, resulted in an apparent deficit of ID12.8 million. The budgetary deficit was covered from reserves; and a loan agreement concluded during 1957, with IPC apparently permitting Iraq to borrow up to ID1,028.8 million, has provided adequate support to the 1957/58 budget, pending full restoration of the pipelines through Syria. Detailed budget figures are presented in FIGURE 23.

Oil revenue now accounts for more than one-third of the total receipts under the ordinary budget, or about the same as customs duties and excise taxes combined. The sources of the ordinary budget revenues are shown in FIGURE 24.




FIGURE 22. REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES

FIGURE 23. BUDGETARY REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
(In millions of Iraqi Dinars)

ITEM	ACTUAL 1955/56	REVISED ESTIMATES 1956/57	ESTI- MATES 1957/58
EXPENDITURES:			
Defense and police.....	20.03	27.19	27.47
Economic schemes and local administration.....	7.70	16.51	11.17
Ministry of Interior.....	2.79	2.84	1.72
Ministry of Finance.....	3.53	4.13	4.79
Ministry of Education.....	3.43	5.96	6.29
Health and Social Welfare....	4.72	6.35	6.75
Ministry of Commerce and Works.....	2.35	3.13	3.37
Agriculture.....	1.73	2.68	2.53
Other expenditures.....	4.59	5.72	6.60
Total.....	50.87	74.51	70.69
REVENUES:			
Oil revenue.....	25.32	22.84	25.40
Customs and excise.....	25.13	24.00	27.46
Income tax.....	2.18	2.00	2.75
Property tax and stamp duties.....	1.55	1.36	1.56
Agriculture.....	2.67	3.47	2.54
Government agencies income.	3.53	4.66	3.35
Post and telegraph.....	2.02	2.03	1.03
Other revenues.....	1.00	1.32	4.32
Total.....	63.40	61.68	68.41
BALANCE.....	+12.53	-*12.83	-2.28

* In the 1957/58 budget speech, the fiscal deficit was stated to have been ID10 million.

Since the expenditures on economic development are now covered primarily by the Development Board budget, defense (including the police force)

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


FIGURE 24. SOURCES OF REVENUE FOR ORDINARY BUDGET




FIGURE 25. EXPENDITURES UNDER ORDINARY BUDGET

is by far the most important expenditure item under the ordinary budget (FIGURE 25). Costs for maintaining completed Development Board projects, not yet fully recognized, will doubtless constitute an increasing expenditure of the ordinary budget.

During the four-year period from 1951/52 to 1954/55 total outlays of the Development Board budget amounted to ID56 million compared with revenues of over ID108 million during the period. During the six-year period from 1955/56 to 1960/61

expenditures of ID500 million are contemplated, distributed as follows, in millions of dinars:

Flood control, irrigation, and drainage	153.8
Roads	63.7
Railroads	24.9
Public buildings	20.9
Housing	24.1
Industry, mining, and electricity	67.1
Buildings and institutions	59.4
Others	86.1
	500.0

Direct expenditures during the first two years of this six-year period have amounted to only ID78 million compared to the planned total of ID102 million, mainly because in the early years the plans and specific projects were not yet ready for effective implementation and because of a shortage of competent domestic labor. The drop in oil revenues after November 1956 has delayed the commencement of some projects, but the adverse effects have been minimized by the fact that the Development Board held reserves amounting to about ID68 million on 31 December 1956.

As of December 1956 Iraq had no external debt. During 1957, however, the IPC extended loans of up to ID28.2 million to compensate for the decline in oil revenues. If the loan is repaid before the end of 1959 no interest will be charged. The internal public debt, amounting to ID27.22 million on 31 December 1956, is held mainly by the central bank.

G. Comments on principal sources

Principal sources in the preparation of this brief have been U.S. Embassy and Consulate reports, studies by the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations, as well as official Iraqi publications. Censuses and other compilations directed by Dr. K. G. Fenelon (a British national), Statistical Expert to the Government of Iraq, have been invaluable.

Available sources of economic information on Iraq are generally adequate and reliable except for current statistical data. Publication of Iraqi official statistical periodicals is generally tardy and analytical and statistical information—particularly in the field of petroleum and other industrial developments—is scanty. There were many errors and omissions as to unit, such as failure to specify kind of tons, and conflicting statistical data among different sources.

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18. Armed Forces

A. General

The armed forces of Iraq, above the Near East average in training and equipment, consist of an army, which includes a small river force, and an air force which is subordinate to the army. The armed forces are inexperienced in combat, but military personnel are seasoned to hardship. An adequate reserve and mobilization system has not been developed. The level of general and technical education of enlisted men is relatively low, and there is a shortage of professionally qualified officers.

Currently the armed forces are receiving U.S. equipment through a mutual defense agreement concluded between the United States and Iraq in 1954. Most of the training assistance, however, continues to be given by British Loan Personnel stationed with both the army and the air force, in accordance with a memorandum of understanding between the United States and the United Kingdom.

1. Historical

Modern Iraq was founded as a separate state at the close of World War I, after having been under the rule of one or another foreign power over a period of centuries. There is, therefore, little national tradition in military affairs.

A force known as the Iraqi Levies was raised in 1915 by the British Government to assist its political officers in maintaining law and order under military government. Levies officers were British, and the organization was similar to that of the British Indian Army. This policy was changed in 1921 when the Iraqi Army was activated with officers recruited from Iraqi officers who had fought in the Hedjaz Army.* The British Military Mission guided the army until 1948. From 1951 to the present British Loan Personnel have served with the Iraqi Army on a contract basis to assist in training.

The Royal Iraqi Air Force (RIAF) came into existence in 1931, following the arrival in April 1931 of a British Royal Air Force (RAF) officer and

- * The Hedjaz Army was an irregular tribal force organized during World War I from deserters from the Ottoman Turkish Army and the followers of King Husayn, the Hashimite Shari of Mecca. It was financed and partially led by the British, one of whom was the noted Lawrence of Arabia.

several British-trained Iraqis who flew five Gipsy Moth trainer aircraft from England to Iraq. By the end of 1932 the newly formed air force possessed two organized squadrons. From its earliest days the RIAF has, except for brief periods, been advised by, and under the supervision of, RAF personnel.

Military ground action was confined largely to campaigns against unruly tribal elements within the national borders from 1921 to 1948, except for a brief period in 1941, when a coup d'état fomented by German Nazis in Iraq resulted in the overthrow of the Iraqi Government and initiation of hostilities against the British in the area. The principal fighting took place when the Iraqi Army besieged the British Habbaniya Airfield. The British garrison drove the Iraqi Army from its positions and, supported by a small British and Arab force from Palestine and Transjordan, again brought the country under British control. An armistice was signed between Britain and Iraq, and the army participated in no activities during World War II other than operations against rebellious tribes within the country.

In 1948, between 18,000 and 20,000 Iraqi troops were sent to aid the other Arab armies in operations against Israel. Supply was a major bottleneck for Iraqi units, and their efforts were not particularly successful. The operations were useful, however, in pointing up logistical weaknesses in the army. The RIAF made only several inconclusive bombing raids on Israeli towns and troop concentrations during the Arab-Israel War.

Since 1948 the aim of the Iraqi Army has been to modernize its forces. This modernization program has been predicated upon British assistance in training; and, since 1955, upon the modern materiel obtained through the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP).

In anticipation of hostilities with Israel on the Jordanian front during the Suez-Sinai crisis of October and November in 1956, the Iraqi Army sent one reinforced infantry brigade to Jordan and maintained a line of communication from Baghdad along the oil pipeline to the area of encampment. These troops did not become involved in any combat action and withdrew at the request of the Jordanian Government in December 1956.

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2. Defense organization

Under the Constitution of 1925, the King is the Commander in Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Government control of the forces, however, is exercised by the Prime Minister through the Minister of Defense, with the Chief of the Army General Staff as the Defense Minister's military adviser (FIGURE 26).

Although little is known of the functions and composition of the Supreme Defense Council, its membership presumably includes the King, the Crown Prince, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the Army General Staff. Apparently it establishes broad military policies but at times also makes what appears to be minor decisions, such as the selection of the officers to attend foreign military schools.

There is also a Defense Council, an advisory board to the Ministry of Defense, which theoretically also coordinates the work of the high command. The Council has not convened for several years, however, and is apparently of little importance. It has as permanent members the Chief of the Army General Staff, who functions as its president, the deputy chiefs of staff, and the Air Officer Commanding (AOC), RIAF. Divisional commanders, directors of staff sections, the Accountant General, and the Advocate General may be called as advisory members.

The Chief of the Army General Staff is subordinate to the Minister of Defense. He commands the army and is the Iraqi permanent representative on the Baghdad Pact Military Committee. The RIAF is integrated into the army at division level and, accordingly, has no high-level position within the Defense Ministry. Policy and interservice coordination are effected by the Minister of Defense and Chief of the Army General Staff whose decisions are transmitted directly to the Air Officer Commanding (AOC), RIAF.

The only other organized force is the Iraqi Police Force, with a personnel strength of about

29,000. Only about 4,000 of this number, however, could be counted as effective support for the army. The responsibility of the police force is vested in the Director General of Police, who is answerable directly to the Minister of Interior.

3. Military manpower and morale

a. MANPOWER — Personnel strength of the armed forces (FIGURE 27) has remained nearly constant since 1955. Total available manpower as of 1 January 1957 is estimated as follows:

AGE	TOTAL MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15-19	303,000	180,000
20-24	173,000	100,000
25-29	115,000	60,000
30-34	96,000	50,000
35-39	92,000	30,000
40-44	113,000	40,000
45-49	115,000	30,000
15-49	1,007,000	490,000

The average number reaching military age annually is about 50,000.

Iraqi personnel show very little mechanical aptitude, and training policies and procedures are affected by this limitation. Some Iraqi pilots, for example, particularly new ones, have shown a tendency to display recklessness and poor judgment with their newly acquired "proficiency" in operating aircraft. In situations requiring a quick change in a course of action, the Iraqi has a tendency to react either too slowly or too quickly. He has not developed the ability to take well-considered, coordinated, and prompt action.

b. MORALE — The morale of army enlisted men is higher than would normally be expected. For unmarried men whose civilian existence would be rather miserable, the army, however restrictive, provides a higher standard of living. Morale among young company-grade officers is high; their spirit is good and their devotion to duty excellent. Among field-grade officers morale drops off




FIGURE 26. DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

FIGURE 27. PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF THE ARMED FORCES

DATE	ARMY	RIAF	RIVER FORCE*	TOTAL
1952	41,000	1,200	183	42,200
1953	41,000	1,400	194	42,400
1954	41,000	1,300	193	42,300
1955**	53,000	2,300	193	55,300
1956	53,000	2,700	193	55,700
1957	53,000	2,700	193	55,700

* The river force strength is not reflected in the total as it is included in that of the army.

** The difference in military strength represents a change in estimates based upon more accurate information from Iraqi Army sources.

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to some extent because promotions and assignment opportunities are limited. Duty with the river force is considered desirable, and morale is high.

RIAF morale, although subject to frequent fluctuations, is considered generally poor. It seems to be extremely sensitive to political changes in the country. Generally, the morale of the officers is lower than that of airmen because of limited opportunity for advancement, lack of prestige, and insecurity. Several capable officers have resigned in the past because of these factors. These unfavorable conditions apply more to the senior officers than to the junior officers and enlisted personnel in the RIAF. The Iraqi Government has made repeated efforts to improve the air force situation but without success.

Any physically fit civilian or any conscript at any stage in his duty may volunteer for the regular army for periods of from two to ten years depending on the branch. At the completion of a conscript's initial three-month basic training he may indicate his intention to buy out of the service for 100 Dinars (US\$280.00). The reason given for this relief from service is that the normal two-year tour would impose a severe hardship on many men supporting large families.

4. Strength trends

The Iraqi Army reportedly plans to continue increasing its strength at least to the extent of filling all understrength units. Because of the extreme shortage of qualified personnel, it is not likely that the present strength of the RIAF will be exceeded to any appreciable extent; nor is it likely that the full extent of the demands of the army for an expanded RIAF will be fulfilled by 1960.

5. Strategy

Iraqi military strategy is basically defensive and relies on strong allies for immediate support in the event of hostilities against a major power. The position of Iraq on one of the major routes of approach from the Soviet Union through Iran to the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal makes it the logical route for an enemy invasion, utilizing passes in the northwestern part of the Zagros Mountains of Iran. Present strategy, formulated with British guidance, calls for demolition of the transportation facilities in the vicinity of two passes along the northeastern Iraqi-Iranian border and a mobile defense of the major route from Iran. The objective of these plans is to delay any attack from the north as long as possible until assistance is rendered by other powers, principally the other members of the Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and the United Kingdom; for discussion of Pact see SECTION 15).

Iraqi military plans probably also envisage providing support to Jordan in the event of an Israeli attack or to maintain the Jordanian King's internal position. Logistical problems and internal security commitments make it doubtful, however, that more than one division could be supported outside the country over an extended period of time.

6. Economic support

Iraq is easily capable of supporting its present armed forces in time of peace and of feeding and clothing them from indigenous production in time of war. However, as the country produces no iron, has no heavy industry, nor, in fact, a significant industrial complex, it is dependent upon foreign sources for all military materiel except small-arms ammunition, the components of which are imported. U.S. MAP support and, to a lesser extent, purchases abroad, principally from the United Kingdom, provide the required materiel. Aviation fuel, which also must be imported, comes from Iran. In peacetime, this situation creates no support problem, as Iraqi revenues from its petroleum production provide ample foreign exchange for any requirements. Should a situation arise, however, in which Iraq could not sell its oil abroad or import munitions, support of its armed forces would depend upon its munitions reserves and materiel stockpiles. Iraq is presently engaged in a well-administered development program (initial phase due for completion 1960-61), which, when achieved, will materially strengthen the economic potential of the country for the support of its armed forces.

There are no facilities for ship construction, but minor repair work and spare parts are provided by the Basra Port Directorate.

7. Military budget

The Ministry of Defense submits an annual military budget to Parliament, which has final authority over all financial affairs of the armed forces. The budget is based upon estimates of expenditures of salaries, allowances, and services and includes most of the funds used by the armed forces (FIGURE 28). Generally, the military budget has been approximately 30% of the total budget of the country. The Accountant General, as the chief fiscal officer of the armed forces, supervises the allocation of military revenues.

An additional source of funds for military purposes is the Iraqi Development Board, which receives the total oil revenues derived from royalties paid by foreign oil interests in the Iraqi Petroleum Company; 30% of this money may be used for current government expenditures. From this 30%, the armed forces may receive grants to sup-

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Tab 1

Army	FEMA	NSA
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DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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FIGURE 28. MILITARY BUDGET
(In U.S. dollars)

YEAR*	ARMY	RIAF	RIVER FORCE**	TOTAL
1951-52....	20,748,513	1,490,974	n a	22,239,487
1952-53....	36,888,938	1,621,634	n a	38,510,572
1953-54....	42,371,802	2,132,000	137,316	44,503,802
1954-55....	45,576,000	2,362,800	123,200	47,938,800
1955-56....	38,222,100	3,620,400	122,640	41,842,500
1956-57....	46,582,952	4,600,000	122,640	51,182,952
1957-58....	54,463,420	5,821,580	n a	60,285,000

NOTE The U.S. dollar amounts are computed on the basis of the official exchange rate (1 Dinar = US\$2.80).

* The Iraqi fiscal year ends on 31 March.

** The river force budget is not reflected in the total as it is included in that of the army.

plement the military allocation from the general budget. This money is not shown in the regular budget figures. The armed forces grants are generally given for special armament procurement and construction projects. So far, Development Board funds have been judiciously administered and have not become a political device to assert control over the armed forces.

The 1957 budget, as passed, has no provision for the purchase of new aircraft. A supplementary appropriation is expected to be granted to pay for the planned procurement of new Hawker Hunter aircraft some time during fiscal year 1957-58. The acquisition of these aircraft will supplement the five Mark VI Hawker Hunter jets recently received from the British as a gift.

B. Army

1. General

The principal missions of the Iraqi Army are defense of the country against external attack and maintenance of internal security. Even though Iraq possesses a sizable police force, the army is necessary to augment that force for internal security purposes. The army is capable of maintaining internal security and probably could successfully resist invasion by any one of its Arab neighbors or Iran. Against invasion by a major power, the army could offer no more than minor harassing action. The army is incapable of supplying and supporting more than one infantry division outside of Iraq without loss of the capability to maintain internal security.

The capabilities of the Iraqi Army are also limited by a shortage of well-trained and efficient officers, its small size, the low level of general and technical education, lack of combat experience, and need of an adequate reserve and mobilization system.

2. Organization

The Iraqi Army is patterned closely after the organization used by the United Kingdom. It is organized into combat arms and service branches. The combat branches of the Iraqi Army, known as Arms, consist of the following: Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers, Armored Force, Corps of Signals, Paratroops, and the RIAF. The service branches of the Iraqi Army, known as the Services, consist of the following: Transportation, Medical, Military Police, Veterinary, Ordnance, and Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. These components of the Iraqi Army correspond to similar elements in the British Army.

The Iraqi General Staff is also patterned after that of the British Army. There is no effective headquarters interposed between the General Staff and the combat units and, as a result, all coordination between the divisions and the air force must be effected by the General Staff. This deficiency is to be eliminated by the recently established Field Force Headquarters (equivalent to U.S. Corps Headquarters), which has been activated but is not yet operational.

3. Strength, composition, and disposition

The Iraqi Army, with an estimated strength of 53,000, is organized into a General Headquarters (GHQ), three infantry divisions, one armored division (newly activated, not yet fully operational, and understrength), and various minor GHQ units, all of which are stationed in Baghdad.

Artillery antiaircraft is completely controlled by the Iraqi Army. All weapons are assigned to army divisions in the field or to the Ministry of Defense for the protection of Baghdad. The weapons are obsolete for use against jet aircraft, lack modern fire control, and are inadequately supplied with ammunition.

The 1st Infantry Division is stationed southeast of Baghdad; the 2d Infantry Division is stationed in the north, generally around Kirkūk; and the 3d Division is stationed east of and near Baghdad. Those elements of the armored units which are operational are all in Baghdad.

4. Training

The quality of training in the Iraqi Army ranges between poor and fair, mainly because of a shortage of well-trained Iraqi officers. The whole system of training and tactics is based on that of the British Army. The British Military Mission was in Iraq from 1921 to 1948. Beginning in 1951 and continuing to the present, numerous British Loan Personnel have given training assistance to the army. British military handbooks have been translated into Arabic and are used throughout the army.

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Tab 1

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Under the military defense agreement between the United States and Iraq and a memorandum of understanding between the United States and the United Kingdom, training activities of the U.S. MAAG in Iraq are limited to those activities directly related to the operation and maintenance of U.S. materiel furnished under MAP, while the remainder of the training assistance of the Iraqi Army are under the British. A modification of this arrangement may be made, however, in the future. The Iraqi Army has sent a limited number of army personnel to U.S. service schools. The output has not yet been sufficient to produce an effective nucleus of instructors to conduct training in U.S. equipment.

Most recruits are illiterate; and training requires considerable time to provide for instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic. The average soldier is inured to hardship, can subsist on little food, and demonstrates a natural understanding of terrain. However, the naturally individualistic Arab resists strict discipline, is prone to make rash moves to satisfy his cravings for glory, and is quick to desert a cause that is not readily seen to be successful. Basic recruits receive their initial training in training battalions of the division to which they are assigned. Artillery recruits are trained in a training battalion under the Director of Artillery. Schools are organized on the British system, but there continues to be a serious deficiency in adequate instructor personnel, training aids, and classroom facilities.

Officer candidates are trained at the Royal Military College, near Baghdad. Advanced specialized training for officers is given in the various branch schools and, to a limited extent, in service schools in the United States and England. Staff training is given principally at the Iraqi Staff College and also at the British Staff College in Camberley, England.

5. Logistics

The supply services of the Iraqi Army are modeled after those of the British Army; because of lack of equipment and of skilled technicians, however, the Iraqi supply system bears little resemblance to the model. The army has no facilities for the development, design, manufacture, or testing of major items of materiel. In recent years, however, it has been attempting to lessen dependence upon foreign procurement by increasing local production of some quartermaster and ordnance items.

The system of recovery and repair of vehicles and equipment is patterned after that of the British Army. Failure on the part of the Iraqi Army school system to produce the required number of

drivers and mechanics is adversely affecting the Iraqi ability to perform organization, field, and base maintenance.

Evacuation of equipment is handled by the recovery and repair system. Personnel evacuation is handled by the Medical Corps according to British concepts. However, duty in the Medical Service is unpopular with both Iraqi officers and men because of lack of prestige; and, consequently, its efficiency is impaired.

Most army equipment must be imported. Since British tables of organization and equipment are followed, the United Kingdom has been the chief source of weapons and equipment, although an increasing amount of engineer and signal equipment and general-purpose truck transport is being purchased from the United States. In addition, the Iraqi Army is being furnished some U.S. artillery, light tanks, jeep-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles, mortars, and radios through the U.S. MAP. British equipment is procured either by direct purchase by the Iraqi Government or through the offshore procurement program of U.S. MAP.

The army relies on local contractors to supply the various units with rations at the times and places specified. They usually do not go beyond the forward maintenance area of a division. If contractors fail to supply the various units with rations, or if the army needs extra rations, local purchasing committees are selected to make purchases. There have been no deficiencies in storage facilities in Iraq. Any accelerated increase in materiel shipments through the U.S. MAP would, however, create storage problems. New storage facilities have been constructed in the past in each case when required.

The Palestine War showed that logistic support was the major weakness of the Iraqi Army. Since then, Iraq has been trying to improve the capabilities of its military transport and supply; any large-scale movement or operation, however, still requires extensive use of civilian vehicles. The fact that the railroad from Basra to Baghdad and Kirkuk is narrow gage and the line to Mosul from Baghdad is standard gage creates a transport problem in that it necessitates transfer at Baghdad of any military supplies shipped from Basra or Kirkuk by rail to the northwestern part of Iraq.

6. River force

Iraq has no navy, and its river force is an integral part of the Iraqi Army. The river force was established in 1937 and consists of 4 river gunboats (PR), 1 yacht (PY), and 193 men. All five vessels are in very good condition and are maintained in an operational status. No additional ships are

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Tab	1
Army	FEMA
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DOJ	NSC
DSWA	NRC
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	STATE
	SENATE
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planned. The river force is adequate to perform its mission of assisting the army in maintaining internal security and preserving order in the tribal areas bordering on the rivers of Iraq. Movement over swamp-like inundated areas is not feasible for army units, but these trouble areas are easily accessible to the river force.

The river force is manned wholly by army personnel. Officers are assigned for a period of two years, and enlisted men serve indefinite periods. Artillery personnel are especially desired by the river force because of their gunnery experience, and assignment to the river force is considered to be preferential duty. At the present time, infantry and signal corps personnel are also assigned in limited numbers. Officers selected for duty with the river force are sent to the United Kingdom for a period of six months to two years for specialized naval training. In addition to regular army training, naval training of enlisted men consists of drills and inspections ashore, followed by short on-board familiarization periods.

C. Air force

1. General

The RIAF is a small, fairly well-equipped unit. It has been assigned a multiple role of supporting the army in defense of the country against external aggression and aiding in the maintenance of internal security.

The capability of the RIAF to provide an effective air defense of Iraq against Syria and Iran is marginal; against the Saudi Arabian and Jordanian Air Forces, good; and nonexistent against either the Turkish or the Soviet Air Forces. The RIAF's capability of furnishing effective close air support to the ground forces is considered to be fair. The RIAF has no paratroop capability as the transports in the RIAF aircraft inventory are not suited to paratroop operations.

The RIAF is handicapped by its inadequate maintenance system; poor morale; poorly managed training system, which is hampered by a lack of qualified instructors; and its inadequate supply reserve. The most glaring deficiency, however, is the lack of delegation of authority.

The maintenance system of the RIAF is inadequate to meet its needs, and equipment on hand is not adequate to perform the work required. All aircraft engines due for major overhaul are shipped to England. The fact that the RIAF can maintain any aircraft in a flyable condition is largely the result of a British RAF advisory and supervisory mission in Iraq.

2. Organization

The Air Officer Commanding (AOC), by long-standing custom, originates and establishes such policy as is permitted him by his senior army commanders; few if any of these policy decisions are delegated to his staff. The operational command of the peacetime air force is vested in the Commander of the Tactical Group. All operational elements of the RIAF are subordinate to this commander. By precedent, the Commanding Officer of the Air Tactical Group is the second-ranking officer in the RIAF, normally moving to the AOC position when it is vacated. The staff officers act as specialized administrative aids to the AOC rather than as general staff officers.

The RIAF is presently attempting to develop a staff concept utilizing the Air Officer Commanding as a Chief of Staff and his four directorates (administration, training, operations, and logistics) as staff sections. Until such time as planning activities are expanded and the establishment of policy is in fact delegated, the air staff will exist in name only.

3. Strength, composition, and disposition

The RIAF has an aircraft strength of 159 aircraft and an approximate personnel strength of 280 officers and 2,420 enlisted men; of the 280 officers, about 95 are trained pilots. In addition, about 190 cadets are in pilot training.

The equipment currently available to the RIAF consists of 5 newly received Hawker Hunter Mark VI jet fighters and 28 obsolete jet fighters (14 FB-1 Venom, 14 MK 51/52 Vampire), 39 piston fighter bombers (FB-1 Fury's), 13 transport aircraft, and 74 miscellaneous trainer and liaison-type aircraft. Tactical units consist of three squadrons of Fury fighter-bombers (piston), one squadron of Vampire fighter-bombers, and one squadron of Venom fighter-bombers. In addition, there are two support squadrons, one of which is a communications and transport squadron; the other, liaison. Although some radar equipment was purchased from the British in 1955, it has never been assembled and is rapidly deteriorating in storage.

The RIAF jet fighter-bombers are based at Habaniya Airfield and the piston fighter-bombers at Shaibah Airfield. Both the transport and liaison squadrons are based at Baghdad.

4. Training

RIAF training is patterned after that of the RIAF training system; British instructors are employed, as are British manuals and curriculums. Service schools, excepting the flight training college and unit-level schools, fall under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense and their policies

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Tab 1

ARMY	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
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DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
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are established by the General Staff. The flight training college is under the supervision of the AOC and the unit-level schools are supervised by unit commanders. The principal operational training includes navigation, formation, and high-altitude flying, as well as air-to-ground gunnery. RIAF training is poorly managed by the Iraqis and is hampered by a lack of qualified Iraqi instructors and supervisors. Furthermore, a shortage of funds and spare parts has made it mandatory to keep all types of training and operations to a minimum.

Normally, each year the RIAF and the Iraqi Army engage in a maneuver. These maneuvers are almost completely directed by RAF personnel and are fairly well executed.

The RIAF has access to two excellent bombing and gunnery ranges located at Habbaniya and Shaibah Airfields, but a shortage of ammunition, rockets, and bombs has held this phase of training to a bare minimum. All training in the past has been geared to tactical support of the army. No consideration is given to a strategic air offensive force. Little attention is given to the most rudimentary elements of air-to-air training such as aerial gunnery, or coordination between air elements and ground radar units coupled for air defense. Technical training for the RIAF is conducted at Rashid Airfield, Baghdad. The British also train a few selected personnel at RAF schools in England.

5. Logistics

Logistic support for the RIAF is the joint responsibility of the Iraqi Army and the RIAF under the Minister of Defense and is centralized at Rashid Airfield. Logistic support constitutes a major problem for extensive military air operations in Iraq. The RIAF lacks an adequate supply reserve and would be unable to support sustained air operations unless considerable outside aid were received shortly after the outbreak of hostilities.

Procurement for the RIAF usually consists of an allocation of money by the Iraqi Army to the RIAF to be used for the purchase of certain equipment and munitions. Some RIAF materiel is procured through the British RAF by exchange of credits against oil royalties owned by the British, who sell surplus materiel to Iraq. All transactions are closely monitored by the government. Although most RIAF aircraft have in the past been procured from the United Kingdom, there recently has been interest in procurement from U.S. sources.

The main bulk fuel storage point in Iraq is Basra. Bulk fuel storage facilities are also available in Baghdad, from which the Baghdad and Habbaniya Airfield complexes are resupplied. Resupply of fuel to all points north of Baghdad is accomplished by truck because of the difference in rail gage. On-base tank fuel storage facilities are presently available at five airfields: Habbaniya, Baghdad West, Basra, Shaibah, and K-1.

6. Air facilities

Iraqi airfield potential is strategically important. Although few of the airfields approach USAF standards for support of sustained military air operations, the Iraqi airfield system as a whole currently has a higher operational support capability than that of any of the surrounding countries except Turkey. Twenty of a total of twenty-six air facilities are in regular use, and nine of these are capable of supporting at least limited jet fighter operations; one additional airfield could support jet fighters on an emergency basis. Seven of these nine airfields are also capable of supporting C-119 or heavier transports; three (Baghdad West, Habbaniya (Plateau), and Rashid) could probably accommodate jet light bombers in an emergency. A number of the minor airfields serving the oil industry are suitable for C-47 type transport and piston-engine fighter use, are strategically located, and have potential significance for logistic support and reconnaissance purposes.

The six military air bases of Habbaniya, Habbaniya (Plateau), Kirkuk Military, Mosul, Rashid, and Shaibah, are included in the RIAF development program for improvement of jet fighter capability.

D. Comments on principal sources

The major sources of information are reports by official U.S. observers. The information is considered to be reliable and accurate. Detailed information is lacking on the activities of the Supreme Defense Council and the Defense Council. Current information is lacking on the quantity and adequacy of supplies on hand and reserves of naval ammunition, spare parts, and fuel oil. Additional collection efforts will be required to keep information up to date as the Iraqi military establishment continues to progress with materiel received through the U.S. Military Aid Program.

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Tab 1

ARMY	FEMA	NSA
CL	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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A. General

1. Geodetic surveys

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revision photography was flown by the U.S. Air Force in 1943-44 and covers 70% of the country; the remainder comprises RAF, U.S. Navy, captured German, and private-contract photography that covers scattered areas throughout Iraq.

Additional aerial photography for Iraq is known to exist but is not available in the United States. For some of this photography the dates, scales, or extent of coverage are unknown. The most extensive is believed to be RAF (Middle East Command) photography that covers 15% of the country and photography flown by private contract in 1947-54 for 10% of the Area. Some of the unavailable photography was flown by the Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) and by other private concerns; the coverage is generally limited to small areas.

C. Maps and charts

1. Topographic maps

Topographic mapping of Iraq has been carried out chiefly by agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States, and by Survey of India units under British jurisdiction from 1914 to 1941. Most of the mapping, including the original survey work, was British; and much of the subsequent mapping has been based on British sources. British agencies currently engaged in mapping programs of the country include the Middle East Land Forces (MELF) and the Directorate Survey, War Office and Air Ministry (GSGS). The U.S. Army Map Service (AMS) and the Iraqi Directorate General of Surveys, which is under the direction of the Ministry of Agriculture, are the other principal agencies now producing topographic maps of Iraq.

The best available topographic coverage is at scales of 1:10,000-1:50,000, 1:100,000, 1:250,000, 1:253,440, 1:500,000, and 1:1,000,000. All but a small part of this coverage requires revision of culture detail.

Only about one-fourth of Iraq is covered by maps at scales larger than 1:75,000, and few of these are accurate. The coverage at scales larger than 1:75,000 comprises series at 1:10,000 through 1:50,000 produced by British, Iraqi, and commercial agencies. Two 1:10,000 series prepared by commercial firms cover small areas in the northern and northeastern part of the country, and an Arabic-script Iraqi 1:20,000 series provides the best detail for part of central and southeastern Iraq. The remainder of the coverage comprises English-language sheets and includes British 1:25,000 maps (IDR 9005, GSGS 8037) for widely scattered areas and three 1:50,000 series for 1) the central and southern part of the country (MDR 685, GSGS 8035), 2) the extreme northeastern and south-

eastern areas (PID 9004, GSGS 8036), and 3) the Iraq-Turkey boundary area (GSGS 3963). Not all of the coverage at these scales is obtainable in quantity, and some of the sheets are in Arabic script or are at nonstandard U.S. military scales. (Standard U.S. military scales are 1:25,000, 1:50,000, 1:100,000, 1:200,000, 1:250,000, 1:500,000, and 1:1,000,000.) On many of the sheets drainage and relief features are poorly portrayed, and none of the sheets has the standard Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid. On all of the coverage except a 1:10,000 series, culture detail requires revision.

In the 1:75,000 through 1:600,000 scale range, complete coverage of Iraq is provided by a combination of series at 1:100,000, 1:250,000, 1:253,440, and 1:500,000. Northern and central Iraq and the southeastern part of the country are covered by a British 1:100,000 series (GSGS 4644), AMS 1:250,000 sheets (K502), and British 1:253,440 coverage (GSGS 3919, distributed as AMS K501). The desert area of southern Iraq is covered by *USAF Aeronautical Approach Charts* at 1:250,000 and British 1:500,000 sheets (GSGS 3954, distributed as AMS K441). All of these sheets are in English and are obtainable in quantity, but only a few of the British 1:100,000 and half of the AMS 1:250,000 sheets meet accuracy requirements. Culture detail is not up to date; relief and some drainage and culture features are inadequately portrayed on the coverage for the southern desert areas.

The best topographic coverage for Iraq at scales smaller than 1:600,000 is provided by the *World (Asia)* 1:1,000,000 series (GSGS 2555 and AMS 1301), which is obtainable in quantity. In order to obtain the most recent and reliable coverage, individual sheets from the two authorities must be selected. None of these 1:1,000,000 sheets meet the standards of accuracy for maps at this scale, and all culture detail requires revision. The 1:1,000,000 scale is the largest at which complete uniform-scale coverage is available for Iraq.

2. Specialized physical and terrain-evaluation maps

Specialized physical and terrain-evaluation maps of Iraq generally consist of medium- and small-scale maps of differing reliability that cover parts of the country and several small-scale maps that provide complete areal coverage but are extremely generalized. Except for one 1955 geologic map at 1:300,000 that covers southwestern and part of western Iraq and a 1950 lithology map included in SECTION 63 of NIS 30, all the available maps range in date from 1920 to 1949. The majority were published during or before World War II.

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Tab 1

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DSWA	NRC	USMC

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Native Iraqi mapping in this field has been limited, and most of the results are of little use except to mining or water-supply specialists. The most useful maps of Iraq have been published by Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. During World War II, German military-geology units prepared geologic, water-supply, terrain-evaluation maps of Iraq; British Army groups also issued terrain-evaluation maps during this period. Specialized physical and terrain-evaluation maps published by the United States include those in SECTION 24 of NIS 28-31, dated 1949. These maps provide complete coverage for Iraq at 1:2,000,000 for the following subjects: soil, vegetation, water supply, military aspects of relief, and suitability for construction of roads, airfields, and underground installations. Most of the maps were based on existing sources rather than on original field work; their reliability ranges from poor to good.

Detailed geologic maps of most of Iraq are critically lacking. Geologic maps prepared by the Iraq Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries are generally not available to users outside the company. Only a small area in the vicinity of Baghdad is covered by any known soil map based on field surveys. Vegetation maps are at small scale and highly generalized, except for three medium-scale sheets that show the forests of the mountainous provinces of northeastern Iraq. Water-supply maps are among the best of the specialized physical and terrain-evaluation maps of Iraq in both detail and extent of coverage, but coverage at scales larger than 1:200,000 is available for only a few areas.

No detailed military-geology maps of Iraq are available. Small-scale coverage is fairly complete, but its quality is spotty. Adequate medium- and large-scale cross-country-movement maps are lacking. The only usable ones are the British "going" maps at 1:500,000, which cover limited areas and are in many places very generalized.

3. Aeronautical charts

Most of the available aeronautical charts for Iraq have been published by the United States and the United Kingdom. Two series of air charts issued by the German *Generalstab des Heeres* (General Staff of the Army) cover the Area at 1:500,000 and 1:2,000,000, but they were produced under wartime conditions and are obsolete.

Complete coverage is available in standard navigation series at 1:1,000,000 and 1:500,000; approximately 90% of the Area is also covered by charts of the 1:250,000 series. Plotting and planning series of U.S. and British origin provide complete coverage for Iraq in a variety of scales and formats. Significant advances in military aviation

capabilities and charting concepts have resulted in the design and publication of new-type, small-scale charts. Among these are the *USAF Jet Navigation Charts* at 1:2,000,000, the U.S. Navy V-30 series at 1:2,188,800, and the *USAF Minimal Flight Planning Charts* at 1:10,000,000.

Some of the small-scale series that cover the NIS Area have been discontinued, and some charts of these series may no longer be available for distribution.

Radio-facility charts and other miscellaneous air charts for Iraq are published periodically by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, the British Royal Air Force, and domestic and foreign commercial airlines.

Target coverage for Iraq was virtually nonexistent until recently, when some target charts prepared as a part of the Air Target Materials Program became available.

4. Charts of ocean, port, and shore features

A combination of eight British Admiralty (B.A.) and U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office (H.O.) charts provide complete hydrographic coverage of Iraqi waters at various scales. Sailing and general charts cover the Persian Gulf approaches to Iraq at 1:1,000,000 and 1:350,000. Khawr 'Abd Allāh and the immediate approaches to the Shatt al Arab are charted at 1:100,000, and a series of charts at 1:25,500 cover the Shatt al Arab to a point about 12 miles north of Basra. The principal and secondary ports of Basra and Al Fāw are charted at 1:12,500 and 1:25,000, respectively. The minor port of Umm Qasr is not covered at a scale larger than 1:100,000.

The charts selected for Iraq, although based on the latest information available, are not reliable. Maintenance of the charts of the Shatt al Arab is difficult because of the constant silting and dredging operations, with consequent changes in channels, depths, and aids to navigation. Most of the current charts are based on the Naharwān datum, but those covering the river between Abadan and Basra require a correction of +5.4" in latitude and -10.8" in longitude.

Plans showing harbor facilities reflecting port capacities for the principal port of Basra are contained in SECTION 35 of NIS 30, dated 1949, and in a 1956 publication of the British Joint Intelligence Bureau.

Oceanographic charts covering the waters of Iraq have been produced chiefly by the British Admiralty, the British Meteorological Office of the Air Ministry, the *Deutsche Seewarte* (German Naval Observatory), and the U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office (USNHO).

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Tab 1

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CIA	FBI	OSD
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DIA	NASA	SENATE
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DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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Most of the available oceanographic charts cover the entire Persian Gulf; with few exceptions they are drawn at small scales and give only very general information. Their reliability is somewhat questionable because of the scarcity of data within 30,000 yards of the shore. The most recent charts giving information for Iraq on tidal currents, bottom sediments, bathymetry, and biological fouling are those at 1:583,000 included in the *U.S. Hydrographic-Oceanographic Data Sheet: Abadan Approach, Iran* (HODS No. 0040-0028). Some of the charts from *Submarine Geology and Oceanography of the Persian Gulf* (H.O. Pub. 750) that were formerly considered to be accurate should now be used with caution. This publication is no longer issued by USNHO because data made available since 1950 render much of the information obsolete.

The oceanographic charts currently being prepared by USNHO for SECTION 22 of NIS 30 probably will supersede most of the charts now available.

5. Climatic maps

Climatic maps of Iraq are sufficient to give a general idea of the climate but, because of the sparsity of the station network, do not present the detail desirable for planning many military operations.

Maps of most of the common climatic elements, such as temperature, precipitation, wind, cloudiness, and visibility, are available. The best source of climatic maps is SECTION 23 of NIS 28-31; the Iraq portion of this Section is currently being revised. Other recommended sources of climatic maps include *Climate of Southwestern Asia*, a 1943 U.S. Army Air Force publication, and the *Climatological Atlas for Iraq*, prepared in 1945 by the Iraq Meteorological Service. Maps in these two sources range in scale from 1:5,000,000 to 1:25,000,000.

The most serious deficiency is the lack of maps presenting the more specialized meteorological elements (such as ceiling heights and visibilities) and combinations of these elements.

6. Maps and plans of urban areas

Town-plan coverage is available for 35 of the 38 principal urban areas of Iraq designated in SECTION 25 of NIS 28-31 and for 6 additional urban areas. No coverage is available for Al Kūt, Ash Sharqāt, and Tūz Khurmātū (designated in SECTION 25 as Kūt Al Imāra, Qal'a Sharqāt, and Tuz Khurmatli, respectively).

The selected coverage, most of which was published by the Iraqi Directorate General of Surveys, and the Municipal Planning Bureau of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior varies from good to poor in reliability. It ranges in date from 1919 to 1956 and in scale from 1:500 to 1:25,000. Much of the

coverage comprises Arabic-script plans that have become available since 1951. Only a few plans show relief, have graticule and grid information, or contain a legend. For the four key strategic urban areas of Baghdad, Basra, Kirkūk, and Mosul, however, English-language plans of recent date and good reliability are available.

7. Railroad, road, waterway, and pipeline maps

A transportation map of the Near East at 1:4,000,000 that was revised by AMS in 1956 provides over-all one-sheet coverage of fair reliability for railroads, roads, and waterways.

Railroad data of good to fair reliability are presented on available maps for Iraq. Special railroad maps ranging in scale from 1:2,400 to 1:2,534,400 afford the most recent information on gage, stations, distances between stations, and number of tracks. Topographic maps at 1:25,000 to 1:500,000 provide the most detailed information available for railroad bridges, tunnels, gage, number of tracks, and alinement.

Maps showing road information vary from good to fair in reliability. The most recent classification data are provided by a road map at 1:2,000,000 published in 1955. Topographic maps at 1:25,000 to 1:500,000 furnish alinement details and additional classification data.

Information of good reliability on navigability of Iraqi inland waterways is shown on a 1954 map at 1:2,450,000 included in SECTION 33 of NIS 30. British Admiralty hydrographic charts provide complete inland-waterway coverage of good reliability for the Shatt al Arab.

Available pipeline maps of good reliability range in scale from 1:253,440 to 1:4,600,000 and in date from 1953 to 1957. A 1954 Iraq Petroleum Company map at 1:750,000 shows the 12", 16", and 30" pipeline routes from Kirkūk west to Syria. A 1953 map at 1:4,000,000 shows oil concessions, oilfields, exploratory wells, refineries, pipelines, pump stations, and concession boundaries. A 1957 map at 1:2,600,000 published by Orchard Lisle Company shows pipelines, producing areas, oil and gas fields, drilling locations, refineries, pump stations, and proposed lines.

8. Telecommunication and postal maps

Telecommunication map coverage of Iraq is considered good, and the maps include fairly comprehensive data on all phases of the system. The best maps were prepared by the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Agency for inclusion in *Signal Technical Intelligence Study—Iraq*, April 1956, and represent compilations of all available intelligence data as of the date prepared. One of these maps, which provides the best overall telecommunication in-

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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RG 263

Box 155

Tab 1

Army	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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formation available as of April 1956, includes both Government and petroleum-company wire and radio facilities. This map is supplemented by two detailed maps showing wire communication facilities (1955) and radio stations (1956), respectively. The other two maps, dated 1953, include the wire and radio facilities operated by the Iraq Petroleum Company. Although the maps are not entirely current, they show the basic telecommunication system and are considered fairly accurate.

No recent postal maps of Iraq are available. The Iraqi Directorate General of Posts and Telegraphs maintains a current map which includes post offices, but has not made copies available to the U.S. Government.

9. Sociological, political, and economic maps

Sociological, political, and economic maps are available in limited numbers and vary widely in subject coverage and quality. They have been prepared largely by Iraqi, British, and U.S. sources.

Many of the special-purpose maps published in recent years have been produced by U.S. companies under contract to the Development Board, by the Iraqi Directorate General of Surveys for other agencies of the Iraqi Government, or in connection with the NIS Program. Although partially out of date, the largest single collection of sociological, economic, and political maps of Iraq is found in the published Sections of the NIS. A limited number of special-subject maps of this type have also appeared in United Nations, German, French, and Soviet publications.

Sociological mapping has concentrated on population distribution and racial or religious groupings. The most recent maps of the settled population are based on the census of 1947; the best tribal maps available draw heavily on sources dating back to 1938. Several maps relating to disease and health facilities have been produced since 1950. Some of the maps of disease and population compiled by the Iraqi Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior have not been made available to the U.S. Government.

Political maps deal entirely with international and internal boundaries. Although large sectors of the international boundaries of Iraq have not been demarcated, the corresponding large- and medium-scale map portrayals are adequate for most sectors. Internal administrative boundaries have appeared in an administrative atlas and on a number of official maps recently published in Iraq. Changes in administrative areas which have occurred in 1957 are not reflected in these publications.

Economic mapping has been primarily concerned with agriculture and petroleum. Irrigation projects are mapped in considerable detail, in many instances by U.S. concerns. Coverage of petroleum activity in Iraq is abundant, but few maps provide current information. Water-supply maps dealing with programs to increase the availability of water for human consumption and for agriculture have come from the Government of Iraq and from U.S. concerns, but the Iraqi Ministry of Mines has not made its latest compilations on water supply available to the U.S. Government. General economic and industrial maps produced in Iraq are few in number and are extremely generalized.

10. Special armed-forces maps

Storage installations and military and associated nonmilitary installations for a few areas of strategic importance are shown reliably on annotated editions of *U.S. Target Complex Charts—Series 100* and *U.S. Target Mosaics—Series 25*, dated 1953–56.

11. Terrain models

Plastic relief sheets at 1:250,000 (AMS K502P) cover less than 10% of Iraq. These sheets are based on the K502 series, and detail is identical. Plastic relief sheets at 1:1,000,000 (AMS 1302P) cover 80% of Iraq. These sheets are based on British 1:1,000,000 sheets (GSGS 2555) ranging in date from 1943 to 1948, and all sheets contain out-of-date culture detail.

D. Programs under way or projected

Some U.S. programs under way or projected are not included in the following discussion.

The British and Iraqi Governments are cooperating in a mapping program that will provide accurate up-to-date topographic coverage for parts of Iraq at scales of 1:20,000, 1:25,000, 1:100,000, 1:250,000, 1:500,000, and 1:1,000,000.

The 1:25,000 series (GSGS 4870) will consist of 382 sheets covering northern Iraq. These sheets will be based on a 1:20,000 monochrome series that is being compiled stereophotogrammetrically by Hunting Aero Surveys under contract to the Iraqi Government. The Iraq Survey Department is establishing new control in the area north of Baghdad as a basis for this stereophotogrammetric mapping. The 1:20,000 maps were scheduled for completion in 1956; it is not known whether this schedule was met. The 1:20,000 sheets will be converted by the Middle East Land Forces (MELF) to 1:25,000, and the UTM grid will be added. Road classifications will be based on information obtained by MELF survey parties working in conjunction with the Iraqi Government. The first sheets of this 1:25,000 series are to be available in late 1957.

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RG	263
Box	155
Tab	1
Army	FEMA NSA
CIA	FBI OSD
DEA	HOUSE STATE
DIA	NASA SENATE
DOE	NAVY TREAS
DOJ	NSC USAF
DSWA	NRC USMC

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Additional 1:25,000 mapping in the Euphrates valley is now being done by Hunting Aero Surveys, but the completion date is unknown.

The British Directorate Survey, War Office and Air Ministry, is engaged in topographic mapping programs at 1:100,000, 1:250,000, and 1:500,000. New 1:100,000 sheets (GSGS 4644) are being produced from aerial photography and field data; preliminary planimetric sheets at 1:100,000 are being revised and contours added. The new 1:100,000 sheets will extend present coverage for northern, central, and eastern Iraq and for the area between the Euphrates River and the Iraq-Jordan boundary. The UTM grid is being added to the present 1:100,000 coverage. This program is scheduled for completion by mid-1959. The Directorate Survey also is reprinting the AMS 1:250,000 series (K502) with name revisions and the addition of the UTM grid. This series will replace corresponding coverage of the GSGS 3919 series at 1:253,440. A *World* 1:500,000 series (GSGS 4830) based on the GSGS 4715 series at 1:500,000, with the same sheet numbering system, is being compiled. New sheets of this series have been published for all of Iraq north of 32°N. Sheets for the remainder of the country are in work and are scheduled for completion in

1957. The series will replace the *Iraq Desert* series (GSGS 3954).

MELF is revising the *International Map of the World* 1:1,000,000 sheets (GSGS 2555) covering all of Iraq. The new sheets will be published as GSGS 4646. Completion date for this program is not known.

The Iraq Petroleum Company is actively engaged in geologic mapping in Iraq, but information concerning the areas involved or the maps being produced is not available.

As a part of the Air Target Materials Program, U.S. military mapping agencies are currently producing target materials covering major air installations and other strategic and tactical industrial and military target complexes.

Oceanographic charts are currently being prepared by the U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office for SECTION 22 of NIS 30. The charts, which will be completed by the end of 1957, will be the most up to date available on the oceanography of the NIS Area, but will not include data for all known oceanographic factors.

It has been reported that the Iraqi Directorate General of Surveys has begun preliminary work on an economic atlas of Iraq.

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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Box 155

Tab 1

ARMY	FEMA	NSA
DEA	FBI	OSD
DIA	HOUSE	STATE
DOE	NASA	SENATE
DOJ	NAVY	TREAS
DSWA	NSC	USAF
	NRC	USMC

NND 011466 -70

SUMMARY MAP LOCATOR FOR IRAQ

	COORDINATES	
	° 'N.	° 'E.
'Abd Allāh, Kwahr (chan).....	29 50	48 20
Al 'Amārah.....	31 50	47 09
Al Bādiyah al Janūbiyah.....	30 30	45 00
Al Bādiyah ash Shamālīyah.....	32 30	41 00
Al Faw.....	29 58	48 29
Al Ḥadīthah.....	34 07	42 23
Al Hindīyah.....	32 32	44 13
Al Kaḥzimīyah.....	33 22	44 20
Al Kut.....	32 30	45 49
Alwand, Nahr (strm).....	34 18	45 11
An Najaf.....	31 59	44 20
Arab, Shatt al (strm).....	31 00	47 29
Ash Shālikīyah.....	33 23	44 22
Ash Sharqāṭ.....	35 27	43 16
Ash Shu 'Aybah.....	30 25	47 38
Bādiyat al Jazīrah.....	35 30	42 30
Baghdad.....	33 21	44 25
Basra.....	30 30	47 47
Dawrah.....	33 49	44 42
Euphrates River.....	31 00	47 25
Great Zab River.....	36 00	43 21
Ḥabbāniyah, Hawr al (lake).....	33 17	43 29
Irbīl.....	36 11	44 01
Karbala'.....	32 36	44 02
Kirkūk.....	35 28	44 28
Kurdistan (regn).....	37 00	44 00
Little Zab River.....	35 12	43 25
Mosul.....	36 20	43 08
Muṭṭīyah.....	30 32	47 48
Panjwīn.....	35 36	45 58
Persian Gulf.....	27 00	51 00
Rawāndūz.....	36 37	44 31
Sāmarrā'.....	34 12	43 52
Sinjār, Jabal (mt).....	36 23	41 52
Tigris River.....	31 00	47 25
Tuz Khurmātū.....	34 53	44 38
Umm Qasr.....	30 02	47 56
Zakhu.....	37 08	42 41
Zubayr.....	31 11	46 07

PRINCIPAL AIRFIELDS

Baghdad West.....	33 19	44 22
Basra.....	30 34	47 46
H-3.....	32 55	39 44
Ḥabbaniya.....	33 22	43 34
Ḥabbaniya (Plateau).....	33 20	43 35
K-1.....	35 31	44 17
Kirkuk Military.....	35 27	44 22
Mosul.....	36 19	43 09
Rashid.....	33 17	44 29
Shaibah.....	30 25	47 38

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Box 155

Tab 1

Army
 CIA
 DEA
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 DSWA
 FEMA
 FBI
 HOUSE
 NASA
 NAVY
 NSC
 NRC
 NSA
 OSD
 STATE
 SENATE
 TREAS
 USAF
 USMC

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AREA BRIEF

LAND:

About 170,000 square miles
Roughly 15% under cultivation or fallow; most of the remainder grassland or desert

PEOPLE:

Population: 6.5 million (estimate); density, about 38 persons per square mile
Ethnic composition: Arabs, 77%; Kurds, 18%; Turkomans, 2%; other, 3%
Religion: Muslim, 95%; Christian, 4%; other, 1%
Literacy: approximately 10%
Sanitation and public health: primitive in many areas but generally improving
Males 15-49: 1,007,000; about 50% fit for military service
About 50,000 reach military age annually

GOVERNMENT:

Constitutional monarchy, cabinet responsible to bicameral parliament
14 provinces under centrally appointed officials
Politics generally controlled by small clique of conservative, pro-Western politicians;
political situation presently stable
All political parties abolished since 1952
Communist Party and front groups actively repressed
Member of UN, Baghdad Pact, Arab League, Arab Collective Security Pact

ECONOMY:

Food: self-sufficient except for tea and sugar
Major industry: crude petroleum (fourth largest producer in Near East)
Electric power: about 85 kwh per capita per year
Exports: crude petroleum, wheat, barley, and dates
Imports: capital goods, sugar, tea, and textiles
Development: 70% of government oil revenue earmarked for economic development

COMMUNICATIONS:

Railroads: 1,060 route miles; about 70% 3'3 3/8" and 30% 4'8 1/2" gage
Highways: 4,309 miles; 35% bituminous or bituminous-treated surface, 65% earth or gravel surface
Inland waterways: Shatt al Arab navigable by maritime traffic for about 80 miles;
Tigris and Euphrates navigable by shallow-draft steamers
Ports: 1 principal, 1 secondary, 1 minor
Airfields: 10 principal, 16 other
Telecommunications: government owned; adequate for needs of country

DEFENSE FORCES:

Personnel: army, about 53,000; air force, 2,700; river force, 193
Ships: 4 gunboats, 1 yacht
Aircraft: 159, of which 33 are jets
Supply: dependent on foreign sources for most military materiel

SUMMARY MAP
IRAQ
~~SECRET~~

FIGURE 29

NND 011466


RG 263

Box 155

Tab 1

Army	FEMA	NSA
IA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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AREA BRIEF

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70% of government oil revenue earmarked for economic development

NND 011466

RG 263

Box 155

Tab 1



Army FEMA NSA
CIA FBI OSD
DEA HOUSE STATE
DIA NASA SENATE
DOE NAVY TREAS
DOJ NSC USAF
DSWA NRC USMC

9% 3'3/4" and 30% 4'8 1/2" gage
ous or bituminous-treated surface, 65% earth or
vailable by maritime traffic for about 80 miles;
shallow-draft steamers
or

ed; adequate for needs of country

ce, 2,700; river force, 193

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RG 263

Box 155

Tab 1


AREA BRIEF

Army FEMA NSA
 CIA FBI OSD
 DEA HOUSE STATE
 DIA NASA SENATE
 DOE NAVY TREAS
 DOJ NSC USAF
 DSWA NRC USMC

fallow; most of the remainder grass

density, about 38 persons per square mile
 Kurds, 18%; Turkomans, 2%; other, 3%

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AI

LAND:

About 170,000 square miles
Roughly 15% under cultivation or for

PEOPLE:

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Imports: capital goods, sugar, tea, a
Development: 70% of government oi

COMMUNICATIONS:

Railroads: 1,060 route miles; about 70
Highways: 4,309 miles; 35% bitumin
gravel surface
Inland waterways: Shatt al Arab na
Tigris and Euphrates navigable by
Ports: 1 principal, 1 secondary, 1 mi
Airfields: 10 principal, 16 other
Telecommunications: government own

DEFENSE FORCES:

Personnel: army, about 53,000; air for
Ships: 4 gunboats, 1 yacht
Aircraft: 159, of which 33 are jets
Supply: dependent on foreign source

SUMM
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FOREIGN NATIONALS

NND 011466

RG 263

Box 155




Tab 1

Army FEMA NSA
CIA FBI OSD
DEA HOUSE STATE
DIA NASA SENATE
DOE NAVY TREAS
DOJ NSC USAF
DSWA NRC USMC

NND 011466 - 75

TERRAIN AND TRANSPORTATION

- International boundary
- ⊕ National capital
- +— Railroad, standard gage
- +— Railroad, narrow gage
- Primary road
- - - Secondary road
- ⋯ Trail or desert track (selected)
- Pipeline
- ✈ Principal airfield
- ⚓ Principal port
- ⚓ Secondary port
- ~ Intermittent stream
- ▨ Intermittent lake
- ▨ Mud flat
- ▨ Sand area
- 4429 Spot height (in feet)



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RG 263

Box 155

Tab 1

Army
CIA
DEA
DIA
DOE
DOJ
DSWA

FEMA
FBI
HOUSE
NASA
NAVY
NSC
NRC

NSA
OSD
STATE
SENATE
TREAS
USAF
USMC

LAND:

About 170,000 square miles
Roughly 15% under cultivation or fall

PEOPLE:

Population: 6.5 million (estimate); dens
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Religion: Muslim, 95%; Christian, 4%;
Literacy: approximately 10%
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Males 15-49: 1,007,000; about 50%
About 50,000 reach military age annu

GOVERNMENT:

Constitutional monarchy, cabinet resp
14 provinces under centrally appointe
Politics generally controlled by small
political situation presently stable
All political parties abolished since 19
Communist Party and front groups acti
Member of UN, Baghdad Pact, Arab L

ECONOMY:



Food: self-sufficient except for tea and
Major industry: crude petroleum (fourth)
Electric power: about 85 kwh per capit
Exports: crude petroleum, wheat, bark
Imports: capital goods, sugar, tea, and
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Highways: 4,309 miles; 35% bituminous
gravel surface
Inland waterways: Shatt al Arab navig
Tigris and Euphrates navigable by sh
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Telecommunications: government own



NND 011466 - 76

Personnel: army, about 53,000; air force
Ships: 4 gunboats, 1 yacht
Aircraft: 159, of which 33 are jets



TERRAIN AND TRANSPORTATION

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| International boundary | Principal airfield |
| National capital | Principal port |
| Railroad, standard gage | Secondary port |
| Railroad, narrow gage | Intermittent stream |
| Primary road | Intermittent lake |
| Secondary road | Mud flat |
| Trail or desert track (selected) | Sand area |
| Pipeline | Spot height (in feet) |



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RG 263

Box 155

Tab 1

Army
 CIA
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 DIA
 DOE
 DOJ
 DSWA

FEMA
 FBI
 HOUSE
 NASA
 NAVY
 NSC
 NRC


NSA
 OSD
 STATE
 SENATE
 TREAS
 USAF
 USMC

NND 011466 - 77 tion or fe

LAND:

PEOPLE:

Population: 6.5 million (estimate); de
Ethnic composition: Arabs, 77%; Ku



NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

NND 011466

RG 263

Box 155

Tab 1



Army	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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Army	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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
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RG 263

Box 155

Tab 1

Army	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC



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
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Box 155

Tab 1

Army	FEMA	NSA
CIA	FBI	OSD
DEA	HOUSE	STATE
DIA	NASA	SENATE
DOE	NAVY	TREAS
DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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


Army
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FEMA
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 STATE
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SAUDI ARABIA



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DSWA

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HOUSE
NASA
NAVY
NSC
NRC

NSA
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STATE
SENATE
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USAF
USMC

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When appropriate, Chapter discussion is amplified by more detailed treatment in one or more of the following Supplements: I Ports and Naval Facilities; II Coasts and Landing Beaches; III Telecommunications; IV Urban Areas; V Petroleum; VI Communism.

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